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Message-ID: <FA94F19F-2AB2-4983-8CEC-D89287D91E20@cisco.com>
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 2021 04:42:28 +0000
From: "Lan Zheng (lanzheng)" <lanzheng@...co.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
"kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
CC: "Lan Zheng (lanzheng)" <lanzheng@...co.com>
Subject: [PATCH v1 1/1] Kernel Config to make randomize_va_space read-only.
From ba2ec52f170a8e69d6c44238bb578f9518a7e3b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: lanzheng <lanzheng@...co.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 2021 22:49:34 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] This patch adds a kernel build config knob that disallows
changes to the sysctl variable randomize_va_space.It makes harder for
attacker to disable ASLR and reduces security risks.
Signed-off-by: lanzheng <lanzheng@...co.com>
Reviewed-by: Yongkui Han <yonhan@...co.com>
Tested-by: Nirmala Arumugam <niarumug@...co.com>
---
kernel/sysctl.c | 4 ++++
security/Kconfig | 8 ++++++++
2 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index c9fbdd848138..2aa9bc8044c7 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -2426,7 +2426,11 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
.procname = "randomize_va_space",
.data = &randomize_va_space,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
+#if defined(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_VA_SPACE_READONLY)
+ .mode = 0444,
+#else
.mode = 0644,
+#endif
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
},
#endif
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 7561f6f99f1d..18b9dff4648c 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -7,6 +7,14 @@ menu "Security options"
source "security/keys/Kconfig"
+config RANDOMIZE_VA_SPACE_READONLY
+ bool "Disallow change of randomize_va_space"
+ default y
+ help
+ If you say Y here, /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space can not
+ be changed by any user, including root, this will help prevent
+ disablement of ASLR.
+
config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
bool "Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog"
default n
--
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