linux-kernel - [PATCH 4.14 28/57] crypto: ecdh - avoid buffer overflow in ecdh_set

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Message-Id: <20210111130035.076633853@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Mon, 11 Jan 2021 14:01:47 +0100
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Pavel Machek <pavel@...x.de>,
        Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>,
        Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>
Subject: [PATCH 4.14 28/57] crypto: ecdh - avoid buffer overflow in ecdh_set_secret()

From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>

commit 0aa171e9b267ce7c52d3a3df7bc9c1fc0203dec5 upstream.

Pavel reports that commit 17858b140bf4 ("crypto: ecdh - avoid unaligned
accesses in ecdh_set_secret()") fixes one problem but introduces another:
the unconditional memcpy() introduced by that commit may overflow the
target buffer if the source data is invalid, which could be the result of
intentional tampering.

So check params.key_size explicitly against the size of the target buffer
before validating the key further.

Fixes: 17858b140bf4 ("crypto: ecdh - avoid unaligned accesses in ecdh_set_secret()")
Reported-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@...x.de>
Cc: <stable@...r.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>

---
 crypto/ecdh.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/crypto/ecdh.c
+++ b/crypto/ecdh.c
@@ -43,7 +43,8 @@ static int ecdh_set_secret(struct crypto
 	struct ecdh params;
 	unsigned int ndigits;
 
-	if (crypto_ecdh_decode_key(buf, len, &params) < 0)
+	if (crypto_ecdh_decode_key(buf, len, &params) < 0 ||
+	    params.key_size > sizeof(ctx->private_key))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	ndigits = ecdh_supported_curve(params.curve_id);