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Message-ID: <160797733182.10793.8402797805442982544.tglx@nanos>
Date: Mon, 14 Dec 2020 20:22:11 -0000
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org
Subject: [GIT pull] efi/core for v5.11-rc1
Linus,
please pull the latest efi/core branch from:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git efi-core-2020-12-14
up to: 54649911f31b: efi: stub: get rid of efi_get_max_fdt_addr()
EFI updates collected by Ard Biesheuvel:
- Don't move BSS section around pointlessly in the x86 decompressor
- Refactor helper for discovering the EFI secure boot mode
- Wire up EFI secure boot to IMA for arm64
- Some fixes for the capsule loader
- Expose the RT_PROP table via the EFI test module
- Relax DT and kernel placement restrictions on ARM
Thanks,
tglx
------------------>
Ard Biesheuvel (5):
efi: x86/xen: switch to efi_get_secureboot_mode helper
efi: capsule: use atomic kmap for transient sglist mappings
efi: capsule: clean scatter-gather entries from the D-cache
efi: arm: reduce minimum alignment of uncompressed kernel
efi: stub: get rid of efi_get_max_fdt_addr()
Arvind Sankar (1):
efi/x86: Only copy the compressed kernel image in efi_relocate_kernel()
Chester Lin (3):
efi: generalize efi_get_secureboot
ima: generalize x86/EFI arch glue for other EFI architectures
arm64/ima: add ima_arch support
Geert Uytterhoeven (1):
efi/libstub: EFI_GENERIC_STUB_INITRD_CMDLINE_LOADER should not default to yes
Heinrich Schuchardt (2):
efi/libstub/x86: simplify efi_is_native()
efi/efi_test: read RuntimeServicesSupported
arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h | 24 ++++++------
arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h | 11 +++---
arch/riscv/include/asm/efi.h | 6 ---
arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h | 5 ++-
arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 2 -
arch/x86/xen/efi.c | 37 +++++-------------
drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig | 2 +-
drivers/firmware/efi/capsule.c | 16 +++++++-
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub.c | 1 -
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h | 3 +-
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/fdt.c | 3 +-
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c | 44 ++++++++-------------
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c | 5 ++-
drivers/firmware/efi/test/efi_test.c | 16 ++++++++
drivers/firmware/efi/test/efi_test.h | 3 ++
include/linux/efi.h | 23 ++++++++++-
security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 4 ++
.../ima_arch.c => security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c | 45 ++++++----------------
20 files changed, 124 insertions(+), 129 deletions(-)
rename arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c => security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c (60%)
diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h
index 3ee4f4381985..abae071a02e1 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h
@@ -66,24 +66,17 @@ static inline void efifb_setup_from_dmi(struct screen_info *si, const char *opt)
#define MAX_UNCOMP_KERNEL_SIZE SZ_32M
/*
- * phys-to-virt patching requires that the physical to virtual offset fits
- * into the immediate field of an add/sub instruction, which comes down to the
- * 24 least significant bits being zero, and so the offset should be a multiple
- * of 16 MB. Since PAGE_OFFSET itself is a multiple of 16 MB, the physical
- * base should be aligned to 16 MB as well.
+ * phys-to-virt patching requires that the physical to virtual offset is a
+ * multiple of 2 MiB. However, using an alignment smaller than TEXT_OFFSET
+ * here throws off the memory allocation logic, so let's use the lowest power
+ * of two greater than 2 MiB and greater than TEXT_OFFSET.
*/
-#define EFI_PHYS_ALIGN SZ_16M
-
-/* on ARM, the FDT should be located in a lowmem region */
-static inline unsigned long efi_get_max_fdt_addr(unsigned long image_addr)
-{
- return round_down(image_addr, EFI_PHYS_ALIGN) + SZ_512M;
-}
+#define EFI_PHYS_ALIGN max(SZ_2M, roundup_pow_of_two(TEXT_OFFSET))
/* on ARM, the initrd should be loaded in a lowmem region */
static inline unsigned long efi_get_max_initrd_addr(unsigned long image_addr)
{
- return round_down(image_addr, EFI_PHYS_ALIGN) + SZ_512M;
+ return round_down(image_addr, SZ_4M) + SZ_512M;
}
struct efi_arm_entry_state {
@@ -93,4 +86,9 @@ struct efi_arm_entry_state {
u32 sctlr_after_ebs;
};
+static inline void efi_capsule_flush_cache_range(void *addr, int size)
+{
+ __cpuc_flush_dcache_area(addr, size);
+}
+
#endif /* _ASM_ARM_EFI_H */
diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
index f858c352f72a..04e78a367c2c 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
@@ -1849,6 +1849,7 @@ config EFI
select EFI_RUNTIME_WRAPPERS
select EFI_STUB
select EFI_GENERIC_STUB
+ imply IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT
default y
help
This option provides support for runtime services provided
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h
index 973b14415271..3578aba9c608 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h
@@ -64,12 +64,6 @@ efi_status_t __efi_rt_asm_wrapper(void *, const char *, ...);
#define EFI_KIMG_ALIGN \
(SEGMENT_ALIGN > THREAD_ALIGN ? SEGMENT_ALIGN : THREAD_ALIGN)
-/* on arm64, the FDT may be located anywhere in system RAM */
-static inline unsigned long efi_get_max_fdt_addr(unsigned long image_addr)
-{
- return ULONG_MAX;
-}
-
/*
* On arm64, we have to ensure that the initrd ends up in the linear region,
* which is a 1 GB aligned region of size '1UL << (VA_BITS_MIN - 1)' that is
@@ -141,4 +135,9 @@ static inline void efi_set_pgd(struct mm_struct *mm)
void efi_virtmap_load(void);
void efi_virtmap_unload(void);
+static inline void efi_capsule_flush_cache_range(void *addr, int size)
+{
+ __flush_dcache_area(addr, size);
+}
+
#endif /* _ASM_EFI_H */
diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/efi.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/efi.h
index 7542282f1141..6d98cd999680 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/efi.h
+++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/efi.h
@@ -27,12 +27,6 @@ int efi_set_mapping_permissions(struct mm_struct *mm, efi_memory_desc_t *md);
#define ARCH_EFI_IRQ_FLAGS_MASK (SR_IE | SR_SPIE)
-/* on RISC-V, the FDT may be located anywhere in system RAM */
-static inline unsigned long efi_get_max_fdt_addr(unsigned long image_addr)
-{
- return ULONG_MAX;
-}
-
/* Load initrd at enough distance from DRAM start */
static inline unsigned long efi_get_max_initrd_addr(unsigned long image_addr)
{
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
index ee249088cbfe..8d358a6fe6ec 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ cflags-$(CONFIG_X86_32) := -march=i386
cflags-$(CONFIG_X86_64) := -mcmodel=small -mno-red-zone
KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(cflags-y)
KBUILD_CFLAGS += -mno-mmx -mno-sse
-KBUILD_CFLAGS += -ffreestanding
+KBUILD_CFLAGS += -ffreestanding -fshort-wchar
KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fno-stack-protector
KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-disable-warning, address-of-packed-member)
KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-disable-warning, gnu)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h
index bc9758ef292e..c98f78330b09 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h
@@ -213,8 +213,6 @@ static inline bool efi_is_64bit(void)
static inline bool efi_is_native(void)
{
- if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64))
- return true;
return efi_is_64bit();
}
@@ -382,4 +380,7 @@ static inline void efi_fake_memmap_early(void)
}
#endif
+#define arch_ima_efi_boot_mode \
+ ({ extern struct boot_params boot_params; boot_params.secure_boot; })
+
#endif /* _ASM_X86_EFI_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
index 68608bd892c0..5eeb808eb024 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
@@ -161,5 +161,3 @@ ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_64),y)
obj-$(CONFIG_MMCONF_FAM10H) += mmconf-fam10h_64.o
obj-y += vsmp_64.o
endif
-
-obj-$(CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT) += ima_arch.o
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/efi.c b/arch/x86/xen/efi.c
index 205a9bc981b0..7d7ffb9c826a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/efi.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/efi.c
@@ -93,37 +93,22 @@ static efi_system_table_t __init *xen_efi_probe(void)
/*
* Determine whether we're in secure boot mode.
- *
- * Please keep the logic in sync with
- * drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c:efi_get_secureboot().
*/
static enum efi_secureboot_mode xen_efi_get_secureboot(void)
{
- static efi_guid_t efi_variable_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
static efi_guid_t shim_guid = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
+ enum efi_secureboot_mode mode;
efi_status_t status;
- u8 moksbstate, secboot, setupmode;
+ u8 moksbstate;
unsigned long size;
- size = sizeof(secboot);
- status = efi.get_variable(L"SecureBoot", &efi_variable_guid,
- NULL, &size, &secboot);
-
- if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
- return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
-
- if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
- goto out_efi_err;
-
- size = sizeof(setupmode);
- status = efi.get_variable(L"SetupMode", &efi_variable_guid,
- NULL, &size, &setupmode);
-
- if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
- goto out_efi_err;
-
- if (secboot == 0 || setupmode == 1)
- return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
+ mode = efi_get_secureboot_mode(efi.get_variable);
+ if (mode == efi_secureboot_mode_unknown) {
+ pr_err("Could not determine UEFI Secure Boot status.\n");
+ return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown;
+ }
+ if (mode != efi_secureboot_mode_enabled)
+ return mode;
/* See if a user has put the shim into insecure mode. */
size = sizeof(moksbstate);
@@ -140,10 +125,6 @@ static enum efi_secureboot_mode xen_efi_get_secureboot(void)
secure_boot_enabled:
pr_info("UEFI Secure Boot is enabled.\n");
return efi_secureboot_mode_enabled;
-
- out_efi_err:
- pr_err("Could not determine UEFI Secure Boot status.\n");
- return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown;
}
void __init xen_efi_init(struct boot_params *boot_params)
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig b/drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig
index 36ec1f718893..b452cfa2100b 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ config EFI_ARMSTUB_DTB_LOADER
config EFI_GENERIC_STUB_INITRD_CMDLINE_LOADER
bool "Enable the command line initrd loader" if !X86
depends on EFI_STUB && (EFI_GENERIC_STUB || X86)
- default y
+ default y if X86
depends on !RISCV
help
Select this config option to add support for the initrd= command
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/capsule.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/capsule.c
index 598b7800d14e..768430293669 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/capsule.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/capsule.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#include <linux/highmem.h>
#include <linux/efi.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <asm/efi.h>
#include <asm/io.h>
typedef struct {
@@ -244,7 +245,7 @@ int efi_capsule_update(efi_capsule_header_t *capsule, phys_addr_t *pages)
for (i = 0; i < sg_count; i++) {
efi_capsule_block_desc_t *sglist;
- sglist = kmap(sg_pages[i]);
+ sglist = kmap_atomic(sg_pages[i]);
for (j = 0; j < SGLIST_PER_PAGE && count > 0; j++) {
u64 sz = min_t(u64, imagesize,
@@ -265,7 +266,18 @@ int efi_capsule_update(efi_capsule_header_t *capsule, phys_addr_t *pages)
else
sglist[j].data = page_to_phys(sg_pages[i + 1]);
- kunmap(sg_pages[i]);
+#if defined(CONFIG_ARM) || defined(CONFIG_ARM64)
+ /*
+ * At runtime, the firmware has no way to find out where the
+ * sglist elements are mapped, if they are mapped in the first
+ * place. Therefore, on architectures that can only perform
+ * cache maintenance by virtual address, the firmware is unable
+ * to perform this maintenance, and so it is up to the OS to do
+ * it instead.
+ */
+ efi_capsule_flush_cache_range(sglist, PAGE_SIZE);
+#endif
+ kunmap_atomic(sglist);
}
mutex_lock(&capsule_mutex);
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub.c
index 914a343c7785..ec2f3985bef3 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub.c
@@ -273,7 +273,6 @@ efi_status_t __efiapi efi_pe_entry(efi_handle_t handle,
install_memreserve_table();
status = allocate_new_fdt_and_exit_boot(handle, &fdt_addr,
- efi_get_max_fdt_addr(image_addr),
initrd_addr, initrd_size,
cmdline_ptr, fdt_addr, fdt_size);
if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h
index 2d7abcd99de9..b50a6c67d9bd 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h
@@ -750,7 +750,6 @@ efi_status_t efi_exit_boot_services(void *handle,
efi_status_t allocate_new_fdt_and_exit_boot(void *handle,
unsigned long *new_fdt_addr,
- unsigned long max_addr,
u64 initrd_addr, u64 initrd_size,
char *cmdline_ptr,
unsigned long fdt_addr,
@@ -848,4 +847,6 @@ asmlinkage void __noreturn efi_enter_kernel(unsigned long entrypoint,
void efi_handle_post_ebs_state(void);
+enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(void);
+
#endif
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/fdt.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/fdt.c
index 368cd60000ee..365c3a43a198 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/fdt.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/fdt.c
@@ -238,7 +238,6 @@ static efi_status_t exit_boot_func(struct efi_boot_memmap *map,
efi_status_t allocate_new_fdt_and_exit_boot(void *handle,
unsigned long *new_fdt_addr,
- unsigned long max_addr,
u64 initrd_addr, u64 initrd_size,
char *cmdline_ptr,
unsigned long fdt_addr,
@@ -275,7 +274,7 @@ efi_status_t allocate_new_fdt_and_exit_boot(void *handle,
efi_info("Exiting boot services and installing virtual address map...\n");
map.map = &memory_map;
- status = efi_allocate_pages(MAX_FDT_SIZE, new_fdt_addr, max_addr);
+ status = efi_allocate_pages(MAX_FDT_SIZE, new_fdt_addr, ULONG_MAX);
if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
efi_err("Unable to allocate memory for new device tree.\n");
goto fail;
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c
index 5efc524b14be..8a18930f3eb6 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c
@@ -12,44 +12,34 @@
#include "efistub.h"
-/* BIOS variables */
-static const efi_guid_t efi_variable_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
-static const efi_char16_t efi_SecureBoot_name[] = L"SecureBoot";
-static const efi_char16_t efi_SetupMode_name[] = L"SetupMode";
-
/* SHIM variables */
static const efi_guid_t shim_guid = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
static const efi_char16_t shim_MokSBState_name[] = L"MokSBState";
+static efi_status_t get_var(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *vendor, u32 *attr,
+ unsigned long *data_size, void *data)
+{
+ return get_efi_var(name, vendor, attr, data_size, data);
+}
+
/*
* Determine whether we're in secure boot mode.
- *
- * Please keep the logic in sync with
- * arch/x86/xen/efi.c:xen_efi_get_secureboot().
*/
enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(void)
{
u32 attr;
- u8 secboot, setupmode, moksbstate;
unsigned long size;
+ enum efi_secureboot_mode mode;
efi_status_t status;
+ u8 moksbstate;
- size = sizeof(secboot);
- status = get_efi_var(efi_SecureBoot_name, &efi_variable_guid,
- NULL, &size, &secboot);
- if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
- return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
- if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
- goto out_efi_err;
-
- size = sizeof(setupmode);
- status = get_efi_var(efi_SetupMode_name, &efi_variable_guid,
- NULL, &size, &setupmode);
- if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
- goto out_efi_err;
-
- if (secboot == 0 || setupmode == 1)
- return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
+ mode = efi_get_secureboot_mode(get_var);
+ if (mode == efi_secureboot_mode_unknown) {
+ efi_err("Could not determine UEFI Secure Boot status.\n");
+ return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown;
+ }
+ if (mode != efi_secureboot_mode_enabled)
+ return mode;
/*
* See if a user has put the shim into insecure mode. If so, and if the
@@ -69,8 +59,4 @@ enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(void)
secure_boot_enabled:
efi_info("UEFI Secure Boot is enabled.\n");
return efi_secureboot_mode_enabled;
-
-out_efi_err:
- efi_err("Could not determine UEFI Secure Boot status.\n");
- return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown;
}
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c
index 3672539cb96e..f14c4ff5839f 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c
@@ -715,8 +715,11 @@ unsigned long efi_main(efi_handle_t handle,
(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32) && buffer_end > KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE) ||
(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64) && buffer_end > MAXMEM_X86_64_4LEVEL) ||
(image_offset == 0)) {
+ extern char _bss[];
+
status = efi_relocate_kernel(&bzimage_addr,
- hdr->init_size, hdr->init_size,
+ (unsigned long)_bss - bzimage_addr,
+ hdr->init_size,
hdr->pref_address,
hdr->kernel_alignment,
LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR);
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/test/efi_test.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/test/efi_test.c
index ddf9eae396fe..47d67bb0a516 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/test/efi_test.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/test/efi_test.c
@@ -663,6 +663,19 @@ static long efi_runtime_query_capsulecaps(unsigned long arg)
return rv;
}
+static long efi_runtime_get_supported_mask(unsigned long arg)
+{
+ unsigned int __user *supported_mask;
+ int rv = 0;
+
+ supported_mask = (unsigned int *)arg;
+
+ if (put_user(efi.runtime_supported_mask, supported_mask))
+ rv = -EFAULT;
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
static long efi_test_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
@@ -699,6 +712,9 @@ static long efi_test_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
case EFI_RUNTIME_RESET_SYSTEM:
return efi_runtime_reset_system(arg);
+
+ case EFI_RUNTIME_GET_SUPPORTED_MASK:
+ return efi_runtime_get_supported_mask(arg);
}
return -ENOTTY;
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/test/efi_test.h b/drivers/firmware/efi/test/efi_test.h
index f2446aa1c2e3..117349e57993 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/test/efi_test.h
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/test/efi_test.h
@@ -118,4 +118,7 @@ struct efi_resetsystem {
#define EFI_RUNTIME_RESET_SYSTEM \
_IOW('p', 0x0B, struct efi_resetsystem)
+#define EFI_RUNTIME_GET_SUPPORTED_MASK \
+ _IOR('p', 0x0C, unsigned int)
+
#endif /* _DRIVERS_FIRMWARE_EFI_TEST_H_ */
diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
index d7c0e73af2b9..1cd5d91d8ca1 100644
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
@@ -1089,7 +1089,28 @@ enum efi_secureboot_mode {
efi_secureboot_mode_disabled,
efi_secureboot_mode_enabled,
};
-enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(void);
+
+static inline
+enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot_mode(efi_get_variable_t *get_var)
+{
+ u8 secboot, setupmode = 0;
+ efi_status_t status;
+ unsigned long size;
+
+ size = sizeof(secboot);
+ status = get_var(L"SecureBoot", &EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID, NULL, &size,
+ &secboot);
+ if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
+ return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown;
+
+ size = sizeof(setupmode);
+ get_var(L"SetupMode", &EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID, NULL, &size, &setupmode);
+ if (secboot == 0 || setupmode == 1)
+ return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
+ return efi_secureboot_mode_enabled;
+}
#ifdef CONFIG_RESET_ATTACK_MITIGATION
void efi_enable_reset_attack_mitigation(void);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
index 67dabca670e2..2499f2485c04 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
@@ -14,3 +14,7 @@ ima-$(CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC) += ima_kexec.o
ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += ima_mok.o
ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) += ima_asymmetric_keys.o
ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS) += ima_queue_keys.o
+
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_EFI),y)
+ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT) += ima_efi.o
+endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c
similarity index 60%
rename from arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c
rename to security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c
index 7dfb1e808928..71786d01946f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c
@@ -5,50 +5,29 @@
#include <linux/efi.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/ima.h>
+#include <asm/efi.h>
-extern struct boot_params boot_params;
+#ifndef arch_ima_efi_boot_mode
+#define arch_ima_efi_boot_mode efi_secureboot_mode_unset
+#endif
static enum efi_secureboot_mode get_sb_mode(void)
{
- efi_guid_t efi_variable_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
- efi_status_t status;
- unsigned long size;
- u8 secboot, setupmode;
-
- size = sizeof(secboot);
+ enum efi_secureboot_mode mode;
if (!efi_rt_services_supported(EFI_RT_SUPPORTED_GET_VARIABLE)) {
pr_info("ima: secureboot mode unknown, no efi\n");
return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown;
}
- /* Get variable contents into buffer */
- status = efi.get_variable(L"SecureBoot", &efi_variable_guid,
- NULL, &size, &secboot);
- if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND) {
+ mode = efi_get_secureboot_mode(efi.get_variable);
+ if (mode == efi_secureboot_mode_disabled)
pr_info("ima: secureboot mode disabled\n");
- return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
- }
-
- if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
+ else if (mode == efi_secureboot_mode_unknown)
pr_info("ima: secureboot mode unknown\n");
- return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown;
- }
-
- size = sizeof(setupmode);
- status = efi.get_variable(L"SetupMode", &efi_variable_guid,
- NULL, &size, &setupmode);
-
- if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) /* ignore unknown SetupMode */
- setupmode = 0;
-
- if (secboot == 0 || setupmode == 1) {
- pr_info("ima: secureboot mode disabled\n");
- return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
- }
-
- pr_info("ima: secureboot mode enabled\n");
- return efi_secureboot_mode_enabled;
+ else
+ pr_info("ima: secureboot mode enabled\n");
+ return mode;
}
bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void)
@@ -57,7 +36,7 @@ bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void)
static bool initialized;
if (!initialized && efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) {
- sb_mode = boot_params.secure_boot;
+ sb_mode = arch_ima_efi_boot_mode;
if (sb_mode == efi_secureboot_mode_unset)
sb_mode = get_sb_mode();
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