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Message-ID: <20210208212851.GY242749@kernel.org>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 23:28:51 +0200
From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org>
To: Michal Hocko <mhocko@...e.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
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David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>,
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"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>,
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Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v17 08/10] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active
secretmem users
On Mon, Feb 08, 2021 at 11:18:37AM +0100, Michal Hocko wrote:
> On Mon 08-02-21 10:49:18, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> > From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@...ux.ibm.com>
> >
> > It is unsafe to allow saving of secretmem areas to the hibernation
> > snapshot as they would be visible after the resume and this essentially
> > will defeat the purpose of secret memory mappings.
> >
> > Prevent hibernation whenever there are active secret memory users.
>
> Does this feature need any special handling? As it is effectivelly
> unevictable memory then it should behave the same as other mlock, ramfs
> which should already disable hibernation as those cannot be swapped out,
> no?
As David already said, hibernation does not care about mlocked memory, so
this feature requires a special handling.
--
Sincerely yours,
Mike.
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