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Message-ID: <202102041154.F0264AC33@keescook>
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2021 11:56:03 -0800
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
Cc: x86@...nel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@...il.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@...hat.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@...cle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>,
Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@...el.com>,
Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@....com>,
Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>,
Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v19 02/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for
user-mode control-flow protection
On Wed, Feb 03, 2021 at 02:55:24PM -0800, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> Shadow Stack provides protection against function return address
> corruption. It is active when the processor supports it, the kernel has
> CONFIG_X86_CET enabled, and the application is built for the feature.
> This is only implemented for the 64-bit kernel. When it is enabled, legacy
> non-Shadow Stack applications continue to work, but without protection.
>
> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/Kconfig | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler | 5 +++++
> 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> index 21f851179ff0..074b3c0e6bf6 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> @@ -1951,6 +1951,28 @@ config X86_SGX
>
> If unsure, say N.
>
> +config ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK
> + def_bool n
> +
> +config X86_CET
> + prompt "Intel Control-flow protection for user-mode"
> + def_bool n
> + depends on X86_64
> + depends on AS_WRUSS
> + select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS
> + select ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK
This seems backwards to me? Shouldn't 'config X86_64' do the 'select
ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK' and 'config X86_CET' do a 'depends on
ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK' instead?
> + help
> + Control-flow protection is a set of hardware features which place
> + additional restrictions on indirect branches. These help
> + mitigate ROP attacks. Applications must be enabled to use it,
> + and old userspace does not get protection "for free".
> + Support for this feature is present on Tiger Lake family of
> + processors released in 2020 or later. Enabling this feature
> + increases kernel text size by 3.7 KB.
> + See Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst for more information.
> +
> + If unsure, say N.
> +
> config EFI
> bool "EFI runtime service support"
> depends on ACPI
> diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler b/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler
> index 26b8c08e2fc4..00c79dd93651 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler
> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler
> @@ -19,3 +19,8 @@ config AS_TPAUSE
> def_bool $(as-instr,tpause %ecx)
> help
> Supported by binutils >= 2.31.1 and LLVM integrated assembler >= V7
> +
> +config AS_WRUSS
> + def_bool $(as-instr,wrussq %rax$(comma)(%rbx))
> + help
> + Supported by binutils >= 2.31 and LLVM integrated assembler
> --
> 2.21.0
>
--
Kees Cook
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