linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v16 06/11] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas

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Message-ID: <20210126090013.GF827@dhcp22.suse.cz>
Date:   Tue, 26 Jan 2021 10:00:13 +0100
From:   Michal Hocko <mhocko@...e.com>
To:     Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org>
Cc:     Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
        Christopher Lameter <cl@...ux.com>,
        Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>,
        Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>,
        "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>,
        Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>,
        Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
        Mike Rapoport <rppt@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>,
        Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@...belt.com>,
        Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@...ive.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>,
        Roman Gushchin <guro@...com>,
        Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@...gle.com>,
        Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ho.ws>, Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>,
        linux-api@...r.kernel.org, linux-arch@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
        linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-nvdimm@...ts.01.org, linux-riscv@...ts.infradead.org,
        x86@...nel.org, Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@...u.net>,
        Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v16 06/11] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to
 create "secret" memory areas

On Tue 26-01-21 10:33:11, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 26, 2021 at 08:16:14AM +0100, Michal Hocko wrote:
> > On Mon 25-01-21 23:36:18, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> > > On Mon, Jan 25, 2021 at 06:01:22PM +0100, Michal Hocko wrote:
> > > > On Thu 21-01-21 14:27:18, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> > > > > From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@...ux.ibm.com>
> > > > > 
> > > > > Introduce "memfd_secret" system call with the ability to create memory
> > > > > areas visible only in the context of the owning process and not mapped not
> > > > > only to other processes but in the kernel page tables as well.
> > > > > 
> > > > > The user will create a file descriptor using the memfd_secret() system
> > > > > call. The memory areas created by mmap() calls from this file descriptor
> > > > > will be unmapped from the kernel direct map and they will be only mapped in
> > > > > the page table of the owning mm.
> > > > > 
> > > > > The secret memory remains accessible in the process context using uaccess
> > > > > primitives, but it is not accessible using direct/linear map addresses.
> > > > > 
> > > > > Functions in the follow_page()/get_user_page() family will refuse to return
> > > > > a page that belongs to the secret memory area.
> > > > > 
> > > > > A page that was a part of the secret memory area is cleared when it is
> > > > > freed.
> > > > > 
> > > > > The following example demonstrates creation of a secret mapping (error
> > > > > handling is omitted):
> > > > > 
> > > > > 	fd = memfd_secret(0);
> > > > > 	ftruncate(fd, MAP_SIZE);
> > > > > 	ptr = mmap(NULL, MAP_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
> > > > 
> > > > I do not see any access control or permission model for this feature.
> > > > Is this feature generally safe to anybody?
> > > 
> > > The mappings obey memlock limit. Besides, this feature should be enabled
> > > explicitly at boot with the kernel parameter that says what is the maximal
> > > memory size secretmem can consume.
> > 
> > Why is such a model sufficient and future proof? I mean even when it has
> > to be enabled by an admin it is still all or nothing approach. Mlock
> > limit is not really useful because it is per mm rather than per user.
> > 
> > Is there any reason why this is allowed for non-privileged processes?
> > Maybe this has been discussed in the past but is there any reason why
> > this cannot be done by a special device which will allow to provide at
> > least some permission policy?
>  
> Why this should not be allowed for non-privileged processes? This behaves
> similarly to mlocked memory, so I don't see a reason why secretmem should
> have different permissions model.

Because appart from the reclaim aspect it fragments the direct mapping
IIUC. That might have an impact on all others, right?

-- 
Michal Hocko
SUSE Labs