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Message-Id: <3de04b5b638546ac75d42ba52307fe1a922173d3.1612203987.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 2021 12:26:27 -0600
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>
Subject: [PATCH] x86/sev-es: Do not unroll string I/O for SEV-ES guests
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
Under the GHCB specification, SEV-ES guests can support string I/O. The
current #VC handler contains this support, so remove the need to unroll
kernel string I/O operations. This will reduce the number of #VC
exceptions generated as well as the number VMEXITS for the guest.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
---
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index c79e5736ab2b..d55ea77e1ca8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -474,9 +474,10 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_init(void)
swiotlb_update_mem_attributes();
/*
- * With SEV, we need to unroll the rep string I/O instructions.
+ * With SEV, we need to unroll the rep string I/O instructions,
+ * but SEV-ES supports them through the #VC handler.
*/
- if (sev_active())
+ if (sev_active() && !sev_es_active())
static_branch_enable(&sev_enable_key);
print_mem_encrypt_feature_info();
base-commit: a7e0bdf1b07ea6169930ec42b0bdb17e1c1e3bb0
--
2.30.0
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