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Message-Id: <20210301161054.096001322@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 2021 17:11:01 +0100
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org,
Daniele Alessandrelli <daniele.alessandrelli@...el.com>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 5.4 117/340] crypto: ecdh_helper - Ensure len >= secret.len in decode_key()
From: Daniele Alessandrelli <daniele.alessandrelli@...el.com>
[ Upstream commit a53ab94eb6850c3657392e2d2ce9b38c387a2633 ]
The length ('len' parameter) passed to crypto_ecdh_decode_key() is never
checked against the length encoded in the passed buffer ('buf'
parameter). This could lead to an out-of-bounds access when the passed
length is less than the encoded length.
Add a check to prevent that.
Fixes: 3c4b23901a0c7 ("crypto: ecdh - Add ECDH software support")
Signed-off-by: Daniele Alessandrelli <daniele.alessandrelli@...el.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
---
crypto/ecdh_helper.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/crypto/ecdh_helper.c b/crypto/ecdh_helper.c
index 66fcb2ea81544..fca63b559f655 100644
--- a/crypto/ecdh_helper.c
+++ b/crypto/ecdh_helper.c
@@ -67,6 +67,9 @@ int crypto_ecdh_decode_key(const char *buf, unsigned int len,
if (secret.type != CRYPTO_KPP_SECRET_TYPE_ECDH)
return -EINVAL;
+ if (unlikely(len < secret.len))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
ptr = ecdh_unpack_data(¶ms->curve_id, ptr, sizeof(params->curve_id));
ptr = ecdh_unpack_data(¶ms->key_size, ptr, sizeof(params->key_size));
if (secret.len != crypto_ecdh_key_len(params))
--
2.27.0
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