linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2 00/25] Apple M1 SoC platform bring-up

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Message-ID: <7d878de7-cfe8-ed32-ff7c-d1c3e61aa54f@marcan.st>
Date:   Thu, 25 Feb 2021 00:55:04 +0900
From:   Hector Martin <marcan@...can.st>
To:     Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
Cc:     linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
        Marc Zyngier <maz@...nel.org>, Rob Herring <robh@...nel.org>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...nel.org>,
        Olof Johansson <olof@...om.net>,
        Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@...nel.org>,
        Mark Kettenis <mark.kettenis@...all.nl>,
        Tony Lindgren <tony@...mide.com>,
        Mohamed Mediouni <mohamed.mediouni@...amail.com>,
        Stan Skowronek <stan@...ellium.com>,
        Alexander Graf <graf@...zon.com>,
        Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>,
        Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@...aro.org>,
        devicetree@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 00/25] Apple M1 SoC platform bring-up

On 22/02/2021 00.20, Hector Martin wrote:
> I haven't tested things at EL0 yet, but it looks like the stateful
> instructions known to be usable in EL0 (AMX) already default to trap on
> this platform, so we should be safe there. Everything else looks like it
> probably either shouldn't work in EL0 (I sure hope the address
> translation one doesn't...) or is probably stateless. I'll dig deeper
> and test EL0 in the future, but so far things look OK (for some
> questionable values of OK :) ).

Follow-up: I have EL0 testing scaffolding now, and I found some more 
mutable state (an IMP-DEF, pre-standard version of FEAT_AFP, using a 
separate status register for the bits), but thankfully it traps at EL0 
by default.

And then I found some other mutable IMP-DEF state that does not trap at 
EL0. And which is a 0-day CVE in macOS, because it doesn't 
save/restore/clear it either, nor does it trap there.

E-mailing security@...le.com...

-- 
Hector Martin (marcan@...can.st)
Public Key: https://mrcn.st/pub