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Message-ID: <795016db-93fa-72ea-f5dd-16b9c56a62e9@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 13 Feb 2021 13:30:51 +0200
From: Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@...il.com>
To: linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org, akpm@...ux-foundation.org,
linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] mm/vmalloc: randomize vmalloc() allocations
Hello,
Is there a chance of getting this reviewed and maybe even merged, please?
-Topi
On 12.12.2020 19.56, Topi Miettinen wrote:
> Memory mappings inside kernel allocated with vmalloc() are in
> predictable order and packed tightly toward the low addresses. With
> new kernel boot parameter 'randomize_vmalloc=1', the entire area is
> used randomly to make the allocations less predictable and harder to
> guess for attackers. Also module and BPF code locations get randomized
> (within their dedicated and rather small area though) and if
> CONFIG_VMAP_STACK is enabled, also kernel thread stack locations.
>
> On 32 bit systems this may cause problems due to increased VM
> fragmentation if the address space gets crowded.
>
> On all systems, it will reduce performance and increase memory and
> cache usage due to less efficient use of page tables and inability to
> merge adjacent VMAs with compatible attributes. On x86_64 with 5 level
> page tables, in the worst case, additional page table entries of up to
> 4 pages are created for each mapping, so with small mappings there's
> considerable penalty.
>
> Without randomize_vmalloc=1:
> $ cat /proc/vmallocinfo
> 0xffffc90000000000-0xffffc90000002000 8192 acpi_os_map_iomem+0x29e/0x2c0 phys=0x000000003ffe1000 ioremap
> 0xffffc90000002000-0xffffc90000005000 12288 acpi_os_map_iomem+0x29e/0x2c0 phys=0x000000003ffe0000 ioremap
> 0xffffc90000005000-0xffffc90000007000 8192 hpet_enable+0x36/0x4a9 phys=0x00000000fed00000 ioremap
> 0xffffc90000007000-0xffffc90000009000 8192 gen_pool_add_owner+0x49/0x130 pages=1 vmalloc
> 0xffffc90000009000-0xffffc9000000b000 8192 gen_pool_add_owner+0x49/0x130 pages=1 vmalloc
> 0xffffc9000000b000-0xffffc9000000d000 8192 gen_pool_add_owner+0x49/0x130 pages=1 vmalloc
> 0xffffc9000000d000-0xffffc9000000f000 8192 gen_pool_add_owner+0x49/0x130 pages=1 vmalloc
> 0xffffc90000011000-0xffffc90000015000 16384 n_tty_open+0x16/0xe0 pages=3 vmalloc
> 0xffffc900003de000-0xffffc900003e0000 8192 acpi_os_map_iomem+0x29e/0x2c0 phys=0x00000000fed00000 ioremap
> 0xffffc900003e0000-0xffffc900003e2000 8192 memremap+0x1a1/0x280 phys=0x00000000000f5000 ioremap
> 0xffffc900003e2000-0xffffc900003f3000 69632 pcpu_create_chunk+0x80/0x2c0 pages=16 vmalloc
> 0xffffc900003f3000-0xffffc90000405000 73728 pcpu_create_chunk+0xb7/0x2c0 pages=17 vmalloc
> 0xffffc90000405000-0xffffc9000040a000 20480 pcpu_create_chunk+0xed/0x2c0 pages=4 vmalloc
> 0xffffe8ffffc00000-0xffffe8ffffe00000 2097152 pcpu_get_vm_areas+0x0/0x1a40 vmalloc
>
> With randomize_vmalloc=1, the allocations are randomized:
> $ cat /proc/vmallocinfo
> 0xffffca3a36442000-0xffffca3a36447000 20480 pcpu_create_chunk+0xed/0x2c0 pages=4 vmalloc
> 0xffffca63034d6000-0xffffca63034d9000 12288 acpi_os_map_iomem+0x29e/0x2c0 phys=0x000000003ffe0000 ioremap
> 0xffffcce23d32e000-0xffffcce23d330000 8192 memremap+0x1a1/0x280 phys=0x00000000000f5000 ioremap
> 0xffffcfb9f0e22000-0xffffcfb9f0e24000 8192 hpet_enable+0x36/0x4a9 phys=0x00000000fed00000 ioremap
> 0xffffd1df23e9e000-0xffffd1df23eb0000 73728 pcpu_create_chunk+0xb7/0x2c0 pages=17 vmalloc
> 0xffffd690c2990000-0xffffd690c2992000 8192 acpi_os_map_iomem+0x29e/0x2c0 phys=0x000000003ffe1000 ioremap
> 0xffffd8460c718000-0xffffd8460c71c000 16384 n_tty_open+0x16/0xe0 pages=3 vmalloc
> 0xffffd89aba709000-0xffffd89aba70b000 8192 gen_pool_add_owner+0x49/0x130 pages=1 vmalloc
> 0xffffe0ca3f2ed000-0xffffe0ca3f2ef000 8192 acpi_os_map_iomem+0x29e/0x2c0 phys=0x00000000fed00000 ioremap
> 0xffffe3ba44802000-0xffffe3ba44804000 8192 gen_pool_add_owner+0x49/0x130 pages=1 vmalloc
> 0xffffe4524b2a2000-0xffffe4524b2a4000 8192 gen_pool_add_owner+0x49/0x130 pages=1 vmalloc
> 0xffffe61372b2e000-0xffffe61372b30000 8192 gen_pool_add_owner+0x49/0x130 pages=1 vmalloc
> 0xffffe704d2f7c000-0xffffe704d2f8d000 69632 pcpu_create_chunk+0x80/0x2c0 pages=16 vmalloc
> 0xffffe8ffffc00000-0xffffe8ffffe00000 2097152 pcpu_get_vm_areas+0x0/0x1a40 vmalloc
>
> With CONFIG_VMAP_STACK, also kernel thread stacks are placed in
> vmalloc area and therefore they also get randomized (only one example
> line from /proc/vmallocinfo shown for brevity):
>
> unrandomized:
> 0xffffc90000018000-0xffffc90000021000 36864 kernel_clone+0xf9/0x560 pages=8 vmalloc
>
> randomized:
> 0xffffcb57611a8000-0xffffcb57611b1000 36864 kernel_clone+0xf9/0x560 pages=8 vmalloc
>
> CC: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
> CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
> CC: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
> CC: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
> CC: Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>
> CC: Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>
> CC: Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@...il.com>
> ---
> v2: retry allocation from other end of vmalloc space in case of
> failure (Matthew Wilcox), improve commit message and documentation
> ---
> .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 23 +++++++++++++++
> mm/vmalloc.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++--
> 2 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> index 44fde25bb221..9386b1b40a27 100644
> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> @@ -4017,6 +4017,29 @@
>
> ramdisk_start= [RAM] RAM disk image start address
>
> + randomize_vmalloc= [KNL] Randomize vmalloc() allocations. With 1,
> + the entire vmalloc() area is used randomly to
> + make the allocations less predictable and
> + harder to guess for attackers. Also module and
> + BPF code locations get randomized (within
> + their dedicated and rather small area though)
> + and if CONFIG_VMAP_STACK is enabled, also
> + kernel thread stack locations.
> +
> + On 32 bit systems this may cause problems due
> + to increased VM fragmentation if the address
> + space gets crowded.
> +
> + On all systems, it will reduce performance and
> + increase memory and cache usage due to less
> + efficient use of page tables and inability to
> + merge adjacent VMAs with compatible
> + attributes. On x86_64 with 5 level page
> + tables, in the worst case, additional page
> + table entries of up to 4 pages are created for
> + each mapping, so with small mappings there's
> + considerable penalty.
> +
> random.trust_cpu={on,off}
> [KNL] Enable or disable trusting the use of the
> CPU's random number generator (if available) to
> diff --git a/mm/vmalloc.c b/mm/vmalloc.c
> index 6ae491a8b210..d78528af6316 100644
> --- a/mm/vmalloc.c
> +++ b/mm/vmalloc.c
> @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
> #include <linux/bitops.h>
> #include <linux/rbtree_augmented.h>
> #include <linux/overflow.h>
> +#include <linux/random.h>
>
> #include <linux/uaccess.h>
> #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
> @@ -1079,6 +1080,17 @@ adjust_va_to_fit_type(struct vmap_area *va,
> return 0;
> }
>
> +static int randomize_vmalloc = 0;
> +
> +static int __init set_randomize_vmalloc(char *str)
> +{
> + if (!str)
> + return 0;
> + randomize_vmalloc = simple_strtoul(str, &str, 0);
> + return 1;
> +}
> +__setup("randomize_vmalloc=", set_randomize_vmalloc);
> +
> /*
> * Returns a start address of the newly allocated area, if success.
> * Otherwise a vend is returned that indicates failure.
> @@ -1152,7 +1164,7 @@ static struct vmap_area *alloc_vmap_area(unsigned long size,
> int node, gfp_t gfp_mask)
> {
> struct vmap_area *va, *pva;
> - unsigned long addr;
> + unsigned long addr, voffset;
> int purged = 0;
> int ret;
>
> @@ -1207,11 +1219,24 @@ static struct vmap_area *alloc_vmap_area(unsigned long size,
> if (pva && __this_cpu_cmpxchg(ne_fit_preload_node, NULL, pva))
> kmem_cache_free(vmap_area_cachep, pva);
>
> + /* Randomize allocation */
> + if (randomize_vmalloc) {
> + voffset = get_random_long() & (roundup_pow_of_two(vend - vstart) - 1);
> + voffset = PAGE_ALIGN(voffset);
> + if (voffset + size > vend - vstart)
> + voffset = vend - vstart - size;
> + } else
> + voffset = 0;
> +
> /*
> * If an allocation fails, the "vend" address is
> * returned. Therefore trigger the overflow path.
> */
> - addr = __alloc_vmap_area(size, align, vstart, vend);
> + addr = __alloc_vmap_area(size, align, vstart + voffset, vend);
> +
> + if (unlikely(addr == vend) && voffset)
> + /* Retry randomization from other end */
> + addr = __alloc_vmap_area(size, align, vstart, vstart + voffset + size);
> spin_unlock(&free_vmap_area_lock);
>
> if (unlikely(addr == vend))
>
> base-commit: 7f376f1917d7461e05b648983e8d2aea9d0712b2
>
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