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Date:   Fri, 18 Dec 2020 16:44:21 +0000
From:   Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@...aro.org>
To:     Stefan Saecherl <stefan.saecherl@....de>
Cc:     x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...cs.fau.de,
        Lorena Kretzschmar <qy15sije@....cs.fau.de>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@...cle.com>,
        Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org>,
        Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@...el.com>,
        Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@...el.com>,
        "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@...nel.org>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/kgdb: Allow removal of early BPs

Hi Stefan

On Mon, Dec 14, 2020 at 03:13:12PM +0100, Stefan Saecherl wrote:
> The problem is that breakpoints that are set early (e.g. via kgdbwait)
> cannot be deleted after boot completed (to be precise after mark_rodata_ro
> ran).
> 
> When setting a breakpoint early there are executable pages that are
> writable so the copy_to_kernel_nofault call in kgdb_arch_set_breakpoint
> succeeds and the breakpoint is saved as type BP_BREAKPOINT.
> 
> Later in the boot write access to these pages is restricted. So when
> removing the breakpoint the copy_to_kernel_nofault call in
> kgdb_arch_remove_breakpoint is destined to fail and the breakpoint removal
> fails. So after copy_to_kernel_nofault failed try to text_poke_kgdb which
> can work around nonwriteability.
> 
> One thing to consider when doing this is that code can go away during boot
> (e.g. .init.text). Previously kgdb_arch_remove_breakpoint handled this case
> gracefully by just having copy_to_kernel_nofault fail but if one then calls
> text_poke_kgdb the system dies due to the BUG_ON we moved out of
> __text_poke.  To avoid this __text_poke now returns an error in case of a
> nonpresent code page and the error is handled at call site.
> 
> Checkpatch complains about two uses of BUG_ON but the new code should not
> trigger BUG_ON in cases where the old didn't.
> 
> Co-developed-by: Lorena Kretzschmar <qy15sije@....cs.fau.de>
> Signed-off-by: Lorena Kretzschmar <qy15sije@....cs.fau.de>
> Signed-off-by: Stefan Saecherl <stefan.saecherl@....de>

I took this to be a gap in the kgdbtest suite so I added a couple of
tests that cover this area. Before this patch they failed now they
pass (at least they do for ARCH=x86).

I don't see any new failures either, so:

Tested-by: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@...aro.org>


Daniel.



> ---
>  arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 16 +++++++----
>  arch/x86/kernel/kgdb.c        | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
>  2 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
> index 2400ad62f330..0f145d837885 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
> @@ -878,11 +878,9 @@ static void *__text_poke(void *addr, const void *opcode, size_t len)
>  		if (cross_page_boundary)
>  			pages[1] = virt_to_page(addr + PAGE_SIZE);
>  	}
> -	/*
> -	 * If something went wrong, crash and burn since recovery paths are not
> -	 * implemented.
> -	 */
> -	BUG_ON(!pages[0] || (cross_page_boundary && !pages[1]));
> +
> +	if (!pages[0] || (cross_page_boundary && !pages[1]))
> +		return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
>  
>  	/*
>  	 * Map the page without the global bit, as TLB flushing is done with
> @@ -976,7 +974,13 @@ void *text_poke(void *addr, const void *opcode, size_t len)
>  {
>  	lockdep_assert_held(&text_mutex);
>  
> -	return __text_poke(addr, opcode, len);
> +	addr = __text_poke(addr, opcode, len);
> +	/*
> +	 * If something went wrong, crash and burn since recovery paths are not
> +	 * implemented.
> +	 */
> +	BUG_ON(IS_ERR(addr));
> +	return addr;
>  }
>  
>  /**
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kgdb.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kgdb.c
> index ff7878df96b4..e98c9c43db7c 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kgdb.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kgdb.c
> @@ -731,6 +731,7 @@ void kgdb_arch_set_pc(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long ip)
>  int kgdb_arch_set_breakpoint(struct kgdb_bkpt *bpt)
>  {
>  	int err;
> +	void *addr;
>  
>  	bpt->type = BP_BREAKPOINT;
>  	err = copy_from_kernel_nofault(bpt->saved_instr, (char *)bpt->bpt_addr,
> @@ -747,8 +748,14 @@ int kgdb_arch_set_breakpoint(struct kgdb_bkpt *bpt)
>  	 */
>  	if (mutex_is_locked(&text_mutex))
>  		return -EBUSY;
> -	text_poke_kgdb((void *)bpt->bpt_addr, arch_kgdb_ops.gdb_bpt_instr,
> -		       BREAK_INSTR_SIZE);
> +
> +	addr = text_poke_kgdb((void *)bpt->bpt_addr, arch_kgdb_ops.gdb_bpt_instr,
> +				BREAK_INSTR_SIZE);
> +	/* This should never trigger because the above call to copy_from_kernel_nofault
> +	 * already succeeded.
> +	 */
> +	BUG_ON(IS_ERR(addr));
> +
>  	bpt->type = BP_POKE_BREAKPOINT;
>  
>  	return 0;
> @@ -756,21 +763,36 @@ int kgdb_arch_set_breakpoint(struct kgdb_bkpt *bpt)
>  
>  int kgdb_arch_remove_breakpoint(struct kgdb_bkpt *bpt)
>  {
> -	if (bpt->type != BP_POKE_BREAKPOINT)
> -		goto knl_write;
> -	/*
> -	 * It is safe to call text_poke_kgdb() because normal kernel execution
> -	 * is stopped on all cores, so long as the text_mutex is not locked.
> -	 */
> -	if (mutex_is_locked(&text_mutex))
> -		goto knl_write;
> -	text_poke_kgdb((void *)bpt->bpt_addr, bpt->saved_instr,
> -		       BREAK_INSTR_SIZE);
> -	return 0;
> +	void *addr;
> +	int err;
>  
> -knl_write:
> -	return copy_to_kernel_nofault((char *)bpt->bpt_addr,
> -				  (char *)bpt->saved_instr, BREAK_INSTR_SIZE);
> +	if (bpt->type == BP_POKE_BREAKPOINT) {
> +		if (mutex_is_locked(&text_mutex)) {
> +			err = copy_to_kernel_nofault((char *)bpt->bpt_addr,
> +							(char *)bpt->saved_instr,
> +							BREAK_INSTR_SIZE);
> +		} else {
> +			/*
> +			 * It is safe to call text_poke_kgdb() because normal kernel execution
> +			 * is stopped on all cores, so long as the text_mutex is not locked.
> +			 */
> +			addr = text_poke_kgdb((void *)bpt->bpt_addr,
> +							bpt->saved_instr,
> +							BREAK_INSTR_SIZE);
> +			err = PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(addr);
> +		}
> +	} else {
> +		err = copy_to_kernel_nofault((char *)bpt->bpt_addr,
> +						(char *)bpt->saved_instr,
> +						BREAK_INSTR_SIZE);
> +		if (err == -EFAULT && !mutex_is_locked(&text_mutex)) {
> +			addr = text_poke_kgdb((void *)bpt->bpt_addr,
> +						bpt->saved_instr,
> +						BREAK_INSTR_SIZE);
> +			err = PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(addr);
> +		}
> +	}
> +	return err;
>  }
>  
>  const struct kgdb_arch arch_kgdb_ops = {
> -- 
> 2.20.1

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