Message-ID: <20210303193247.GA32216@ashkalra_ubuntu_server>
Date:   Wed, 3 Mar 2021 19:32:47 +0000
From:   Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@....com>
To:     Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>
Cc:     Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
        Steve Rutherford <srutherford@...gle.com>,
        "pbonzini@...hat.com" <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        "joro@...tes.org" <joro@...tes.org>,
        "Lendacky, Thomas" <Thomas.Lendacky@....com>,
        "kvm@...r.kernel.org" <kvm@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "venu.busireddy@...cle.com" <venu.busireddy@...cle.com>,
        "Singh, Brijesh" <brijesh.singh@....com>,
        Quentin Perret <qperret@...gle.com>, maz@...nel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 10/16] KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_GET_SHARED_PAGES_LIST
 ioctl

On Wed, Mar 03, 2021 at 06:54:41PM +0000, Will Deacon wrote:
> [+Marc]
> 
> On Tue, Mar 02, 2021 at 02:55:43PM +0000, Ashish Kalra wrote:
> > On Fri, Feb 26, 2021 at 09:44:41AM -0800, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > > On Fri, Feb 26, 2021, Ashish Kalra wrote:
> > > > On Thu, Feb 25, 2021 at 02:59:27PM -0800, Steve Rutherford wrote:
> > > > > On Thu, Feb 25, 2021 at 12:20 PM Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@....com> wrote:
> > > > > Thanks for grabbing the data!
> > > > > 
> > > > > I am fine with both paths. Sean has stated an explicit desire for
> > > > > hypercall exiting, so I think that would be the current consensus.
> > > 
> > > Yep, though it'd be good to get Paolo's input, too.
> > > 
> > > > > If we want to do hypercall exiting, this should be in a follow-up
> > > > > series where we implement something more generic, e.g. a hypercall
> > > > > exiting bitmap or hypercall exit list. If we are taking the hypercall
> > > > > exit route, we can drop the kvm side of the hypercall.
> > > 
> > > I don't think this is a good candidate for arbitrary hypercall interception.  Or
> > > rather, I think hypercall interception should be an orthogonal implementation.
> > > 
> > > The guest, including guest firmware, needs to be aware that the hypercall is
> > > supported, and the ABI needs to be well-defined.  Relying on userspace VMMs to
> > > implement a common ABI is an unnecessary risk.
> > > 
> > > We could make KVM's default behavior be a nop, i.e. have KVM enforce the ABI but
> > > require further VMM intervention.  But, I just don't see the point, it would
> > > save only a few lines of code.  It would also limit what KVM could do in the
> > > future, e.g. if KVM wanted to do its own bookkeeping _and_ exit to userspace,
> > > then mandatory interception would essentially make it impossible for KVM to do
> > > bookkeeping while still honoring the interception request.
> > > 
> > > However, I do think it would make sense to have the userspace exit be a generic
> > > exit type.  But hey, we already have the necessary ABI defined for that!  It's
> > > just not used anywhere.
> > > 
> > > 	/* KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL */
> > > 	struct {
> > > 		__u64 nr;
> > > 		__u64 args[6];
> > > 		__u64 ret;
> > > 		__u32 longmode;
> > > 		__u32 pad;
> > > 	} hypercall;
> > > 
> > > 
> > > > > Userspace could also handle the MSR using MSR filters (would need to
> > > > > confirm that).  Then userspace could also be in control of the cpuid bit.
> > > 
> > > An MSR is not a great fit; it's x86 specific and limited to 64 bits of data.
> > > The data limitation could be fudged by shoving data into non-standard GPRs, but
> > > that will result in truly heinous guest code, and extensibility issues.
> > > 
> > > The data limitation is a moot point, because the x86-only thing is a deal
> > > breaker.  arm64's pKVM work has a near-identical use case for a guest to share
> > > memory with a host.  I can't think of a clever way to avoid having to support
> > > TDX's and SNP's hypervisor-agnostic variants, but we can at least not have
> > > multiple KVM variants.
> > 
> > Looking at arm64's pKVM work, i see that it is a recently introduced RFC
> > patch-set and probably relevant to arm64 nVHE hypervisor
> > mode/implementation, and potentially makes sense as it adds guest
> > memory protection as both host and guest kernels are running on the same
> > privilege level ?
> > 
> > Though i do see that the pKVM stuff adds two hypercalls, specifically :
> > 
> > pkvm_create_mappings() ( I assume this is for setting shared memory
> > regions between host and guest) &
> > pkvm_create_private_mappings().
> > 
> > And the use-cases are quite similar to memory protection architectues
> > use cases, for example, use with virtio devices, guest DMA I/O, etc.
> 
> These hypercalls are both private to the host kernel communicating with
> its hypervisor counterpart, so I don't think they're particularly
> relevant here. 

Yes, i have the same thoughts here as this looked like a private hypercall
interface between host kernel and hypervisor, rather than between guest
and host/hypervisor.

> As far as I can see, the more useful thing is to allow
> the guest to communicate back to the host (and the VMM) that it has opened
> up a memory window, perhaps for virtio rings or some other shared memory.
> 

Yes, this is our main use case.

> We hacked this up as a prototype in the past:
> 
> https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fandroid-kvm.googlesource.com%2Flinux%2F%2B%2Fd12a9e2c12a52cf7140d40cd9fa092dc8a85fac9%255E%2521%2F&amp;data=04%7C01%7Cashish.kalra%40amd.com%7C7ae6bbd9fa6442f9edcc08d8de75d14b%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637503944913839841%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&amp;sdata=Juon5nJ7BB6moTWYssRXOWrDOrYfZLmA%2BLrz3s12Ook%3D&amp;reserved=0
> 
> but that's all arm64-specific and if we're solving the same problem as
> you, then let's avoid arch-specific stuff if possible. The way in which
> the guest discovers the interface will be arch-specific (we already have
> a mechanism for that and some hypercalls are already allocated by specs
> from Arm), but the interface back to the VMM and some (most?) of the host
> handling could be shared.
> 

Ok, yes and that makes sense.

> > But, isn't this patch set still RFC, and though i agree that it adds
> > an infrastructure for standardised communication between the host and
> > it's guests for mutually controlled shared memory regions and
> > surely adds some kind of portability between hypervisor
> > implementations, but nothing is standardised still, right ?
> 
> No, and it seems that you're further ahead than us in terms of
> implementation in this area. We're happy to review patches though, to
> make sure we end up with something that works for us both.
> 

Here is the link to the current patch series :
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/cover.1612398155.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com/

And the following patches will be relevant here: 
  KVM: x86: Add AMD SEV specific Hypercall3
  KVM: X86: Introduce KVM_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS hypercall
  mm: x86: Invoke hypercall when page encryption status is changed
  KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_GET_SHARED_PAGES_LIST ioctl
  KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_SET_SHARED_PAGES_LIST ioctl

Thanks,
Ashish

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