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Message-ID: <CAG_fn=WOSsVPOKVS8GF8h-hHavgcqMEdbjy4Puy=bajTmW7sbg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2021 08:40:41 +0100
From: Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>
To: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@....com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>,
Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>,
Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@...gle.com>,
Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@....com>,
Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@....com>,
kasan-dev <kasan-dev@...glegroups.com>,
Linux ARM <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>,
Linux Memory Management List <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 02/11] kasan: clarify HW_TAGS impact on TBI
On Tue, Jan 5, 2021 at 7:28 PM Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com> wrote:
>
> Mention in the documentation that enabling CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS
> always results in in-kernel TBI (Top Byte Ignore) being enabled.
>
> Also do a few minor documentation cleanups.
>
> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>
> Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Iba2a6697e3c6304cb53f89ec61dedc77fa29e3ae
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>
> ---
> Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst | 16 +++++++++++-----
> 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst b/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst
> index 0fc3fb1860c4..26c99852a852 100644
> --- a/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst
> @@ -147,15 +147,14 @@ negative values to distinguish between different kinds of inaccessible memory
> like redzones or freed memory (see mm/kasan/kasan.h).
>
> In the report above the arrows point to the shadow byte 03, which means that
> -the accessed address is partially accessible.
> -
> -For tag-based KASAN this last report section shows the memory tags around the
> -accessed address (see `Implementation details`_ section).
> +the accessed address is partially accessible. For tag-based KASAN modes this
> +last report section shows the memory tags around the accessed address
> +(see the `Implementation details`_ section).
>
> Boot parameters
> ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>
> -Hardware tag-based KASAN mode (see the section about different mode below) is
> +Hardware tag-based KASAN mode (see the section about various modes below) is
> intended for use in production as a security mitigation. Therefore it supports
> boot parameters that allow to disable KASAN competely or otherwise control
> particular KASAN features.
> @@ -305,6 +304,13 @@ reserved to tag freed memory regions.
> Hardware tag-based KASAN currently only supports tagging of
> kmem_cache_alloc/kmalloc and page_alloc memory.
>
> +If the hardware doesn't support MTE (pre ARMv8.5), hardware tag-based KASAN
> +won't be enabled. In this case all boot parameters are ignored.
> +
> +Note, that enabling CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS always results in in-kernel TBI being
> +enabled. Even when kasan.mode=off is provided, or when the hardware doesn't
> +support MTE (but supports TBI).
> +
> What memory accesses are sanitised by KASAN?
> --------------------------------------------
>
> --
> 2.29.2.729.g45daf8777d-goog
>
--
Alexander Potapenko
Software Engineer
Google Germany GmbH
Erika-Mann-Straße, 33
80636 München
Geschäftsführer: Paul Manicle, Halimah DeLaine Prado
Registergericht und -nummer: Hamburg, HRB 86891
Sitz der Gesellschaft: Hamburg
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