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Message-ID: <CAD=FV=XULGJMiyrfME7FDsNuZJRz=JhTbtrYKH9UGiTHSKn9Ow@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2021 08:11:48 -0800
From: Doug Anderson <dianders@...omium.org>
To: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@...omium.org>
Cc: Andy Gross <agross@...nel.org>,
Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@...aro.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-arm-msm <linux-arm-msm@...r.kernel.org>,
Sai Prakash Ranjan <saiprakash.ranjan@...eaurora.org>,
Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@...aro.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] soc: qcom: socinfo: Open read access to all for debugfs
Hi,
On Mon, Jan 11, 2021 at 6:04 PM Stephen Boyd <swboyd@...omium.org> wrote:
>
> Quoting Doug Anderson (2021-01-05 15:06:35)
> > Hi,
> >
> > On Tue, Dec 15, 2020 at 11:19 PM Stephen Boyd <swboyd@...omium.org> wrote:
> > >
> > > There doesn't seem to be any reason to limit this to only root user
> > > readable. Let's make it readable by all so that random programs can
> > > read the debugfs files in here instead of just root. The information is
> > > just that, informational, so this is fine.
> > >
> > > Cc: Sai Prakash Ranjan <saiprakash.ranjan@...eaurora.org>
> > > Cc: Douglas Anderson <dianders@...omium.org>
> > > Cc: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@...aro.org>
> > > Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@...omium.org>
> > > ---
> > > drivers/soc/qcom/socinfo.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++-------------------
> > > 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
> >
> > One worry I'd have is whether there would ever be any PII (personally
> > identifiable information) here, like maybe a chip serial number. If
> > so, is that something that is OK to provide to any random process?
> > ...maybe I'm just being paranoid though, since presumably there are
> > enough random HW characteristics that could be strung together and
> > hashed to make roughly a unique ID anyway and hiding every HW
> > characteristic would be a bit extreme...
> >
>
> I suppose if that's a problem then the process that mounts debugfs can
> change the access to restrict it. I'm not aware of this needing to be a
> kernel policy though, so I'd rather leave that up to userspace to decide
> if it should be restricted further.
OK, fair enough.
Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@...omium.org>
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