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Message-ID: <CAD=FV=UzhLX4bdRV5gEXZgsbnQW9ViZxC9Vs2TXeSxXu72Dagg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 1 Mar 2021 14:42:50 -0800
From: Doug Anderson <dianders@...omium.org>
To: Sai Prakash Ranjan <saiprakash.ranjan@...eaurora.org>
Cc: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@...aro.org>,
Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@....com>,
Mike Leach <mike.leach@...aro.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...nel.org>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@...ux.intel.com>,
Leo Yan <leo.yan@...aro.org>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...hat.com>,
Namhyung Kim <namhyung@...nel.org>, coresight@...ts.linaro.org,
Stephen Boyd <swboyd@...omium.org>,
Denis Nikitin <denik@...omium.org>,
Mattias Nissler <mnissler@...omium.org>,
Al Grant <al.grant@....com>,
linux-arm-msm <linux-arm-msm@...r.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux ARM <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCHv2 1/4] perf/core: Add support to exclude kernel mode PMU tracing
Hi,
On Mon, Mar 1, 2021 at 11:05 AM Sai Prakash Ranjan
<saiprakash.ranjan@...eaurora.org> wrote:
>
> Hardware assisted tracing families such as ARM Coresight, Intel PT
> provides rich tracing capabilities including instruction level
> tracing and accurate timestamps which are very useful for profiling
> and also pose a significant security risk. One such example of
> security risk is when kernel mode tracing is not excluded and these
> hardware assisted tracing can be used to analyze cryptographic code
> execution. In this case, even the root user must not be able to infer
> anything.
>
> To explain it more clearly in the words of a security team member
> (credits: Mattias Nissler),
>
> "Consider a system where disk contents are encrypted and the encryption
> key is set up by the user when mounting the file system. From that point
> on the encryption key resides in the kernel. It seems reasonable to
> expect that the disk encryption key be protected from exfiltration even
> if the system later suffers a root compromise (or even against insiders
> that have root access), at least as long as the attacker doesn't
> manage to compromise the kernel."
>
> Here the idea is to protect such important information from all users
> including root users since root privileges does not have to mean full
> control over the kernel [1] and root compromise does not have to be
> the end of the world.
>
> But "Peter said even the regular counters can be used for full branch
> trace, the information isn't as accurate as PT and friends and not easier
> but is good enough to infer plenty". This would mean that a global tunable
> config for all kernel mode pmu tracing is more appropriate than the one
> targeting the hardware assisted instruction tracing.
>
> Currently we can exclude kernel mode tracing via perf_event_paranoid
> sysctl but it has following limitations,
>
> * No option to restrict kernel mode instruction tracing by the
> root user.
> * Not possible to restrict kernel mode instruction tracing when the
> hardware assisted tracing IPs like ARM Coresight ETMs use an
> additional interface via sysfs for tracing in addition to perf
> interface.
>
> So introduce a new config CONFIG_EXCLUDE_KERNEL_PMU_TRACE to exclude
> kernel mode pmu tracing which will be generic and applicable to all
> hardware tracing families and which can also be used with other
> interfaces like sysfs in case of ETMs.
>
> [1] https://lwn.net/Articles/796866/
>
> Suggested-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@....com>
> Suggested-by: Al Grant <al.grant@....com>
> Tested-by: Denis Nikitin <denik@...omium.org>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201015124522.1876-1-saiprakash.ranjan@codeaurora.org/
> Signed-off-by: Sai Prakash Ranjan <saiprakash.ranjan@...eaurora.org>
> ---
> init/Kconfig | 11 +++++++++++
> kernel/events/core.c | 3 +++
> 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+)
I'm not really knowledgeable at all about the perf subsystem so my
review doesn't hold a lot of weight. However, Sai's patch seems sane
to me.
Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@...omium.org>
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