linux-kernel - [PATCH 2/3] x86/sev-es: Check if regs->sp is trusted before adjusting #VC IST stack

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Message-Id: <20210217120143.6106-3-joro@8bytes.org>
Date:   Wed, 17 Feb 2021 13:01:42 +0100
From:   Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>
To:     x86@...nel.org
Cc:     Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, stable@...r.kernel.org,
        hpa@...or.com, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>,
        Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
        Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
        Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
        Cfir Cohen <cfir@...gle.com>,
        Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@...gle.com>,
        Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
        Mike Stunes <mstunes@...are.com>,
        Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
        Martin Radev <martin.b.radev@...il.com>,
        Arvind Sankar <nivedita@...m.mit.edu>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
        virtualization@...ts.linux-foundation.org
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] x86/sev-es: Check if regs->sp is trusted before adjusting #VC IST stack

From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>

The code in the NMI handler to adjust the #VC handler IST stack is
needed in case an NMI hits when the #VC handler is still using its IST
stack.
But the check for this condition also needs to look if the regs->sp
value is trusted, meaning it was not set by user-space. Extend the
check to not use regs->sp when the NMI interrupted user-space code or
the SYSCALL gap.

Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Fixes: 315562c9af3d5 ("x86/sev-es: Adjust #VC IST Stack on entering NMI handler")
Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org # 5.10+
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
index 84c1821819af..0df38b185d53 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
@@ -144,7 +144,9 @@ void noinstr __sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 	old_ist = __this_cpu_read(cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC]);
 
 	/* Make room on the IST stack */
-	if (on_vc_stack(regs->sp))
+	if (on_vc_stack(regs->sp) &&
+	    !user_mode(regs) &&
+	    !from_syscall_gap(regs))
 		new_ist = ALIGN_DOWN(regs->sp, 8) - sizeof(old_ist);
 	else
 		new_ist = old_ist - sizeof(old_ist);
-- 
2.30.0