linux-kernel - [PATCH] Fix unsynchronized access to sev members through svm_register_enc

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Message-Id: <20210126185431.1824530-1-pgonda@google.com>
Date:   Tue, 26 Jan 2021 10:54:30 -0800
From:   Peter Gonda <pgonda@...gle.com>
To:     kvm@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Peter Gonda <pgonda@...gle.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
        Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
        Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>,
        Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>, x86@...nel.org,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] Fix unsynchronized access to sev members through svm_register_enc_region

sev_pin_memory assumes that callers hold the kvm->lock. This was true for
all callers except svm_register_enc_region since it does not originate
from svm_mem_enc_op. Also added lockdep annotation to help prevent
future regressions.

Tested: Booted SEV enabled VM on host.

Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
Cc: x86@...nel.org
Cc: kvm@...r.kernel.org
Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Fixes: 116a2214c5173 (KVM: SVM: Pin guest memory when SEV is active)
Signed-off-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@...gle.com>

---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 16 +++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index afdc5b44fe9f..9884e57f3d0f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -1699,6 +1699,8 @@ static struct page **sev_pin_memory(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long uaddr,
 	struct page **pages;
 	unsigned long first, last;
 
+	lockdep_assert_held(&kvm->lock);
+
 	if (ulen == 0 || uaddr + ulen < uaddr)
 		return NULL;
 
@@ -7228,12 +7230,19 @@ static int svm_register_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm,
 	if (!region)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
+	mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
 	region->pages = sev_pin_memory(kvm, range->addr, range->size, &region->npages, 1);
 	if (!region->pages) {
 		ret = -ENOMEM;
 		goto e_free;
 	}
 
+	region->uaddr = range->addr;
+	region->size = range->size;
+
+	list_add_tail(&region->list, &sev->regions_list);
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
+
 	/*
 	 * The guest may change the memory encryption attribute from C=0 -> C=1
 	 * or vice versa for this memory range. Lets make sure caches are
@@ -7242,13 +7251,6 @@ static int svm_register_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm,
 	 */
 	sev_clflush_pages(region->pages, region->npages);
 
-	region->uaddr = range->addr;
-	region->size = range->size;
-
-	mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
-	list_add_tail(&region->list, &sev->regions_list);
-	mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
-
 	return ret;
 
 e_free:
-- 
2.30.0.280.ga3ce27912f-goog