linux-kernel - [PATCH] xen/privcmd: allow fetching resource sizes

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <20210111152958.7166-1-roger.pau@citrix.com>
Date:   Mon, 11 Jan 2021 16:29:58 +0100
From:   Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@...rix.com>
To:     <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
CC:     Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@...rix.com>,
        Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>,
        Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>,
        Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@...nel.org>,
        Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@...rix.com>,
        <xen-devel@...ts.xenproject.org>
Subject: [PATCH] xen/privcmd: allow fetching resource sizes

Allow issuing an IOCTL_PRIVCMD_MMAP_RESOURCE ioctl with num = 0 and
addr = 0 in order to fetch the size of a specific resource.

Add a shortcut to the default map resource path, since fetching the
size requires no address to be passed in, and thus no VMA to setup.

Fixes: 3ad0876554caf ('xen/privcmd: add IOCTL_PRIVCMD_MMAP_RESOURCE')
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@...rix.com>
---
NB: fetching the size of a resource shouldn't trigger an hypercall
preemption, and hence I've dropped the preempt indications.
---
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@...nel.org>
Cc: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@...rix.com>
Cc: xen-devel@...ts.xenproject.org
---
 drivers/xen/privcmd.c | 21 +++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/xen/privcmd.c b/drivers/xen/privcmd.c
index b0c73c58f987..a6e7e6e4286f 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/privcmd.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/privcmd.c
@@ -717,14 +717,15 @@ static long privcmd_ioctl_restrict(struct file *file, void __user *udata)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static long privcmd_ioctl_mmap_resource(struct file *file, void __user *udata)
+static long privcmd_ioctl_mmap_resource(struct file *file,
+				struct privcmd_mmap_resource __user *udata)
 {
 	struct privcmd_data *data = file->private_data;
 	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
 	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
 	struct privcmd_mmap_resource kdata;
 	xen_pfn_t *pfns = NULL;
-	struct xen_mem_acquire_resource xdata;
+	struct xen_mem_acquire_resource xdata = { };
 	int rc;
 
 	if (copy_from_user(&kdata, udata, sizeof(kdata)))
@@ -734,6 +735,18 @@ static long privcmd_ioctl_mmap_resource(struct file *file, void __user *udata)
 	if (data->domid != DOMID_INVALID && data->domid != kdata.dom)
 		return -EPERM;
 
+	xdata.domid = kdata.dom;
+	xdata.type = kdata.type;
+	xdata.id = kdata.id;
+
+	if (!kdata.addr && !kdata.num) {
+		/* Query the size of the resource. */
+		rc = HYPERVISOR_memory_op(XENMEM_acquire_resource, &xdata);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+		return __put_user(xdata.nr_frames, &udata->num);
+	}
+
 	mmap_write_lock(mm);
 
 	vma = find_vma(mm, kdata.addr);
@@ -768,10 +781,6 @@ static long privcmd_ioctl_mmap_resource(struct file *file, void __user *udata)
 	} else
 		vma->vm_private_data = PRIV_VMA_LOCKED;
 
-	memset(&xdata, 0, sizeof(xdata));
-	xdata.domid = kdata.dom;
-	xdata.type = kdata.type;
-	xdata.id = kdata.id;
 	xdata.frame = kdata.idx;
 	xdata.nr_frames = kdata.num;
 	set_xen_guest_handle(xdata.frame_list, pfns);
-- 
2.29.2