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Message-ID: <YBE8Pj8t8bsVroyQ@alley>
Date: Wed, 27 Jan 2021 11:11:10 +0100
From: Petr Mladek <pmladek@...e.com>
To: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>
Cc: Timur Tabi <timur@...nel.org>, Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@...il.com>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, torvalds@...ux-foundation.org,
roman.fietze@...na.com, keescook@...omium.org,
John Ogness <john.ogness@...utronix.de>, linux-mm@...ck.org,
Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/2] introduce DUMP_PREFIX_UNHASHED for hex dumps
On Tue 2021-01-26 12:40:32, Steven Rostedt wrote:
> On Tue, 26 Jan 2021 12:39:12 -0500
> Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org> wrote:
>
> > On Tue, 26 Jan 2021 11:30:02 -0600
> > Timur Tabi <timur@...nel.org> wrote:
> >
> > > On 1/26/21 11:14 AM, Vlastimil Babka wrote:
> > > > If it was a boot option, I would personally be for leaving hashing enabled by
> > > > default, with opt-in boot option to disable it.
> > >
> > > A boot option would solve all my problems. I wouldn't need to recompile
> > > the kernel, and it would apply to all variations of printk.
> >
> > Should it be called "make-printk-insecure"
Nit: This makes me feel that printk() might break (block) the system.
Please, make it more clear that it is about unveiling some secret
information, something like:
"non-secret-printk"
"non-confidental-printk"
"unretricted-printk"
I do not mind about the words order or using the
"make-printk-non-secret" form.
> And even if we make this a boot time option, perhaps we should still
> include that nasty dmesg notice, which will let people know that the kernel
> has unhashed values.
+1
Best Regards,
Petr
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