linux-kernel - [PATCH v2 3/4] KVM: SVM: Add support for VMCB address check change

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Message-Id: <20210121065508.1169585-4-wei.huang2@amd.com>
Date:   Thu, 21 Jan 2021 01:55:07 -0500
From:   Wei Huang <wei.huang2@....com>
To:     kvm@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, pbonzini@...hat.com,
        vkuznets@...hat.com, mlevitsk@...hat.com, seanjc@...gle.com,
        joro@...tes.org, bp@...en8.de, tglx@...utronix.de,
        mingo@...hat.com, x86@...nel.org, jmattson@...gle.com,
        wanpengli@...cent.com, bsd@...hat.com, dgilbert@...hat.com,
        luto@...capital.net, wei.huang2@....com
Subject: [PATCH v2 3/4] KVM: SVM: Add support for VMCB address check change

New AMD CPUs have a change that checks VMEXIT intercept on special SVM
instructions before checking their EAX against reserved memory region.
This change is indicated by CPUID_0x8000000A_EDX[28]. If it is 1, #VMEXIT
is triggered before #GP. KVM doesn't need to intercept and emulate #GP
faults as #GP is supposed to be triggered.

Co-developed-by: Bandan Das <bsd@...hat.com>
Signed-off-by: Bandan Das <bsd@...hat.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Huang <wei.huang2@....com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c             | 6 +++++-
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 84b887825f12..ea89d6fdd79a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -337,6 +337,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_AVIC		(15*32+13) /* Virtual Interrupt Controller */
 #define X86_FEATURE_V_VMSAVE_VMLOAD	(15*32+15) /* Virtual VMSAVE VMLOAD */
 #define X86_FEATURE_VGIF		(15*32+16) /* Virtual GIF */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SVME_ADDR_CHK	(15*32+28) /* "" SVME addr check */
 
 /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (ECX), word 16 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512VBMI		(16*32+ 1) /* AVX512 Vector Bit Manipulation instructions*/
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 6ed523cab068..2a12870ac71a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -313,7 +313,8 @@ int svm_set_efer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 efer)
 	svm->vmcb->save.efer = efer | EFER_SVME;
 	vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_CR);
 	/* Enable #GP interception for SVM instructions */
-	set_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
+	if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SVME_ADDR_CHK))
+		set_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -933,6 +934,9 @@ static __init void svm_set_cpu_caps(void)
 	    boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD))
 		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD);
 
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SVME_ADDR_CHK))
+		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SVME_ADDR_CHK);
+
 	/* Enable INVPCID feature */
 	kvm_cpu_cap_check_and_set(X86_FEATURE_INVPCID);
 }
-- 
2.27.0