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Message-ID: <20210120203504.GM2260413@casper.infradead.org>
Date: Wed, 20 Jan 2021 20:35:04 +0000
From: Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>
To: Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
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James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>,
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Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
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Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@...belt.com>,
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Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v15 06/11] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to
create "secret" memory areas
On Wed, Jan 20, 2021 at 08:06:07PM +0200, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> +static struct page *secretmem_alloc_page(gfp_t gfp)
> +{
> + /*
> + * FIXME: use a cache of large pages to reduce the direct map
> + * fragmentation
> + */
> + return alloc_page(gfp);
> +}
> +
> +static vm_fault_t secretmem_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
> +{
> + struct address_space *mapping = vmf->vma->vm_file->f_mapping;
> + struct inode *inode = file_inode(vmf->vma->vm_file);
> + pgoff_t offset = vmf->pgoff;
> + unsigned long addr;
> + struct page *page;
> + int err;
> +
> + if (((loff_t)vmf->pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT) >= i_size_read(inode))
> + return vmf_error(-EINVAL);
> +
> +retry:
> + page = find_lock_page(mapping, offset);
> + if (!page) {
> + page = secretmem_alloc_page(vmf->gfp_mask);
> + if (!page)
> + return VM_FAULT_OOM;
> +
> + err = set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(page, 1);
> + if (err)
> + return vmf_error(err);
Haven't we leaked the page at this point?
> + __SetPageUptodate(page);
> + err = add_to_page_cache(page, mapping, offset, vmf->gfp_mask);
At this point, doesn't the page contain data from the last person to use
the page? ie we've leaked data to this process? I don't see anywhere
that we write data to the page.
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