linux-kernel - Re: bcm2711_thermal: Kernel panic - not syncing: Asynchronous SError Interrupt

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Message-ID: <6612b35f-86bb-bb1e-bae8-188366495dbe@gmail.com>
Date:   Wed, 10 Feb 2021 14:59:45 -0800
From:   Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@...il.com>
To:     Nicolas Saenz Julienne <nsaenzjulienne@...e.de>,
        Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@....com>,
        Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@...onical.com>,
        stefan.wahren@...e.com, Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@...il.com>,
        Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
        Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@....con>
Cc:     bcm-kernel-feedback-list@...adcom.com,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
        linux-pm@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: bcm2711_thermal: Kernel panic - not syncing: Asynchronous SError
 Interrupt



On 2/10/2021 8:55 AM, Nicolas Saenz Julienne wrote:
> Hi Robin,
> 
> On Wed, 2021-02-10 at 16:25 +0000, Robin Murphy wrote:
>> On 2021-02-10 13:15, Nicolas Saenz Julienne wrote:
>>> [ Add Robin, Catalin and Florian in case they want to chime in ]
>>>
>>> Hi Juerg, thanks for the report!
>>>
>>> On Wed, 2021-02-10 at 11:48 +0100, Juerg Haefliger wrote:
>>>> Trying to dump the BCM2711 registers kills the kernel:
>>>>
>>>> # cat /sys/kernel/debug/regmap/dummy-avs-monitor\@fd5d2000/range
>>>> 0-efc
>>>> # cat /sys/kernel/debug/regmap/dummy-avs-monitor\@fd5d2000/registers
>>>>
>>>> [   62.857661] SError Interrupt on CPU1, code 0xbf000002 -- SError
>>>
>>> So ESR's IDS (bit 24) is set, which means it's an 'Implementation Defined
>>> SError,' hence IIUC the rest of the error code is meaningless to anyone outside
>>> of Broadcom/RPi.
>>
>> It's imp-def from the architecture's PoV, but the implementation in this 
>> case is Cortex-A72, where 0x000002 means an attributable, containable 
>> Slave Error:
>>
>> https://developer.arm.com/documentation/100095/0003/system-control/aarch64-register-descriptions/exception-syndrome-register--el1-and-el3?lang=en
>>
>> In other words, the thing at the other end of an interconnect 
>> transaction said "no" :)
>>
>> (The fact that Cortex-A72 gets too far ahead of itself to take it as a 
>> synchronous external abort is a mild annoyance, but hey...)
> 
> Thanks for both your clarifications! Reading arm documentation is a skill on
> its own.

Yes it is.

> 
>>> The regmap is created through the following syscon device:
>>>
>>> 	avs_monitor: avs-monitor@...d2000 {
>>> 		compatible = "brcm,bcm2711-avs-monitor",
>>> 			     "syscon", "simple-mfd";
>>> 		reg = <0x7d5d2000 0xf00>;
>>>
>>> 		thermal: thermal {
>>> 			compatible = "brcm,bcm2711-thermal";
>>> 			#thermal-sensor-cells = <0>;
>>> 		};
>>> 	};
>>>
>>> I've done some tests with devmem, and the whole <0x7d5d2000 0xf00> range is
>>> full of addresses that trigger this same error. Also note that as per Florian's
>>> comments[1]: "AVS_RO_REGISTERS_0: 0x7d5d2200 - 0x7d5d22e3." But from what I can
>>> tell, at least 0x7d5d22b0 seems to be faulty too.
>>>
>>> Any ideas/comments? My guess is that those addresses are marked somehow as
>>> secure, and only for VC4 to access (VC4 is RPi4's co-processor). Ultimately,
>>> the solution is to narrow the register range exposed by avs-monitor to whatever
>>> bcm2711-thermal needs (which is ATM a single 32bit register).
>>
>> When a peripheral decodes a region of address space, nobody says it has 
>> to accept accesses to *every* address in that space; registers may be 
>> sparsely populated, and although some devices might be "nice" and make 
>> unused areas behave as RAZ/WI, others may throw slave errors if you poke 
>> at the wrong places. As you note, in a TrustZone-aware device some 
>> registers may only exist in one or other of the Secure/Non-Secure 
>> address spaces.
>>
>> Even when there is a defined register at a given address, it still 
>> doesn't necessarily accept all possible types of access; it wouldn't be 
>> particularly friendly, but a device *could* have, say, some registers 
>> that support 32-bit accesses and others that only support 16-bit 
>> accesses, and thus throw slave errors if you do the wrong thing in the 
>> wrong place.
>>
>> It really all depends on the device itself.
> 
> All in all, assuming there is no special device quirk to apply, the feeling I'm
> getting is to just let the error be. As you hint, firmware has no blame here,
> and debugfs is a 'best effort, zero guarantees' interface after all.

We should probably fill a regmap_access_table to deny reading registers
for which there is no address decoding and possibly another one to deny
writing to the read-only registers.
-- 
Florian