[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <YBg0Sy3MlD0Rn3mF@google.com>
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 2021 09:03:07 -0800
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
jmattson@...gle.com, stable@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] KVM: x86: Allow guests to see MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL even
if tsx=off
On Mon, Feb 01, 2021, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> On 29/01/21 17:58, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > On Fri, Jan 29, 2021, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> > > */
> > > if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM))
> > > - data &= ~(ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO | ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR);
> > > + data &= ~ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO;
> >
> > Hmm, simply clearing TSX_CTRL will only preserve the host value. Since
> > ARCH_CAPABILITIES is unconditionally emulated by KVM, wouldn't it make sense to
> > unconditionally expose TSX_CTRL as well, as opposed to exposing it only if it's
> > supported in the host? I.e. allow migrating a TSX-disabled guest to a host
> > without TSX. Or am I misunderstanding how TSX_CTRL is checked/used?
>
> I'm a bit wary of having a combination (MDS_NO=0, TSX_CTRL=1) that does not
> exist on bare metal. There are other cases where such combinations can
> happen, especially with the Spectre and SSBD mitigations (for example due to
> AMD CPUID bits for Intel processors), but at least those are just
> redundancies in the CPUID bits and it's more likely that the guest does
> something sensible with them.
Gotcha. The vulnerability combos and all the double and triple negatives make
my head spin.
Thanks!
Powered by blists - more mailing lists