linux-kernel - [PATCH 1/6] KVM: SVM: create svm_process_injected

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Message-Id: <20210106105001.449974-2-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Date:   Wed,  6 Jan 2021 12:49:56 +0200
From:   Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@...hat.com>
To:     kvm@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org (open list:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND
        64-BIT)), Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
        x86@...nel.org (maintainer:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)),
        Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@...hat.com>
Subject: [PATCH 1/6] KVM: SVM: create svm_process_injected_event

Refactor the logic that is dealing with parsing of an injected event to a
separate function.

This will be used in the next patch to deal with the events that L1 wants to
inject to L2 in a way that survives migration.

Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@...hat.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h |  4 +++
 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 941e5251e13fe..01f1655d9e6f7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -3584,38 +3584,21 @@ static inline void sync_lapic_to_cr8(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl |= cr8 & V_TPR_MASK;
 }
 
-static void svm_complete_interrupts(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+void svm_process_injected_event(struct vcpu_svm *svm,
+				u32 event,
+				u32 event_err_code)
 {
-	u8 vector;
-	int type;
-	u32 exitintinfo = svm->vmcb->control.exit_int_info;
-	unsigned int3_injected = svm->int3_injected;
+	u8 vector = event & SVM_EXITINTINFO_VEC_MASK;
+	int type = event & SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_MASK;
 
+	unsigned int int3_injected = svm->int3_injected;
 	svm->int3_injected = 0;
 
-	/*
-	 * If we've made progress since setting HF_IRET_MASK, we've
-	 * executed an IRET and can allow NMI injection.
-	 */
-	if ((svm->vcpu.arch.hflags & HF_IRET_MASK) &&
-	    (sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm) ||
-	     kvm_rip_read(&svm->vcpu) != svm->nmi_iret_rip)) {
-		svm->vcpu.arch.hflags &= ~(HF_NMI_MASK | HF_IRET_MASK);
-		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, &svm->vcpu);
-	}
-
-	svm->vcpu.arch.nmi_injected = false;
-	kvm_clear_exception_queue(&svm->vcpu);
-	kvm_clear_interrupt_queue(&svm->vcpu);
-
-	if (!(exitintinfo & SVM_EXITINTINFO_VALID))
+	if (!(event & SVM_EXITINTINFO_VALID))
 		return;
 
 	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, &svm->vcpu);
 
-	vector = exitintinfo & SVM_EXITINTINFO_VEC_MASK;
-	type = exitintinfo & SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_MASK;
-
 	switch (type) {
 	case SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_NMI:
 		svm->vcpu.arch.nmi_injected = true;
@@ -3640,7 +3623,7 @@ static void svm_complete_interrupts(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 					      int3_injected);
 			break;
 		}
-		if (exitintinfo & SVM_EXITINTINFO_VALID_ERR) {
+		if (event & SVM_EXITINTINFO_VALID_ERR) {
 			u32 err = svm->vmcb->control.exit_int_info_err;
 			kvm_requeue_exception_e(&svm->vcpu, vector, err);
 
@@ -3653,6 +3636,31 @@ static void svm_complete_interrupts(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
+
+}
+
+static void svm_complete_interrupts(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+
+	/*
+	 * If we've made progress since setting HF_IRET_MASK, we've
+	 * executed an IRET and can allow NMI injection.
+	 */
+	if ((svm->vcpu.arch.hflags & HF_IRET_MASK) &&
+	    (sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm) ||
+	     kvm_rip_read(&svm->vcpu) != svm->nmi_iret_rip)) {
+		svm->vcpu.arch.hflags &= ~(HF_NMI_MASK | HF_IRET_MASK);
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, &svm->vcpu);
+	}
+
+	svm->vcpu.arch.nmi_injected = false;
+	kvm_clear_exception_queue(&svm->vcpu);
+	kvm_clear_interrupt_queue(&svm->vcpu);
+
+	svm_process_injected_event(svm,
+				   svm->vmcb->control.exit_int_info,
+				   svm->vmcb->control.exit_int_info_err);
+
 }
 
 static void svm_cancel_injection(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
index 5431e6335e2e8..b5587650181f2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
@@ -420,6 +420,10 @@ int svm_set_efer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 efer);
 void svm_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0);
 void svm_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4);
 void svm_flush_tlb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+void svm_process_injected_event(struct vcpu_svm *svm, u32 event,
+				u32 event_err_code);
+
 void disable_nmi_singlestep(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
 bool svm_smi_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 bool svm_nmi_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
-- 
2.26.2