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Date:   Wed, 20 Jan 2021 16:09:28 -0600
From:   Babu Moger <babu.moger@....com>
To:     Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
Cc:     pbonzini@...hat.com, tglx@...utronix.de, mingo@...hat.com,
        bp@...en8.de, fenghua.yu@...el.com, tony.luck@...el.com,
        wanpengli@...cent.com, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
        thomas.lendacky@....com, peterz@...radead.org, joro@...tes.org,
        x86@...nel.org, kyung.min.park@...el.com,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, krish.sadhukhan@...cle.com,
        hpa@...or.com, mgross@...ux.intel.com, vkuznets@...hat.com,
        kim.phillips@....com, wei.huang2@....com, jmattson@...gle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] KVM: SVM: Add support for Virtual SPEC_CTRL



On 1/19/21 5:45 PM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 19, 2021, Babu Moger wrote:
>>
>> On 1/19/21 12:31 PM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
>>> On Fri, Jan 15, 2021, Babu Moger wrote:
>>>> @@ -3789,7 +3792,10 @@ static __no_kcsan fastpath_t svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>>>>  	 * is no need to worry about the conditional branch over the wrmsr
>>>>  	 * being speculatively taken.
>>>>  	 */
>>>> -	x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(svm->spec_ctrl, svm->virt_spec_ctrl);
>>>> +	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_SPEC_CTRL))
>>>> +		svm->vmcb->save.spec_ctrl = svm->spec_ctrl;
>>>> +	else
>>>> +		x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(svm->spec_ctrl, svm->virt_spec_ctrl);
>>>
>>> Can't we avoid functional code in svm_vcpu_run() entirely when V_SPEC_CTRL is
>>> supported?  Make this code a nop, disable interception from time zero, and
>>
>> Sean, I thought you mentioned earlier about not changing the interception
>> mechanism.
> 
> I assume you're referring to this comment?
> 
>   On Mon, Dec 7, 2020 at 3:13 PM Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com> wrote:
>   >
>   > On Mon, Dec 07, 2020, Babu Moger wrote:
>   > > When this feature is enabled, the hypervisor no longer has to
>   > > intercept the usage of the SPEC_CTRL MSR and no longer is required to
>   > > save and restore the guest SPEC_CTRL setting when switching
>   > > hypervisor/guest modes.
>   >
>   > Well, it's still required if the hypervisor wanted to allow the guest to turn
>   > off mitigations that are enabled in the host.  I'd omit this entirely and focus
>   > on what hardware does and how Linux/KVM utilize the new feature.
> 
> I wasn't suggesting that KVM should intercept SPEC_CTRL, I was pointing out that
> there exists a scenario where a hypervisor would need/want to intercept
> SPEC_CTRL, and that stating that a hypervisor is/isn't required to do something
> isn't helpful in a KVM/Linux changelog because it doesn't describe the actual
> change, nor does it help understand _why_ the change is correct.

Ok. Got it.

> 
>> Do you think we should disable the interception right away if V_SPEC_CTRL is
>> supported?
> 
> Yes, unless I'm missing an interaction somewhere, that will simplify the get/set
> flows as they won't need to handle the case where the MSR is intercepted when
> V_SPEC_CTRL is supported.  If the MSR is conditionally passed through, the get
> flow would need to check if the MSR is intercepted to determine whether
> svm->spec_ctrl or svm->vmcb->save.spec_ctrl holds the guest's value.

Ok. Sure.

> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> index cce0143a6f80..40f1bd449cfa 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> @@ -2678,7 +2678,10 @@ static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
>                     !guest_has_spec_ctrl_msr(vcpu))
>                         return 1;
>  
> -               msr_info->data = svm->spec_ctrl;
> +               if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_SPEC_CTRL))
> +                       msr_info->data = svm->vmcb->save.spec_ctrl;
> +               else
> +                       msr_info->data = svm->spec_ctrl;
>                 break;
>         case MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL:
>                 if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
> @@ -2779,6 +2782,11 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
>                 if (kvm_spec_ctrl_test_value(data))
>                         return 1;
>  
> +               if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_SPEC_CTRL)) {
> +                       svm->vmcb->save.spec_ctrl = data;
> +                       break;
> +               }
> +
>                 svm->spec_ctrl = data;
>                 if (!data)
>                         break;
> 
>>> read/write the VMBC field in svm_{get,set}_msr().  I.e. don't touch
>>> svm->spec_ctrl if V_SPEC_CTRL is supported.  

Sure. Will make these changes.

>  
> Potentially harebrained alternative...
> 
> From an architectural SVM perspective, what are the rules for VMCB fields that
> don't exist (on the current hardware)?  E.g. are they reserved MBZ?  If not,
> does the SVM architecture guarantee that reserved fields will not be modified?
> I couldn't (quickly) find anything in the APM that explicitly states what
> happens with defined-but-not-existent fields.

I checked with our hardware design team about this. They dont want
software to make any assumptions about these fields.
thanks
Babu

> 
> Specifically in the context of this change, ignoring nested correctness, what
> would happen if KVM used the VMCB field even on CPUs without V_SPEC_CTRL?  Would
> this explode on VMRUN?  Risk silent corruption?  Just Work (TM)?
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> index cce0143a6f80..22a6a7c35d0a 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> @@ -1285,7 +1285,6 @@ static void svm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
>         u32 dummy;
>         u32 eax = 1;
> 
> -       svm->spec_ctrl = 0;
>         svm->virt_spec_ctrl = 0;
> 
>         if (!init_event) {
> @@ -2678,7 +2677,7 @@ static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
>                     !guest_has_spec_ctrl_msr(vcpu))
>                         return 1;
> 
> -               msr_info->data = svm->spec_ctrl;
> +               msr_info->data = svm->vmcb->save.spec_ctrl;
>                 break;
>         case MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL:
>                 if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
> @@ -2779,7 +2778,7 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
>                 if (kvm_spec_ctrl_test_value(data))
>                         return 1;
> 
> -               svm->spec_ctrl = data;
> +               svm->vmcb->save.spec_ctrl = data;
>                 if (!data)
>                         break;
> 
> @@ -3791,7 +3790,7 @@ static __no_kcsan fastpath_t svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>          * is no need to worry about the conditional branch over the wrmsr
>          * being speculatively taken.
>          */
> -       x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(svm->spec_ctrl, svm->virt_spec_ctrl);
> +       x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(svm->vmcb->save.spec_ctrl, svm->virt_spec_ctrl);
> 
>         svm_vcpu_enter_exit(vcpu, svm);
> 
> @@ -3811,12 +3810,12 @@ static __no_kcsan fastpath_t svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>          * save it.
>          */
>         if (unlikely(!msr_write_intercepted(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL)))
> -               svm->spec_ctrl = native_read_msr(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL);
> +               svm->vmcb->save.spec_ctrl = native_read_msr(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL);
> 
>         if (!sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm))
>                 reload_tss(vcpu);
> 
> -       x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(svm->spec_ctrl, svm->virt_spec_ctrl);
> +       x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(svm->vmcb->save.spec_ctrl, svm->virt_spec_ctrl);
> 
>         if (!sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm)) {
>                 vcpu->arch.cr2 = svm->vmcb->save.cr2;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> index 5431e6335e2e..a4f9417e3b7e 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> @@ -137,7 +137,6 @@ struct vcpu_svm {
>                 u64 gs_base;
>         } host;
> 
> -       u64 spec_ctrl;
>         /*
>          * Contains guest-controlled bits of VIRT_SPEC_CTRL, which will be
>          * translated into the appropriate L2_CFG bits on the host to
> 

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