linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas

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Message-ID: <5a8567a9-6940-c23f-0927-e4b5c5db0d5e@redhat.com>
Date:   Tue, 16 Feb 2021 18:16:36 +0100
From:   David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>
To:     jejb@...ux.ibm.com, Michal Hocko <mhocko@...e.com>
Cc:     Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org>,
        Mike Rapoport <rppt@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
        Christopher Lameter <cl@...ux.com>,
        Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>,
        Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>,
        Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
        Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>,
        Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@...belt.com>,
        Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@...ive.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>,
        Roman Gushchin <guro@...com>,
        Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@...gle.com>,
        Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ho.ws>, Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>,
        linux-api@...r.kernel.org, linux-arch@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
        linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-nvdimm@...ts.01.org, linux-riscv@...ts.infradead.org,
        x86@...nel.org, Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@...u.net>,
        Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to
 create "secret" memory areas

>>   For the other parts, the question is what we actually want to let
>> user space configure.
>>
>> Being able to specify "Very secure" "maximum secure" "average
>> secure"  all doesn't really make sense to me.
> 
> Well, it doesn't to me either unless the user feels a cost/benefit, so
> if max cost $100 per invocation and average cost nothing, most people
> would chose average unless they had a very good reason not to.  In your
> migratable model, if we had separate limits for non-migratable and
> migratable, with non-migratable being set low to prevent exhaustion,
> max secure becomes a highly scarce resource, whereas average secure is
> abundant then having the choice might make sense.

I hope that we can find a way to handle the migration part internally. 
Especially, because Mike wants the default to be "as secure as 
possible", so if there is a flag, it would have to be an opt-out flag.

I guess as long as we don't temporarily map it into the "owned" location 
in the direct map shared by all VCPUs we are in a good positon. But this 
needs more thought, of course.

> 
>>   The discussion regarding migratability only really popped up because
>> this is a user-visible thing and not being able to migrate can be a
>> real problem (fragmentation, ZONE_MOVABLE, ...).
> 
> I think the biggest use will potentially come from hardware
> acceleration.  If it becomes simple to add say encryption to a secret
> page with no cost, then no flag needed.  However, if we only have a
> limited number of keys so once we run out no more encrypted memory then
> it becomes a costly resource and users might want a choice of being
> backed by encryption or not.

Right. But wouldn't HW support with configurable keys etc. need more 
syscall parameters (meaning, even memefd_secret() as it is would not be 
sufficient?). I suspect the simplistic flag approach might not be 
sufficient. I might be wrong because I have no clue about MKTME and friends.

Anyhow, I still think extending memfd_create() might just be good enough 
- at least for now. Things like HW support might have requirements we 
don't even know yet and that we cannot even model in memfd_secret() 
right now.

-- 
Thanks,

David / dhildenb