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Date: Sat, 19 Dec 2020 22:35:08 -0500 From: Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org> To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org Cc: Serge Hallyn <shallyn@...co.com>, Hervé Guillemet <herve@...llemet.org>, Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>, "Andrew G . Morgan" <morgan@...nel.org>, James Morris <jamorris@...ux.microsoft.com>, Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org> Subject: [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 3/6] [SECURITY] fix namespaced fscaps when !CONFIG_SECURITY From: Serge Hallyn <shallyn@...co.com> [ Upstream commit ed9b25d1970a4787ac6a39c2091e63b127ecbfc1 ] Namespaced file capabilities were introduced in 8db6c34f1dbc . When userspace reads an xattr for a namespaced capability, a virtualized representation of it is returned if the caller is in a user namespace owned by the capability's owning rootid. The function which performs this virtualization was not hooked up if CONFIG_SECURITY=n. Therefore in that case the original xattr was shown instead of the virtualized one. To test this using libcap-bin (*1), $ v=$(mktemp) $ unshare -Ur setcap cap_sys_admin-eip $v $ unshare -Ur setcap -v cap_sys_admin-eip $v /tmp/tmp.lSiIFRvt8Y: OK "setcap -v" verifies the values instead of setting them, and will check whether the rootid value is set. Therefore, with this bug un-fixed, and with CONFIG_SECURITY=n, setcap -v will fail: $ v=$(mktemp) $ unshare -Ur setcap cap_sys_admin=eip $v $ unshare -Ur setcap -v cap_sys_admin=eip $v nsowner[got=1000, want=0],/tmp/tmp.HHDiOOl9fY differs in [] Fix this bug by calling cap_inode_getsecurity() in security_inode_getsecurity() instead of returning -EOPNOTSUPP, when CONFIG_SECURITY=n. *1 - note, if libcap is too old for getcap to have the '-n' option, then use verify-caps instead. Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=209689 Cc: Hervé Guillemet <herve@...llemet.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <shallyn@...co.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@...nel.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@...ux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org> --- include/linux/security.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index d2240605edc46..454cc963d1457 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -787,7 +787,7 @@ static inline int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) static inline int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc) { - return -EOPNOTSUPP; + return cap_inode_getsecurity(inode, name, buffer, alloc); } static inline int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) -- 2.27.0
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