linux-kernel - [PATCH v2 11/14] KVM: SVM: Move SEV VMCB tracking allocation to sev.c

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Message-Id: <20210114003708.3798992-12-seanjc@google.com>
Date:   Wed, 13 Jan 2021 16:37:05 -0800
From:   Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
To:     Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Cc:     Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
        Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
        Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>,
        Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
        Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 11/14] KVM: SVM: Move SEV VMCB tracking allocation to sev.c

Move the allocation of the SEV VMCB array to sev.c to help pave the way
toward encapsulating SEV enabling wholly within sev.c.

No functional change intended.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 13 +++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 17 ++++++++---------
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h |  1 +
 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 1a143340103e..a2c3e2d42a7f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -1330,6 +1330,19 @@ void sev_hardware_teardown(void)
 	sev_flush_asids();
 }
 
+int sev_cpu_init(struct svm_cpu_data *sd)
+{
+	if (!svm_sev_enabled())
+		return 0;
+
+	sd->sev_vmcbs = kmalloc_array(max_sev_asid + 1, sizeof(void *),
+				      GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
+	if (!sd->sev_vmcbs)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /*
  * Pages used by hardware to hold guest encrypted state must be flushed before
  * returning them to the system.
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index bb7b99743bea..89b95fb87a0c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -552,23 +552,22 @@ static void svm_cpu_uninit(int cpu)
 static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu)
 {
 	struct svm_cpu_data *sd;
+	int ret;
 
 	sd = kzalloc(sizeof(struct svm_cpu_data), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!sd)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	sd->cpu = cpu;
 	sd->save_area = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!sd->save_area)
+	if (!sd->save_area) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
 		goto free_cpu_data;
+	}
 	clear_page(page_address(sd->save_area));
 
-	if (svm_sev_enabled()) {
-		sd->sev_vmcbs = kmalloc_array(max_sev_asid + 1,
-					      sizeof(void *),
-					      GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
-		if (!sd->sev_vmcbs)
-			goto free_save_area;
-	}
+	ret = sev_cpu_init(sd);
+	if (ret)
+		goto free_save_area;
 
 	per_cpu(svm_data, cpu) = sd;
 
@@ -578,7 +577,7 @@ static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu)
 	__free_page(sd->save_area);
 free_cpu_data:
 	kfree(sd);
-	return -ENOMEM;
+	return ret;
 
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
index 8e169835f52a..4eb4bab0ca3e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
@@ -583,6 +583,7 @@ int svm_unregister_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm,
 void pre_sev_run(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int cpu);
 void __init sev_hardware_setup(void);
 void sev_hardware_teardown(void);
+int sev_cpu_init(struct svm_cpu_data *sd);
 void sev_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 int sev_handle_vmgexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
 int sev_es_string_io(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int size, unsigned int port, int in);
-- 
2.30.0.284.gd98b1dd5eaa7-goog