| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2021 17:24:03 +0100
From: Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>
To: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@....com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>,
Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>,
Peter Collingbourne <pcc@...gle.com>,
Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@...gle.com>,
Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@....com>,
Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@....com>,
kasan-dev <kasan-dev@...glegroups.com>,
Linux ARM <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>,
Linux Memory Management List <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 03/14] kasan: clean up comments in tests
On Wed, 13 Jan 2021 at 17:21, Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com> wrote:
>
> Clarify and update comments in KASAN tests.
>
> Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/I6c816c51fa1e0eb7aa3dead6bda1f339d2af46c8
> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>
> ---
> lib/test_kasan.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
> lib/test_kasan_module.c | 5 ++--
> 2 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/lib/test_kasan.c b/lib/test_kasan.c
> index 2947274cc2d3..6f46e27c2af7 100644
> --- a/lib/test_kasan.c
> +++ b/lib/test_kasan.c
> @@ -28,10 +28,9 @@
> #define OOB_TAG_OFF (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) ? 0 : KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE)
>
> /*
> - * We assign some test results to these globals to make sure the tests
> - * are not eliminated as dead code.
> + * Some tests use these global variables to store return values from function
> + * calls that could otherwise be eliminated by the compiler as dead code.
> */
> -
> void *kasan_ptr_result;
> int kasan_int_result;
>
> @@ -39,14 +38,13 @@ static struct kunit_resource resource;
> static struct kunit_kasan_expectation fail_data;
> static bool multishot;
>
> +/*
> + * Temporarily enable multi-shot mode. Otherwise, KASAN would only report the
> + * first detected bug and panic the kernel if panic_on_warn is enabled.
> + */
> static int kasan_test_init(struct kunit *test)
> {
> - /*
> - * Temporarily enable multi-shot mode and set panic_on_warn=0.
> - * Otherwise, we'd only get a report for the first case.
> - */
> multishot = kasan_save_enable_multi_shot();
> -
> return 0;
> }
>
> @@ -56,12 +54,12 @@ static void kasan_test_exit(struct kunit *test)
> }
>
> /**
> - * KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL() - Causes a test failure when the expression does
> - * not cause a KASAN error. This uses a KUnit resource named "kasan_data." Do
> - * Do not use this name for a KUnit resource outside here.
> - *
> + * KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL() - check that the executed expression produces a
> + * KASAN report; causes a test failure otherwise. This relies on a KUnit
> + * resource named "kasan_data". Do not use this name for KUnit resources
> + * outside of KASAN tests.
> */
> -#define KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, condition) do { \
> +#define KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, expression) do { \
> fail_data.report_expected = true; \
> fail_data.report_found = false; \
> kunit_add_named_resource(test, \
> @@ -69,7 +67,7 @@ static void kasan_test_exit(struct kunit *test)
> NULL, \
> &resource, \
> "kasan_data", &fail_data); \
> - condition; \
> + expression; \
> KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, \
> fail_data.report_expected, \
> fail_data.report_found); \
> @@ -121,7 +119,8 @@ static void kmalloc_pagealloc_oob_right(struct kunit *test)
> return;
> }
>
> - /* Allocate a chunk that does not fit into a SLUB cache to trigger
> + /*
> + * Allocate a chunk that does not fit into a SLUB cache to trigger
> * the page allocator fallback.
> */
> ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
> @@ -168,7 +167,9 @@ static void kmalloc_large_oob_right(struct kunit *test)
> {
> char *ptr;
> size_t size = KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE - 256;
> - /* Allocate a chunk that is large enough, but still fits into a slab
> +
> + /*
> + * Allocate a chunk that is large enough, but still fits into a slab
> * and does not trigger the page allocator fallback in SLUB.
> */
> ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
> @@ -469,10 +470,13 @@ static void ksize_unpoisons_memory(struct kunit *test)
> ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
> KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr);
> real_size = ksize(ptr);
> - /* This access doesn't trigger an error. */
> +
> + /* This access shouldn't trigger a KASAN report. */
> ptr[size] = 'x';
> - /* This one does. */
> +
> + /* This one must. */
> KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ptr[real_size] = 'y');
> +
> kfree(ptr);
> }
>
> @@ -568,7 +572,7 @@ static void kmem_cache_invalid_free(struct kunit *test)
> return;
> }
>
> - /* Trigger invalid free, the object doesn't get freed */
> + /* Trigger invalid free, the object doesn't get freed. */
> KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, kmem_cache_free(cache, p + 1));
>
> /*
> @@ -585,7 +589,10 @@ static void kasan_memchr(struct kunit *test)
> char *ptr;
> size_t size = 24;
>
> - /* See https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206337 */
> + /*
> + * str* functions are not instrumented with CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT.
> + * See https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206337 for details.
> + */
> if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
> kunit_info(test,
> "str* functions are not instrumented with CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT");
> @@ -610,7 +617,10 @@ static void kasan_memcmp(struct kunit *test)
> size_t size = 24;
> int arr[9];
>
> - /* See https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206337 */
> + /*
> + * str* functions are not instrumented with CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT.
> + * See https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206337 for details.
> + */
> if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
> kunit_info(test,
> "str* functions are not instrumented with CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT");
> @@ -634,7 +644,10 @@ static void kasan_strings(struct kunit *test)
> char *ptr;
> size_t size = 24;
>
> - /* See https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206337 */
> + /*
> + * str* functions are not instrumented with CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT.
> + * See https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206337 for details.
> + */
> if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
> kunit_info(test,
> "str* functions are not instrumented with CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT");
> @@ -706,7 +719,7 @@ static void kasan_bitops_generic(struct kunit *test)
> }
>
> /*
> - * Allocate 1 more byte, which causes kzalloc to round up to 16-bytes;
> + * Allocate 1 more byte, which causes kzalloc to round up to 16 bytes;
> * this way we do not actually corrupt other memory.
> */
> bits = kzalloc(sizeof(*bits) + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
> diff --git a/lib/test_kasan_module.c b/lib/test_kasan_module.c
> index 3b4cc77992d2..eee017ff8980 100644
> --- a/lib/test_kasan_module.c
> +++ b/lib/test_kasan_module.c
> @@ -123,8 +123,9 @@ static noinline void __init kasan_workqueue_uaf(void)
> static int __init test_kasan_module_init(void)
> {
> /*
> - * Temporarily enable multi-shot mode. Otherwise, we'd only get a
> - * report for the first case.
> + * Temporarily enable multi-shot mode. Otherwise, KASAN would only
> + * report the first detected bug and panic the kernel if panic_on_warn
> + * is enabled.
> */
> bool multishot = kasan_save_enable_multi_shot();
>
> --
> 2.30.0.284.gd98b1dd5eaa7-goog
>
Powered by blists - more mailing lists