lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date:   Fri, 11 Dec 2020 10:29:05 -0500
From:   Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
To:     Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
Cc:     sumit.garg@...aro.org, Elaine Palmer <erpalmerny@...il.com>,
        jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com, jejb@...ux.ibm.com,
        dhowells@...hat.com, jens.wiklander@...aro.org, corbet@....net,
        jmorris@...ei.org, serge@...lyn.com, casey@...aufler-ca.com,
        janne.karhunen@...il.com, daniel.thompson@...aro.org,
        Markus.Wamser@...ed-mode.de, lhinds@...hat.com,
        keyrings@...r.kernel.org, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
        op-tee@...ts.trustedfirmware.org,
        Kenneth Goldman <kgoldman@...ibm.com>, gcwilson@...ux.ibm.com,
        zgu@...ibm.com, stefanb@...ibm.com, NAYNA JAIN1 <naynjain@....com>,
        Zohargshu Gu <zgu@...ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 3/4] doc: trusted-encrypted: updates with TEE as a
 new trust source

On Fri, 2020-12-11 at 12:36 +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Wed, Dec 09, 2020 at 11:50:19AM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > On Tue, 2020-12-08 at 19:49 +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > On Tue, Dec 08, 2020 at 10:02:57AM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > 
> > > > > Please also use a proper email client and split your paragraphs into
> > > > > at most 80 character lines with new line characters when writing email.
> > > > > I prefer to use 72 character line length so that there's some space
> > > > > for longer email threads.
> > > > 
> > > > Sure, we'll re-post the suggested documentation changes/additions.
> > > > 
> > > 
> > > So. Wouldn't it be a better idea to post a patch that Sumit could
> > > squash to his (and add co-developed-by tag)?
> > 
> > I just posted it on Elaine's behalf.
> >   
> 
> I responded. It's good that this feedback came as I think the whole
> thing does not have the correct label for it.

Every HW is going to want to add "trusted keys" support.   We've seen
this with Udit Agarwal's "secure keys" proposal for NXP CAAM crypto HW
accelerator.  If we go down this route to extend "trusted keys" to
support specific implementations like this one, I strongly recommend
requiring an accompaying high-level threat model.  This is similar to
how new LSMs need to comply with Documentation/security/lsm-
development.rst.

Based on Elaine's work with OCP, an example of a high-level threat
model is "Common Security Threats v1.0” (
https://www.opencompute.org/documents/common-security-threats-notes-1-pdf
 ).

thanks,

Mimi

Powered by blists - more mailing lists