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Message-ID: <20210204155423.2864bf4f@gandalf.local.home>
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2021 15:54:23 -0500
From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>
To: Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>
Cc: Timur Tabi <timur@...nel.org>, Petr Mladek <pmladek@...e.com>,
Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@...il.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
willy@...radead.org, akpm@...ux-foundation.org,
torvalds@...ux-foundation.org, roman.fietze@...na.com,
keescook@...omium.org, john.ogness@...utronix.de,
akinobu.mita@...il.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] lib/vsprintf: make-printk-non-secret printks all
addresses as unhashed
On Thu, 4 Feb 2021 21:48:35 +0100
Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz> wrote:
> > + pr_warn("** Kernel memory addresses are exposed, which may **\n");
> > + pr_warn("** compromise security on your system. **\n");
>
> This is lies, right? And way too verbose.
Not really. More of an exaggeration than a lie. And the verbosity is to
make sure it's noticed by those that shouldn't have it set. This works well
for keeping trace_printk() out of production kernels. Why do you care
anyway, you are just debugging it, and it shouldn't trigger any bug reports
on testing infrastructure. That's why I like the notice. It gets the job
done of keeping people from using things they shouldn't be using, and
doesn't cause testing failures that a WARN_ON would.
-- Steve
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