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Message-ID: <CALvZod73Uem8jzP3QQdQ6waXbx80UUOTJQS7WBwnmaCdq++8xw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 2021 15:17:30 -0800
From: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@...gle.com>
To: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@...gle.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, jeffv@...gle.com,
Minchan Kim <minchan@...nel.org>,
Michal Hocko <mhocko@...e.com>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>, edgararriaga@...gle.com,
Tim Murray <timmurray@...gle.com>, fweimer@...hat.com,
oleg@...hat.com, jmorris@...ei.org, Linux MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
selinux@...r.kernel.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
kernel-team <kernel-team@...roid.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] mm/madvise: replace ptrace attach requirement for process_madvise
On Wed, Mar 3, 2021 at 10:58 AM Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@...gle.com> wrote:
>
> process_madvise currently requires ptrace attach capability.
> PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH gives one process complete control over another
> process. It effectively removes the security boundary between the
> two processes (in one direction). Granting ptrace attach capability
> even to a system process is considered dangerous since it creates an
> attack surface. This severely limits the usage of this API.
> The operations process_madvise can perform do not affect the correctness
> of the operation of the target process; they only affect where the data
> is physically located (and therefore, how fast it can be accessed).
> What we want is the ability for one process to influence another process
> in order to optimize performance across the entire system while leaving
> the security boundary intact.
> Replace PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH with a combination of PTRACE_MODE_READ
> and CAP_SYS_NICE. PTRACE_MODE_READ to prevent leaking ASLR metadata
> and CAP_SYS_NICE for influencing process performance.
>
> Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org # 5.10+
> Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@...gle.com>
> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
> Acked-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@...nel.org>
> Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>
> ---
> changes in v3
> - Added Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
> - Created man page for process_madvise per Andrew's request: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/docs/man-pages/man-pages.git/commit/?id=a144f458bad476a3358e3a45023789cb7bb9f993
> - cc'ed stable@...r.kernel.org # 5.10+ per Andrew's request
> - cc'ed linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org per James Morris's request
>
> mm/madvise.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
> 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/mm/madvise.c b/mm/madvise.c
> index df692d2e35d4..01fef79ac761 100644
> --- a/mm/madvise.c
> +++ b/mm/madvise.c
> @@ -1198,12 +1198,22 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(process_madvise, int, pidfd, const struct iovec __user *, vec,
> goto release_task;
> }
>
> - mm = mm_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS);
> + /* Require PTRACE_MODE_READ to avoid leaking ASLR metadata. */
> + mm = mm_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS);
> if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(mm)) {
> ret = IS_ERR(mm) ? PTR_ERR(mm) : -ESRCH;
> goto release_task;
> }
>
> + /*
> + * Require CAP_SYS_NICE for influencing process performance. Note that
> + * only non-destructive hints are currently supported.
How is non-destructive defined? Is MADV_DONTNEED non-destructive?
> + */
> + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
> + ret = -EPERM;
> + goto release_mm;
> + }
> +
> total_len = iov_iter_count(&iter);
>
> while (iov_iter_count(&iter)) {
> @@ -1218,6 +1228,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(process_madvise, int, pidfd, const struct iovec __user *, vec,
> if (ret == 0)
> ret = total_len - iov_iter_count(&iter);
>
> +release_mm:
> mmput(mm);
> release_task:
> put_task_struct(task);
> --
> 2.30.1.766.gb4fecdf3b7-goog
>
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