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Message-ID: <YAmj4Q2J9htW2Fe8@mtj.duckdns.org>
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2021 10:55:13 -0500
From: Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
Cc: Vipin Sharma <vipinsh@...gle.com>, brijesh.singh@....com,
jon.grimm@....com, eric.vantassell@....com, pbonzini@...hat.com,
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jmattson@...gle.com, tglx@...utronix.de, mingo@...hat.com,
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rientjes@...gle.com, dionnaglaze@...gle.com, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
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Subject: Re: [Patch v4 1/2] cgroup: svm: Add Encryption ID controller
Hello,
On Thu, Jan 21, 2021 at 08:55:07AM -0600, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> The hardware will allow any SEV capable ASID to be run as SEV-ES, however,
> the SEV firmware will not allow the activation of an SEV-ES VM to be
> assigned to an ASID greater than or equal to the SEV minimum ASID value. The
> reason for the latter is to prevent an !SEV-ES ASID starting out as an
> SEV-ES guest and then disabling the SEV-ES VMCB bit that is used by VMRUN.
> This would result in the downgrading of the security of the VM without the
> VM realizing it.
>
> As a result, you have a range of ASIDs that can only run SEV-ES VMs and a
> range of ASIDs that can only run SEV VMs.
I see. That makes sense. What's the downside of SEV-ES compared to SEV w/o
ES? Are there noticeable performance / feature penalties or is the split
mostly for backward compatibility?
Thanks.
--
tejun
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