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Message-ID: <87o8h8x1a6.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
Date: Thu, 28 Jan 2021 14:19:13 -0600
From: ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@...hat.com>,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-unionfs@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] security.capability: fix conversions on getxattr
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com> writes:
> On Tue, Jan 19, 2021 at 07:34:49PM -0600, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>> Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@...hat.com> writes:
>>
>> > If a capability is stored on disk in v2 format cap_inode_getsecurity() will
>> > currently return in v2 format unconditionally.
>> >
>> > This is wrong: v2 cap should be equivalent to a v3 cap with zero rootid,
>> > and so the same conversions performed on it.
>> >
>> > If the rootid cannot be mapped v3 is returned unconverted. Fix this so
>> > that both v2 and v3 return -EOVERFLOW if the rootid (or the owner of the fs
>> > user namespace in case of v2) cannot be mapped in the current user
>> > namespace.
>>
>> This looks like a good cleanup.
>
> Sorry, I'm not following. Why is this a good cleanup? Why should
> the xattr be shown as faked v3 in this case?
If the reader is in &init_user_ns. If the filesystem was mounted in a
user namespace. Then the reader looses the information that the
capability xattr only applies to a subset of user namespaces.
A trivial place where this would be important is if userspace was to
copy the file and the associated capability xattr to another
filesystem, that is mounted differently.
<aside>
>From our previous discussions I would also argue it would be good
if there was a bypass that skipped all conversions if the reader
and the filesystem are in the same user namespace.
</aside>
> A separate question below.
>
>> I do wonder how well this works with stacking. In particular
>> ovl_xattr_set appears to call vfs_getxattr without overriding the creds.
>> What the purpose of that is I haven't quite figured out. It looks like
>> it is just a probe to see if an xattr is present so maybe it is ok.
>>
>> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
>>
>> >
>> > Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@...hat.com>
>> > ---
>> > security/commoncap.c | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
>> > 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
>> >
>> > diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
>> > index bacc1111d871..c9d99f8f4c82 100644
>> > --- a/security/commoncap.c
>> > +++ b/security/commoncap.c
>> > @@ -371,10 +371,11 @@ int cap_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer,
>> > {
>> > int size, ret;
>> > kuid_t kroot;
>> > + __le32 nsmagic, magic;
>> > uid_t root, mappedroot;
>> > char *tmpbuf = NULL;
>> > struct vfs_cap_data *cap;
>> > - struct vfs_ns_cap_data *nscap;
>> > + struct vfs_ns_cap_data *nscap = NULL;
>> > struct dentry *dentry;
>> > struct user_namespace *fs_ns;
>> >
>> > @@ -396,46 +397,61 @@ int cap_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer,
>> > fs_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns;
>> > cap = (struct vfs_cap_data *) tmpbuf;
>> > if (is_v2header((size_t) ret, cap)) {
>> > - /* If this is sizeof(vfs_cap_data) then we're ok with the
>> > - * on-disk value, so return that. */
>> > - if (alloc)
>> > - *buffer = tmpbuf;
>> > - else
>> > - kfree(tmpbuf);
>> > - return ret;
>> > - } else if (!is_v3header((size_t) ret, cap)) {
>> > - kfree(tmpbuf);
>> > - return -EINVAL;
>> > + root = 0;
>> > + } else if (is_v3header((size_t) ret, cap)) {
>> > + nscap = (struct vfs_ns_cap_data *) tmpbuf;
>> > + root = le32_to_cpu(nscap->rootid);
>> > + } else {
>> > + size = -EINVAL;
>> > + goto out_free;
>> > }
>> >
>> > - nscap = (struct vfs_ns_cap_data *) tmpbuf;
>> > - root = le32_to_cpu(nscap->rootid);
>> > kroot = make_kuid(fs_ns, root);
>> >
>> > /* If the root kuid maps to a valid uid in current ns, then return
>> > * this as a nscap. */
>> > mappedroot = from_kuid(current_user_ns(), kroot);
>> > if (mappedroot != (uid_t)-1 && mappedroot != (uid_t)0) {
>> > + size = sizeof(struct vfs_ns_cap_data);
>> > if (alloc) {
>> > - *buffer = tmpbuf;
>> > + if (!nscap) {
>> > + /* v2 -> v3 conversion */
>> > + nscap = kzalloc(size, GFP_ATOMIC);
>> > + if (!nscap) {
>> > + size = -ENOMEM;
>> > + goto out_free;
>> > + }
>> > + nsmagic = VFS_CAP_REVISION_3;
>> > + magic = le32_to_cpu(cap->magic_etc);
>> > + if (magic & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE)
>> > + nsmagic |= VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE;
>> > + memcpy(&nscap->data, &cap->data, sizeof(__le32) * 2 * VFS_CAP_U32);
>> > + nscap->magic_etc = cpu_to_le32(nsmagic);
>> > + } else {
>> > + /* use allocated v3 buffer */
>> > + tmpbuf = NULL;
>> > + }
>> > nscap->rootid = cpu_to_le32(mappedroot);
>> > - } else
>> > - kfree(tmpbuf);
>> > - return size;
>> > + *buffer = nscap;
>> > + }
>> > + goto out_free;
>> > }
>> >
>> > if (!rootid_owns_currentns(kroot)) {
>> > - kfree(tmpbuf);
>> > - return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>> > + size = -EOVERFLOW;
>
> Why this change? Christian (cc:d) noticed that this is a user visible change.
> Without this change, if you are in a userns which has different rootid, the
> EOVERFLOW tells vfs_getxattr to vall back to __vfs_getxattr() and so you can
> see the v3 capability with its rootid.
>
> With this change, you instead just get EOVERFLOW.
Returning EOVERFLOW is the desired behavior when the rootid can not be
represented by the calling userspace.
Today when you execute such a file from such a namespace the file will
run without any file capabilities because get_vfs_caps_from_disk
returns -ENODATA.
However today if you copy the file will all of it's xattrs onto another
filesystem the new file will have a v3 cap that will grant capabilities
in some contexts. That mismatch is potentially a security problem.
Which means the only sane thing to do is to fail so userspace does not
think it can safely copy or comprehend all of the xattrs of the file.
>> > + goto out_free;
>> > }
>> >
>> > /* This comes from a parent namespace. Return as a v2 capability */
>> > size = sizeof(struct vfs_cap_data);
>> > if (alloc) {
>> > - *buffer = kmalloc(size, GFP_ATOMIC);
>> > - if (*buffer) {
>> > - struct vfs_cap_data *cap = *buffer;
>> > - __le32 nsmagic, magic;
>> > + if (nscap) {
>> > + /* v3 -> v2 conversion */
>> > + cap = kzalloc(size, GFP_ATOMIC);
>> > + if (!cap) {
>> > + size = -ENOMEM;
>> > + goto out_free;
>> > + }
>> > magic = VFS_CAP_REVISION_2;
>> > nsmagic = le32_to_cpu(nscap->magic_etc);
>> > if (nsmagic & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE)
>> > @@ -443,9 +459,12 @@ int cap_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer,
>> > memcpy(&cap->data, &nscap->data, sizeof(__le32) * 2 * VFS_CAP_U32);
>> > cap->magic_etc = cpu_to_le32(magic);
>> > } else {
>> > - size = -ENOMEM;
>> > + /* use unconverted v2 */
>> > + tmpbuf = NULL;
>> > }
>> > + *buffer = cap;
>> > }
>> > +out_free:
>> > kfree(tmpbuf);
>> > return size;
>> > }
Eric
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