linux-kernel - [PATCH 1/2] KVM: VMX: create vmx_process_injected

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Date:   Wed,  6 Jan 2021 12:53:05 +0200
From:   Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@...hat.com>
To:     kvm@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>, Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org (open list:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND
        64-BIT)),
        x86@...nel.org (maintainer:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)),
        Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@...hat.com>
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] KVM: VMX: create vmx_process_injected_event

Refactor the logic that is dealing with parsing of an injected event to a
separate function.

This will be used in the next patch to deal with the events that L1 wants to
inject to L2 in a way that survives migration.

Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@...hat.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h |  4 +++
 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 75c9c6a0a3a45..dec6bc94a56b4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -6442,29 +6442,16 @@ static void vmx_recover_nmi_blocking(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 					      vmx->loaded_vmcs->entry_time));
 }
 
-static void __vmx_complete_interrupts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
-				      u32 idt_vectoring_info,
-				      int instr_len_field,
-				      int error_code_field)
+void vmx_process_injected_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				u32 idt_vectoring_info,
+				u32 instr_len,
+				u32 error_code)
 {
-	u8 vector;
-	int type;
-	bool idtv_info_valid;
-
-	idtv_info_valid = idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK;
-
-	vcpu->arch.nmi_injected = false;
-	kvm_clear_exception_queue(vcpu);
-	kvm_clear_interrupt_queue(vcpu);
-
-	if (!idtv_info_valid)
-		return;
+	u8 vector = idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VECTOR_MASK;
+	u32 type = idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_TYPE_MASK;
 
 	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
 
-	vector = idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VECTOR_MASK;
-	type = idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_TYPE_MASK;
-
 	switch (type) {
 	case INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR:
 		vcpu->arch.nmi_injected = true;
@@ -6476,17 +6463,16 @@ static void __vmx_complete_interrupts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 		vmx_set_nmi_mask(vcpu, false);
 		break;
 	case INTR_TYPE_SOFT_EXCEPTION:
-		vcpu->arch.event_exit_inst_len = vmcs_read32(instr_len_field);
+		vcpu->arch.event_exit_inst_len = instr_len;
 		fallthrough;
 	case INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION:
 		if (idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK) {
-			u32 err = vmcs_read32(error_code_field);
-			kvm_requeue_exception_e(vcpu, vector, err);
+			kvm_requeue_exception_e(vcpu, vector, error_code);
 		} else
 			kvm_requeue_exception(vcpu, vector);
 		break;
 	case INTR_TYPE_SOFT_INTR:
-		vcpu->arch.event_exit_inst_len = vmcs_read32(instr_len_field);
+		vcpu->arch.event_exit_inst_len = instr_len;
 		fallthrough;
 	case INTR_TYPE_EXT_INTR:
 		kvm_queue_interrupt(vcpu, vector, type == INTR_TYPE_SOFT_INTR);
@@ -6496,6 +6482,34 @@ static void __vmx_complete_interrupts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	}
 }
 
+static void __vmx_complete_interrupts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				      u32 idt_vectoring_info,
+				      int instr_len_field,
+				      int error_code_field)
+{
+	u32 instr_len = 0, err_code = 0;
+	u32 type;
+
+	vcpu->arch.nmi_injected = false;
+	kvm_clear_exception_queue(vcpu);
+	kvm_clear_interrupt_queue(vcpu);
+
+	if (!(idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK))
+		return;
+
+	type = idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_TYPE_MASK;
+
+	if (idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK)
+		err_code = vmcs_read32(error_code_field);
+
+	if (type == INTR_TYPE_SOFT_EXCEPTION || type == INTR_TYPE_SOFT_INTR)
+		instr_len = vmcs_read32(instr_len_field);
+
+	vmx_process_injected_event(vcpu, idt_vectoring_info, instr_len,
+				   err_code);
+}
+
+
 static void vmx_complete_interrupts(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 {
 	__vmx_complete_interrupts(&vmx->vcpu, vmx->idt_vectoring_info,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
index 9d3a557949ac2..0c9ecada11025 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
@@ -336,6 +336,10 @@ bool vmx_interrupt_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 bool vmx_get_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void vmx_set_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool masked);
 void vmx_set_virtual_apic_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void vmx_process_injected_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				u32 idt_vectoring_info,
+				u32 instr_len,
+				u32 error_code);
 struct vmx_uret_msr *vmx_find_uret_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr);
 void pt_update_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void vmx_update_host_rsp(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long host_rsp);
-- 
2.26.2