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Message-ID: <57dcc827-052a-94cd-31d4-286675f9d506@intel.com> Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2021 13:38:10 -0800 From: "Yu, Yu-cheng" <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com> To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> Cc: x86@...nel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Balbir Singh <bsingharora@...il.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@...hat.com>, Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>, "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@...cle.com>, Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>, "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>, Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@...el.com>, Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@....com>, Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>, Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@...el.com>, haitao.huang@...el.com Subject: Re: [PATCH v20 21/25] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack On 2/10/2021 11:58 AM, Kees Cook wrote: > On Wed, Feb 10, 2021 at 09:56:59AM -0800, Yu-cheng Yu wrote: >> To deliver a signal, create a shadow stack restore token and put the token >> and the signal restorer address on the shadow stack. For sigreturn, verify >> the token and restore from it the shadow stack pointer. >> >> A shadow stack restore token marks a restore point of the shadow stack. >> The token is distinctively different from any shadow stack address. > > How is it different? It seems like it just has the last 2 bits > masked/set? > For example, for 64-bit apps, A shadow stack pointer value (*ssp) has to be in some code area, but for a token, (*ptr_of_token) = (ptr_of_token + 8), which has to be within the same shadow stack area. In cet_verify_rstor_token(), this is checked. >> In sigreturn, restoring from a token ensures the target address is the >> location pointed by the token. > > As in, a token (real stack address with 2-bit mask) is checked against > the real stack address? I don't see a comparison -- it only checks that > it is < TASK_SIZE. > > How does cet_restore_signal() figure into this? (As in, the MSR writes?) > The kernel takes the restore address from the token. It will not mistakenly take a wrong address from the shadow stack. I will put this in my commit logs. [...] >> Introduce WRUSS, which is a kernel-mode instruction but writes directly to >> user shadow stack. It is used to construct the user signal stack as >> described above. >> >> Currently there is no systematic facility for extending a signal context. >> Introduce a signal context extension 'struct sc_ext', which is used to save >> shadow stack restore token address and WAIT_ENDBR status. WAIT_ENDBR will >> be introduced later in the Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT) series, but add >> that into sc_ext now to keep the struct stable in case the IBT series is >> applied later. >> >> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com> [...] >> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c >> index d25a03215984..08e43d9b5176 100644 >> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c >> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c >> @@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ >> #include <asm/fpu/xstate.h> >> #include <asm/fpu/types.h> >> #include <asm/cet.h> >> +#include <asm/special_insns.h> >> +#include <uapi/asm/sigcontext.h> >> >> static void start_update_msrs(void) >> { >> @@ -72,6 +74,80 @@ static unsigned long alloc_shstk(unsigned long size, int flags) >> return addr; >> } >> >> +#define TOKEN_MODE_MASK 3UL >> +#define TOKEN_MODE_64 1UL >> +#define IS_TOKEN_64(token) (((token) & TOKEN_MODE_MASK) == TOKEN_MODE_64) >> +#define IS_TOKEN_32(token) (((token) & TOKEN_MODE_MASK) == 0) >> + >> +/* >> + * Verify the restore token at the address of 'ssp' is >> + * valid and then set shadow stack pointer according to the >> + * token. >> + */ >> +int cet_verify_rstor_token(bool ia32, unsigned long ssp, >> + unsigned long *new_ssp) >> +{ >> + unsigned long token; >> + >> + *new_ssp = 0; >> + >> + if (!IS_ALIGNED(ssp, 8)) >> + return -EINVAL; >> + >> + if (get_user(token, (unsigned long __user *)ssp)) >> + return -EFAULT; >> + >> + /* Is 64-bit mode flag correct? */ >> + if (!ia32 && !IS_TOKEN_64(token)) >> + return -EINVAL; >> + else if (ia32 && !IS_TOKEN_32(token)) >> + return -EINVAL; >> + >> + token &= ~TOKEN_MODE_MASK; >> + >> + /* >> + * Restore address properly aligned? >> + */ >> + if ((!ia32 && !IS_ALIGNED(token, 8)) || !IS_ALIGNED(token, 4)) >> + return -EINVAL; >> + >> + /* >> + * Token was placed properly? >> + */ >> + if (((ALIGN_DOWN(token, 8) - 8) != ssp) || token >= TASK_SIZE_MAX) >> + return -EINVAL; >> + >> + *new_ssp = token; >> + return 0; >> +} >> + >> +/* >> + * Create a restore token on the shadow stack. >> + * A token is always 8-byte and aligned to 8. >> + */ >> +static int create_rstor_token(bool ia32, unsigned long ssp, >> + unsigned long *new_ssp) >> +{ >> + unsigned long addr; >> + >> + *new_ssp = 0; >> + >> + if ((!ia32 && !IS_ALIGNED(ssp, 8)) || !IS_ALIGNED(ssp, 4)) >> + return -EINVAL; >> + >> + addr = ALIGN_DOWN(ssp, 8) - 8; >> + >> + /* Is the token for 64-bit? */ >> + if (!ia32) >> + ssp |= TOKEN_MODE_64; >> + >> + if (write_user_shstk_64(addr, ssp)) >> + return -EFAULT; >> + >> + *new_ssp = addr; >> + return 0; >> +} >> + [...]
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