linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v3 04/11] x86/kthread,dumpstack: Set task_pt

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Date:   Thu, 4 Mar 2021 12:19:06 -0800
From:   Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@...el.com>
To:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc:     x86@...nel.org, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
        Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 04/11] x86/kthread,dumpstack: Set
 task_pt_regs->cs.RPL=3 for kernel threads

On Thu, Mar 04, 2021 at 11:05:57AM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> For kernel threads, task_pt_regs is currently all zeros, a valid user state
> (if kernel_execve() has been called), or some combination thereof during
> execution of kernel_execve().  If a stack trace is printed, the unwinder
> might get confused and treat task_pt_regs as a kernel state.  Indeed,
> forcing a stack dump results in an attempt to display _kernel_ code bytes
> from a bogus address at the very top of kernel memory.
> 
> Fix the confusion by setting cs=3 so that user_mode(task_pt_regs(...)) ==
> true for kernel threads.
> 
> Also improve the error when failing to fetch code bytes to show which type
> of fetch failed.  This makes it much easier to understand what's happening.
> 
> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c |  4 ++--
>  arch/x86/kernel/process.c   | 13 +++++++++++++
>  2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
> index 55cf3c8325c6..9b7b69bb12e5 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
> @@ -128,8 +128,8 @@ void show_opcodes(struct pt_regs *regs, const char *loglvl)
>  		/* No access to the user space stack of other tasks. Ignore. */
>  		break;
>  	default:
> -		printk("%sCode: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0x%lx.\n",
> -		       loglvl, prologue);
> +		printk("%sCode: Unable to access %s opcode bytes at RIP 0x%lx.\n",
> +		       loglvl, user_mode(regs) ? "user" : "kernel", prologue);
>  		break;
>  	}
>  }
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
> index 145a7ac0c19a..f6f16df04cb9 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
> @@ -163,6 +163,19 @@ int copy_thread(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long sp, unsigned long arg,
>  	/* Kernel thread ? */
>  	if (unlikely(p->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
>  		memset(childregs, 0, sizeof(struct pt_regs));
> +
> +		/*
> +		 * Even though there is no real user state here, these
> +		 * are were user regs belong, and kernel_execve() will
                       ^^^^^
                       where?

Ira

> +		 * overwrite them with user regs.  Put an obviously
> +		 * invalid value that nonetheless causes user_mode(regs)
> +		 * to return true in CS.
> +		 *
> +		 * This also prevents the unwinder from thinking that there
> +		 * is invalid kernel state at the top of the stack.
> +		 */
> +		childregs->cs = 3;
> +
>  		kthread_frame_init(frame, sp, arg);
>  		return 0;
>  	}
> -- 
> 2.29.2
>