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Message-ID: <5a151e3ccc1fd041482807f1caa03f1ccabe3080.camel@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Sun, 24 Jan 2021 09:01:58 -0500
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@...il.com>,
tusharsu@...ux.microsoft.com, tyhicks@...ux.microsoft.com,
casey@...aufler-ca.com, agk@...hat.com, snitzer@...hat.com,
gmazyland@...il.com, sashal@...nel.org,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, selinux@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@...ux.microsoft.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] selinux: include a consumer of the new IMA critical
data hook
On Fri, 2021-01-22 at 15:24 -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 14, 2021 at 2:15 PM Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
> <nramas@...ux.microsoft.com> wrote:
> >
> > SELinux stores the active policy in memory, so the changes to this data
> > at runtime would have an impact on the security guarantees provided
> > by SELinux. Measuring in-memory SELinux policy through IMA subsystem
> > provides a secure way for the attestation service to remotely validate
> > the policy contents at runtime.
> >
> > Measure the hash of the loaded policy by calling the IMA hook
> > ima_measure_critical_data(). Since the size of the loaded policy
> > can be large (several MB), measure the hash of the policy instead of
> > the entire policy to avoid bloating the IMA log entry.
> >
> > To enable SELinux data measurement, the following steps are required:
> >
> > 1, Add "ima_policy=critical_data" to the kernel command line arguments
> > to enable measuring SELinux data at boot time.
> > For example,
> > BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/vmlinuz-5.10.0-rc1+ root=UUID=fd643309-a5d2-4ed3-b10d-3c579a5fab2f ro nomodeset security=selinux ima_policy=critical_data
> >
> > 2, Add the following rule to /etc/ima/ima-policy
> > measure func=CRITICAL_DATA label=selinux
> >
> > Sample measurement of the hash of SELinux policy:
> >
> > To verify the measured data with the current SELinux policy run
> > the following commands and verify the output hash values match.
> >
> > sha256sum /sys/fs/selinux/policy | cut -d' ' -f 1
> >
> > grep "selinux-policy-hash" /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | tail -1 | cut -d' ' -f 6
> >
> > Note that the actual verification of SELinux policy would require loading
> > the expected policy into an identical kernel on a pristine/known-safe
> > system and run the sha256sum /sys/kernel/selinux/policy there to get
> > the expected hash.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@...ux.microsoft.com>
> > Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@...il.com>
> > Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
> > Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@...ux.microsoft.com>
> > ---
> > Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 3 +-
> > security/selinux/Makefile | 2 +
> > security/selinux/ima.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++
> > security/selinux/include/ima.h | 24 +++++++++++
> > security/selinux/include/security.h | 3 +-
> > security/selinux/ss/services.c | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----
> > 6 files changed, 129 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
> > create mode 100644 security/selinux/ima.c
> > create mode 100644 security/selinux/include/ima.h
>
> Hi Mimi,
>
> Just checking as I didn't see a reply to this from you in my inbox,
> you merged this into the IMA linux-next branch, yes?
The patches are first staged in the linux-integrity #next-integrity-
testing branch, before being staged in the #next-integrity branch,
which is picked up by linux-next. Sorry, they've been staged in the
next-integrity-testing branch, but are now next-integrity.
Mim
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