linux-kernel - [PATCH 03/12] kasan: optimize large kmalloc poisoning

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Message-Id: <8fdbf86842f4eaf2458ecd23d0844058dbc2c7a2.1612208222.git.andreyknvl@google.com>
Date:   Mon,  1 Feb 2021 20:43:27 +0100
From:   Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>
To:     Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
        Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@....com>,
        Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
        Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
        Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>
Cc:     Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>,
        Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>,
        Peter Collingbourne <pcc@...gle.com>,
        Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@...gle.com>,
        Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@....com>,
        Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@....com>,
        kasan-dev@...glegroups.com, linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
        linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>
Subject: [PATCH 03/12] kasan: optimize large kmalloc poisoning

Similarly to kasan_kmalloc(), kasan_kmalloc_large() doesn't need
to unpoison the object as it as already unpoisoned by alloc_pages()
(or by ksize() for krealloc()).

This patch changes kasan_kmalloc_large() to only poison the redzone.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>
---
 mm/kasan/common.c | 20 +++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
index 128cb330ca73..a7eb553c8e91 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/common.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
@@ -494,7 +494,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kasan_kmalloc);
 void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size,
 						gfp_t flags)
 {
-	struct page *page;
 	unsigned long redzone_start;
 	unsigned long redzone_end;
 
@@ -504,12 +503,23 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size,
 	if (unlikely(ptr == NULL))
 		return NULL;
 
-	page = virt_to_page(ptr);
+	/*
+	 * The object has already been unpoisoned by kasan_alloc_pages() for
+	 * alloc_pages() or by ksize() for krealloc().
+	 */
+
+	/*
+	 * The redzone has byte-level precision for the generic mode.
+	 * Partially poison the last object granule to cover the unaligned
+	 * part of the redzone.
+	 */
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC))
+		kasan_poison_last_granule(ptr, size);
+
+	/* Poison the aligned part of the redzone. */
 	redzone_start = round_up((unsigned long)(ptr + size),
 				KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
-	redzone_end = (unsigned long)ptr + page_size(page);
-
-	kasan_unpoison(ptr, size);
+	redzone_end = (unsigned long)ptr + page_size(virt_to_page(ptr));
 	kasan_poison((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
 		     KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE);
 
-- 
2.30.0.365.g02bc693789-goog