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Message-Id: <86F8CE62-A94B-46BD-9A29-DBE1CC14AA83@amacapital.net>
Date: Fri, 29 Jan 2021 11:58:21 -0800
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>, x86@...nel.org,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@...il.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@...hat.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@...cle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>,
Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@...el.com>,
Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@....com>,
Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>,
Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v18 02/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode control-flow protection
> On Jan 29, 2021, at 11:42 AM, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com> wrote:
>
> On 1/27/21 1:25 PM, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
>> + help
>> + Control-flow protection is a hardware security hardening feature
>> + that detects function-return address or jump target changes by
>> + malicious code.
>
> It's not really one feature. I also think it's not worth talking about
> shadow stacks or indirect branch tracking in *here*. Leave that for
> Documentation/.
>
> Just say:
>
> Control-flow protection is a set of hardware features which
> place additional restrictions on indirect branches. These help
> mitigate ROP attacks.
>
> ... and add more in the IBT patches.
>
>> Applications must be enabled to use it, and old
>> + userspace does not get protection "for free".
>> + Support for this feature is present on processors released in
>> + 2020 or later. Enabling this feature increases kernel text size
>> + by 3.7 KB.
>
> Did any CPUs ever get released that have this? If so, name them. If
> not, time to change this to 2021, I think.
Zen 3 :)
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