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Message-ID: <58b021e3-6d76-7501-c75f-53b4bb254800@amd.com>
Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2021 15:24:56 -0600
From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Cc: brijesh.singh@....com, Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 06/14] x86/sev: Drop redundant and potentially
misleading 'sev_enabled'
On 1/13/21 6:37 PM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> Drop the sev_enabled flag and switch its one user over to sev_active().
> sev_enabled was made redundant with the introduction of sev_status in
> commit b57de6cd1639 ("x86/sev-es: Add SEV-ES Feature Detection").
> sev_enabled and sev_active() are guaranteed to be equivalent, as each is
> true iff 'sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED' is true, and are only ever
> written in tandem (ignoring compressed boot's version of sev_status).
>
> Removing sev_enabled avoids confusion over whether it refers to the guest
> or the host, and will also allow KVM to usurp "sev_enabled" for its own
> purposes.
>
> No functional change intended.
>
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 1 -
> arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 12 +++++-------
> arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c | 1 -
> 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
Thanks
Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
> index 2f62bbdd9d12..88d624499411 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
> @@ -20,7 +20,6 @@
>
> extern u64 sme_me_mask;
> extern u64 sev_status;
> -extern bool sev_enabled;
>
> void sme_encrypt_execute(unsigned long encrypted_kernel_vaddr,
> unsigned long decrypted_kernel_vaddr,
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> index bc0833713be9..b89bc03c63a2 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> @@ -44,8 +44,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(sme_me_mask);
> DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(sev_enable_key);
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_enable_key);
>
> -bool sev_enabled __section(".data");
> -
> /* Buffer used for early in-place encryption by BSP, no locking needed */
> static char sme_early_buffer[PAGE_SIZE] __initdata __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
>
> @@ -342,16 +340,16 @@ int __init early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size)
> * up under SME the trampoline area cannot be encrypted, whereas under SEV
> * the trampoline area must be encrypted.
> */
> -bool sme_active(void)
> -{
> - return sme_me_mask && !sev_enabled;
> -}
> -
> bool sev_active(void)
> {
> return sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED;
> }
>
> +bool sme_active(void)
> +{
> + return sme_me_mask && !sev_active();
> +}
> +
> /* Needs to be called from non-instrumentable code */
> bool noinstr sev_es_active(void)
> {
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
> index 6c5eb6f3f14f..0c2759b7f03a 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
> @@ -545,7 +545,6 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
>
> /* SEV state cannot be controlled by a command line option */
> sme_me_mask = me_mask;
> - sev_enabled = true;
> physical_mask &= ~sme_me_mask;
> return;
> }
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