linux-kernel - Re: platform/surface: Add Surface Aggregator user-space interface (static analysis issues)

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Date:   Mon, 11 Jan 2021 14:55:43 +0100
From:   Maximilian Luz <luzmaximilian@...il.com>
To:     Colin Ian King <colin.king@...onical.com>
Cc:     Hans de Goede <hdegoede@...hat.com>,
        Mark Gross <mgross@...ux.intel.com>,
        platform-driver-x86@...r.kernel.org,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: platform/surface: Add Surface Aggregator user-space interface
 (static analysis issues)

On 1/11/21 1:12 PM, Colin Ian King wrote:
> Hi Maximilian,
> 
> Static analysis of linux-next with Coverity has found several issues
> with the following commit:
> 
> commit 178f6ab77e617c984d6520b92e747075a12676ff
> Author: Maximilian Luz <luzmaximilian@...il.com>
> Date:   Mon Dec 21 19:39:58 2020 +0100
> 
>      platform/surface: Add Surface Aggregator user-space interface
> 
> The analysis is as follows:
> 
> 65static long ssam_cdev_request(struct ssam_cdev *cdev, unsigned long arg)
>   66{
>   67        struct ssam_cdev_request __user *r;
>   68        struct ssam_cdev_request rqst;
> 
>     1. var_decl: Declaring variable spec without initializer.
> 
>   69        struct ssam_request spec;
>   70        struct ssam_response rsp;
>   71        const void __user *plddata;
>   72        void __user *rspdata;
>   73        int status = 0, ret = 0, tmp;
>   74
>   75        r = (struct ssam_cdev_request __user *)arg;
>   76        ret = copy_struct_from_user(&rqst, sizeof(rqst), r, sizeof(*r));
> 
>     2. Condition ret, taking true branch.
> 
>   77        if (ret)
> 
>     3. Jumping to label out.
> 
>   78                goto out;
> 
>   79
>   80        plddata = u64_to_user_ptr(rqst.payload.data);
>   81        rspdata = u64_to_user_ptr(rqst.response.data);
>   82
>   83        /* Setup basic request fields. */
>   84        spec.target_category = rqst.target_category;
>   85        spec.target_id = rqst.target_id;
>   86        spec.command_id = rqst.command_id;
>   87        spec.instance_id = rqst.instance_id;
>   88        spec.flags = 0;
>   89        spec.length = rqst.payload.length;
>   90        spec.payload = NULL;
>   91
>   92        if (rqst.flags & SSAM_CDEV_REQUEST_HAS_RESPONSE)
>   93                spec.flags |= SSAM_REQUEST_HAS_RESPONSE;
>   94
>   95        if (rqst.flags & SSAM_CDEV_REQUEST_UNSEQUENCED)
>   96                spec.flags |= SSAM_REQUEST_UNSEQUENCED;
>   97
>   98        rsp.capacity = rqst.response.length;
>   99        rsp.length = 0;
> 100        rsp.pointer = NULL;
> 101
> 102        /* Get request payload from user-space. */
> 103        if (spec.length) {
> 104                if (!plddata) {
> 105                        ret = -EINVAL;
> 106                        goto out;
> 107                }
> 108
> 
> CID: Untrusted allocation size (TAINTED_SCALAR)
>     8. tainted_data: Passing tainted expression spec.length to kzalloc,
> which uses it as an allocation size
> 
> 109                spec.payload = kzalloc(spec.length, GFP_KERNEL);

I assume a constraint on the maximum length will fix this?

> 110                if (!spec.payload) {
> 111                        ret = -ENOMEM;
> 112                        goto out;
> 113                }
> 114
> 115                if (copy_from_user((void *)spec.payload, plddata,
> spec.length)) {
> 116                        ret = -EFAULT;
> 117                        goto out;
> 118                }
> 119        }
> 120
> 121        /* Allocate response buffer. */
> 122        if (rsp.capacity) {
> 123                if (!rspdata) {
> 124                        ret = -EINVAL;
> 125                        goto out;
> 126                }
> 127
> 
> CID: Untrusted allocation size (TAINTED_SCALAR)
>     12. tainted_data: Passing tainted expression rsp.capacity to kzalloc,
> which uses it as an allocation size
> 
> 128                rsp.pointer = kzalloc(rsp.capacity, GFP_KERNEL);
> 129                if (!rsp.pointer) {
> 130                        ret = -ENOMEM;
> 131                        goto out;
> 132                }
> 133        }
> 134
> 135        /* Perform request. */
> 136        status = ssam_request_sync(cdev->ctrl, &spec, &rsp);
> 137        if (status)
> 138                goto out;
> 139
> 140        /* Copy response to user-space. */
> 141        if (rsp.length && copy_to_user(rspdata, rsp.pointer, rsp.length))
> 142                ret = -EFAULT;
> 143
> 144out:
> 145        /* Always try to set response-length and status. */
> 
>     CID: Uninitialized pointer read (UNINIT)
>     Using uninitialized value rsp.length
> 
> 146        tmp = put_user(rsp.length, &r->response.length);
> 
>     4. Condition tmp, taking true branch.
> 
> 147        if (tmp)
> 148                ret = tmp;
> 149
> 150        tmp = put_user(status, &r->status);
> 
>     5. Condition tmp, taking true branch.
> 
> 151        if (tmp)
> 152                ret = tmp;
> 153
> 154        /* Cleanup. */
> 
>     CID: Uninitialized pointer read (UNINIT)
>     6. uninit_use_in_call: Using uninitialized value spec.payload when
> calling kfree.
> 
> 155        kfree(spec.payload);
> 
>     CID: Uninitialized pointer read (UNINIT)
>     uninit_use_in_call: Using uninitialized value rsp.pointer when
> calling kfree
> 
> 156        kfree(rsp.pointer);

Right, taking the first jump to out leaves rsp and spec uninitialized.
I'll fix that.

> 157
> 158        return ret;
> 
> Colin
> 

Thank you for the analysis. I'll draft up two patches to address these
issues.

Regards,
Max