linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] nvme-tcp: Check if request has started before processing it

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date:   Mon, 15 Feb 2021 13:23:55 -0800
From:   Sagi Grimberg <sagi@...mberg.me>
To:     Hannes Reinecke <hare@...e.de>, Keith Busch <kbusch@...nel.org>
Cc:     Jens Axboe <axboe@...com>, Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>,
        linux-nvme@...ts.infradead.org, Daniel Wagner <dwagner@...e.de>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] nvme-tcp: Check if request has started before processing
 it


>>>>> blk_mq_tag_to_rq() will always return a request if the command_id is
>>>>> in the valid range. Check if the request has been started. If we
>>>>> blindly process the request we might double complete a request which
>>>>> can be fatal.
>>>>
>>>> How did you get to this one? did the controller send a completion for
>>>> a completed/bogus request?
>>>
>>> If that is the case, then that must mean it's possible the driver could
>>> have started the command id just before the bogus completion check. Data
>>> iorruption, right?
>>
>> Yes, which is why I don't think this check is very useful..
> 
> I actually view that as a valid protection against spoofed frames.
> Without it it's easy to crash the machine by injecting fake completions 
> with random command ids.

And this doesn't help because the command can have been easily reused
and started... What is this protecting against? Note that none of the
other transports checks that, why should tcp?