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Message-ID: <0643d35b-b765-0c9f-ffc5-99fb8cd22eb4@linux.microsoft.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2021 10:26:13 -0800
From: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@...ux.microsoft.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>, stephen.smalley.work@...il.com,
casey@...aufler-ca.com, agk@...hat.com, snitzer@...hat.com,
gmazyland@...il.com, paul@...l-moore.com
Cc: tyhicks@...ux.microsoft.com, sashal@...nel.org, jmorris@...ei.org,
nramas@...ux.microsoft.com, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
selinux@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, dm-devel@...hat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/3] IMA: add policy condition to measure duplicate
critical data
On 2021-02-08 12:45 p.m., Mimi Zohar wrote:
> Hi Tushar,
>
> On Fri, 2021-01-29 at 16:45 -0800, Tushar Sugandhi wrote:
>> IMA needs to support duplicate measurements of integrity
>> critical data to accurately determine the current state of that data
>> on the system. Further, since measurement of duplicate data is not
>> required for all the use cases, it needs to be policy driven.
>>
>> Define "allow_dup", a new IMA policy condition, for the IMA func
>> CRITICAL_DATA to allow duplicate buffer measurement of integrity
>> critical data.
>>
>> Limit the ability to measure duplicate buffer data when action is
>> "measure" and func is CRITICAL_DATA.
>
> Why?!
>
I wasn't sure if it would break any use-case by supporting this for all
the files / buffers. That's why I only wanted to address the scenario
that we discussed in the last series (critical data measurement).
But as you suggested in this series' cover letter response, I am happy
to extend it to other scenarios (by disabling "htable" using new Kconfig
(e.g. CONFIG_IMA_DISABLE_HTABLE)
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@...ux.microsoft.com>
>> ---
>>
>> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
>> index 9b45d064a87d..b89eb768dd05 100644
>> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
>> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
>> @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
>> #define IMA_FSNAME 0x0200
>> #define IMA_KEYRINGS 0x0400
>> #define IMA_LABEL 0x0800
>> +#define IMA_ALLOW_DUP 0x1000
>>
>> #define UNKNOWN 0
>> #define MEASURE 0x0001 /* same as IMA_MEASURE */
>> @@ -87,6 +88,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
>> char *fsname;
>> struct ima_rule_opt_list *keyrings; /* Measure keys added to these keyrings */
>> struct ima_rule_opt_list *label; /* Measure data grouped under this label */
>
> Defining a new boolean entry shouldn't be necessary. The other
> boolean values are just stored in "flags".
>
Thanks. Will do the same here.
Thanks,
Tushar
>> struct ima_template_desc *template;
>> };
>
> thanks,
>
> Mimi
>
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