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Message-ID: <20210212121112.GA3158@orbyte.nwl.cc>
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2021 13:11:12 +0100
From: Phil Sutter <phil@....cc>
To: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@...hat.com>
Cc: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>,
Linux-Audit Mailing List <linux-audit@...hat.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
netfilter-devel@...r.kernel.org, Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@...hat.com>, fw@...len.de,
twoerner@...hat.com, Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>,
tgraf@...radead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH ghak124 v3] audit: log nftables configuration change
events
Hi,
On Thu, Feb 11, 2021 at 04:02:55PM -0500, Steve Grubb wrote:
> On Thursday, February 11, 2021 11:29:34 AM EST Paul Moore wrote:
> > > If I'm not mistaken, iptables emits a single audit log per table, ipset
> > > doesn't support audit at all. So I wonder how much audit logging is
> > > required at all (for certification or whatever reason). How much
> > > granularity is desired?
>
> <snip>
>
> > I believe the netfilter auditing was mostly a nice-to-have bit of
> > functionality to help add to the completeness of the audit logs, but I
> > could very easily be mistaken. Richard put together those patches, he
> > can probably provide the background/motivation for the effort.
>
> There are certifications which levy requirements on information flow control.
> The firewall can decide if information should flow or be blocked. Information
> flow decisions need to be auditable - which we have with the audit target.
In nftables, this is realized via 'log level audit' statement.
Functionality should by all means be identical to that of xtables' AUDIT
target.
> That then swings in requirements on the configuration of the information flow
> policy.
>
> The requirements state a need to audit any management activity - meaning the
> creation, modification, and/or deletion of a "firewall ruleset". Because it
> talks constantly about a ruleset and then individual rules, I suspect only 1
> summary event is needed to say something happened, who did it, and the
> outcome. This would be in line with how selinux is treated: we have 1 summary
> event for loading/modifying/unloading selinux policy.
So the central element are firewall rules for audit purposes and
NETFILTER_CFG notifications merely serve asserting changes to those
rules are noticed by the auditing system. Looking at xtables again, this
seems coherent: Any change causes the whole table blob to be replaced
(while others stay in place). So table replace/create is the most common
place for a change notification. In nftables, the most common one is
generation dump - all tables are treated as elements of the same
ruleset, not individually like in xtables.
Richard, assuming the above is correct, are you fine with reducing
nftables auditing to a single notification per transaction then? I guess
Florian sufficiently illustrated how this would be implemented.
> Hope this helps...
It does, thanks a lot for the information!
Thanks, Phil
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