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Message-ID: <CAGyP=7eV=CfgCp1OKt1mDN0erz5Zq40ePapJvF0wCnHfzOR=Xg@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Tue, 2 Mar 2021 13:22:18 +0530
From:   Palash Oswal <hello@...alpalash.com>
To:     Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
Cc:     Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>,
        James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] ima: Replacing deprecated strlcpy with strscpy ~~~~~~~~~ Replace

Apologies for the in-accurate description. This patch is covered under
the patch-set by Romain Perier ( https://lkml.org/lkml/2021/2/22/739 )
and can be disregarded.

Best Regards,
Palash

On Fri, Feb 19, 2021 at 11:09 PM Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org> wrote:
>
> Reply-To:
> In-Reply-To: <20210219084038.GA7564@...oswalpalash.com>
>
> On Fri, Feb 19, 2021 at 02:10:38PM +0530, Palash Oswal wrote:
> > The strlcpy() function is unsafe in that the source buffer length
> > is unbounded or possibly be non NULL terminated. This can cause
> > memory over-reads, crashes, etc.
> >
> > Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/89
> > Signed-off-by: Palash Oswal <hello@...alpalash.com>
>
> The long description does not explain what the commit does, and
> does not include any details about deprecation of strlcpy(), which
> at least I'm not aware of.
>
> I don't think *length* ever is NULL terminated. The first sentence
> is somewhat weird. Also strlcpy() does have a bounds check.
>
> Generally, the description and reasoning is sloppy to say the
> least.
>
> /Jarkko
>
>
> > ---
> >  security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c    | 2 +-
> >  security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 2 +-
> >  2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> > index 1dd70dc68ffd..2f3b8257181d 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> > @@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *namebuf)
> >       }
> >
> >       if (!pathname) {
> > -             strlcpy(namebuf, path->dentry->d_name.name, NAME_MAX);
> > +             strscpy(namebuf, path->dentry->d_name.name, NAME_MAX);
> >               pathname = namebuf;
> >       }
> >
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> > index 9b45d064a87d..010839aef6ba 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> > @@ -791,7 +791,7 @@ static int __init ima_init_arch_policy(void)
> >               char rule[255];
> >               int result;
> >
> > -             result = strlcpy(rule, *rules, sizeof(rule));
> > +             strscpy(rule, *rules, sizeof(rule));
> >
> >               INIT_LIST_HEAD(&arch_policy_entry[i].list);
> >               result = ima_parse_rule(rule, &arch_policy_entry[i]);
> >
> > base-commit: f6692213b5045dc461ce0858fb18cf46f328c202
> > --
> > 2.27.0
> >
> >

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