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Message-ID: <YEJk44FXEl0+mEPr@kernel.org>
Date:   Fri, 5 Mar 2021 19:05:39 +0200
From:   Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
To:     Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc:     keyrings@...r.kernel.org, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org,
        davem@...emloft.net, herbert@...dor.apana.org.au,
        dhowells@...hat.com, zohar@...ux.ibm.com,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, patrick@...terwijk.org,
        linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
        Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 1/9] crypto: Add support for ECDSA signature
 verification

On Thu, Mar 04, 2021 at 07:51:55PM -0500, Stefan Berger wrote:
> From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.ibm.com>
> 
> Add support for parsing the parameters of a NIST P256 or NIST P192 key.
> Enable signature verification using these keys. The new module is
> enabled with CONFIG_ECDSA:
>   Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (NIST P192, P256 etc.)
>   is A NIST cryptographic standard algorithm. Only signature verification
>   is implemented.
> 
> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>
> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
> Cc: linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.ibm.com>
> Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
> 

Extra new line.

> ---

Also, noticed some other tidbits.

> v8->v9:
>   - unregister nist_p192 curve if nist_p256 cannot be registered
> ---
>  crypto/Kconfig               |  10 +
>  crypto/Makefile              |   6 +
>  crypto/ecc.c                 |  13 +-
>  crypto/ecc.h                 |  28 +++
>  crypto/ecdsa.c               | 369 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  crypto/ecdsasignature.asn1   |   4 +
>  crypto/testmgr.c             |  12 ++
>  crypto/testmgr.h             | 267 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  include/linux/oid_registry.h |   6 +-
>  9 files changed, 703 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
>  create mode 100644 crypto/ecdsa.c
>  create mode 100644 crypto/ecdsasignature.asn1
> 
> diff --git a/crypto/Kconfig b/crypto/Kconfig
> index a367fcfeb5d4..a31df40591f5 100644
> --- a/crypto/Kconfig
> +++ b/crypto/Kconfig
> @@ -247,6 +247,16 @@ config CRYPTO_ECDH
>  	help
>  	  Generic implementation of the ECDH algorithm
>  
> +config CRYPTO_ECDSA
> +	tristate "ECDSA (NIST P192, P256 etc.) algorithm"
> +	select CRYPTO_ECC
> +	select CRYPTO_AKCIPHER
> +	select ASN1
> +	help
> +	  Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (NIST P192, P256 etc.)
> +	  is A NIST cryptographic standard algorithm. Only signature verification
> +	  is implemented.
> +
>  config CRYPTO_ECRDSA
>  	tristate "EC-RDSA (GOST 34.10) algorithm"
>  	select CRYPTO_ECC
> diff --git a/crypto/Makefile b/crypto/Makefile
> index b279483fba50..982066c6bdfb 100644
> --- a/crypto/Makefile
> +++ b/crypto/Makefile
> @@ -50,6 +50,12 @@ sm2_generic-y += sm2.o
>  
>  obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SM2) += sm2_generic.o
>  
> +$(obj)/ecdsasignature.asn1.o: $(obj)/ecdsasignature.asn1.c $(obj)/ecdsasignature.asn1.h
> +$(obj)/ecdsa.o: $(obj)/ecdsasignature.asn1.h
> +ecdsa_generic-y += ecdsa.o
> +ecdsa_generic-y += ecdsasignature.asn1.o
> +obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECDSA) += ecdsa_generic.o
> +
>  crypto_acompress-y := acompress.o
>  crypto_acompress-y += scompress.o
>  obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ACOMP2) += crypto_acompress.o
> diff --git a/crypto/ecc.c b/crypto/ecc.c
> index c80aa25994a0..25e79fd70566 100644
> --- a/crypto/ecc.c
> +++ b/crypto/ecc.c
> @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ typedef struct {
>  	u64 m_high;
>  } uint128_t;
>  
> -static inline const struct ecc_curve *ecc_get_curve(unsigned int curve_id)
> +const struct ecc_curve *ecc_get_curve(unsigned int curve_id)
>  {
>  	switch (curve_id) {
>  	/* In FIPS mode only allow P256 and higher */
> @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ static inline const struct ecc_curve *ecc_get_curve(unsigned int curve_id)
>  		return NULL;
>  	}
>  }
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(ecc_get_curve);
>  
>  static u64 *ecc_alloc_digits_space(unsigned int ndigits)
>  {
> @@ -1281,16 +1282,6 @@ void ecc_point_mult_shamir(const struct ecc_point *result,
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(ecc_point_mult_shamir);
>  
> -static inline void ecc_swap_digits(const u64 *in, u64 *out,
> -				   unsigned int ndigits)
> -{
> -	const __be64 *src = (__force __be64 *)in;
> -	int i;
> -
> -	for (i = 0; i < ndigits; i++)
> -		out[i] = be64_to_cpu(src[ndigits - 1 - i]);
> -}
> -
>  static int __ecc_is_key_valid(const struct ecc_curve *curve,
>  			      const u64 *private_key, unsigned int ndigits)
>  {
> diff --git a/crypto/ecc.h b/crypto/ecc.h
> index d4e546b9ad79..2ea86dfb5cf7 100644
> --- a/crypto/ecc.h
> +++ b/crypto/ecc.h
> @@ -33,6 +33,8 @@
>  
>  #define ECC_DIGITS_TO_BYTES_SHIFT 3
>  
> +#define ECC_MAX_BYTES (ECC_MAX_DIGITS << ECC_DIGITS_TO_BYTES_SHIFT)
> +
>  /**
>   * struct ecc_point - elliptic curve point in affine coordinates
>   *
> @@ -70,6 +72,32 @@ struct ecc_curve {
>  	u64 *b;
>  };
>  
> +/**
> + * ecc_swap_digits() - Copy ndigits from big endian array to native array
> + *

You should not have a separating line before the parameters.

> + * @in:       input array

"Input array" (capital letter)

> + * @out:      output array
> + * @ndigits:  number of digits to copy
> + */
> +static inline void ecc_swap_digits(const u64 *in, u64 *out,
> +				   unsigned int ndigits)

Put to the same line.

Similar issues repeat over the patch.

> +{
> +	const __be64 *src = (__force __be64 *)in;
> +	int i;
> +
> +	for (i = 0; i < ndigits; i++)
> +		out[i] = be64_to_cpu(src[ndigits - 1 - i]);
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * ecc_get_curve()  - Get a curve given its curve_id
> + *
> + * @curve_id:  Id of the curve
> + *
> + * Returns pointer to the curve data, NULL if curve is not available
> + */
> +const struct ecc_curve *ecc_get_curve(unsigned int curve_id);
> +
>  /**
>   * ecc_is_key_valid() - Validate a given ECDH private key
>   *
> diff --git a/crypto/ecdsa.c b/crypto/ecdsa.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..04fbb3d2abc5
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/crypto/ecdsa.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,369 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
> +/*
> + * Copyright (c) 2021 IBM Corporation
> + *
> + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
> + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are
> + * met:
> + *  * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
> + *   notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
> + *  * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
> + *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
> + *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
> + *
> + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
> + * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
> + * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
> + * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
> + * HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
> + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
> + * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
> + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
> + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
> + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
> + * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
> + */

This license platter is redundant, given SPDX.


> +
> +#include <linux/module.h>
> +#include <crypto/internal/akcipher.h>
> +#include <crypto/akcipher.h>
> +#include <crypto/ecdh.h>
> +#include <linux/asn1_decoder.h>
> +#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
> +
> +#include "ecc.h"
> +#include "ecdsasignature.asn1.h"
> +
> +struct ecc_ctx {
> +	unsigned int curve_id;
> +	const struct ecc_curve *curve;
> +
> +	bool pub_key_set;
> +	u64 x[ECC_MAX_DIGITS]; /* pub key x and y coordinates */
> +	u64 y[ECC_MAX_DIGITS];
> +	struct ecc_point pub_key;
> +};
> +
> +struct ecdsa_signature_ctx {
> +	const struct ecc_curve *curve;
> +	u64 r[ECC_MAX_DIGITS];
> +	u64 s[ECC_MAX_DIGITS];
> +};
> +
> +/*
> + * Get the r and s components of a signature from the X509 certificate.
> + */
> +static int ecdsa_get_signature_rs(u64 *dest, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag,
> +				  const void *value, size_t vlen,
> +				  unsigned int ndigits)
> +{
> +	size_t keylen = ndigits * sizeof(u64);
> +	ssize_t diff = vlen - keylen;
> +	const char *d = value;
> +	u8 rs[ECC_MAX_BYTES];
> +
> +	if (!value || !vlen)
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	/* diff = 0: 'value' has exacly the right size
> +	 * diff > 0: 'value' has too many bytes; one leading zero is allowed that
> +	 *           makes the value a positive integer; error on more
> +	 * diff < 0: 'value' is missing leading zeros, which we add
> +	 */
> +	if (diff > 0) {
> +		/* skip over leading zeros that make 'value' a positive int */
> +		if (*d == 0) {
> +			vlen -= 1;
> +			diff--;
> +			d++;
> +		}
> +		if (diff)
> +			return -EINVAL;
> +	}
> +	if (-diff >= keylen)
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	if (diff) {
> +		/* leading zeros not given in 'value' */
> +		memset(rs, 0, -diff);
> +	}
> +
> +	memcpy(&rs[-diff], d, vlen);
> +
> +	ecc_swap_digits((u64 *)rs, dest, ndigits);
> +
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +int ecdsa_get_signature_r(void *context, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag,
> +			const void *value, size_t vlen)
> +{
> +	struct ecdsa_signature_ctx *sig = context;
> +
> +	return ecdsa_get_signature_rs(sig->r, hdrlen, tag, value, vlen,
> +				      sig->curve->g.ndigits);
> +}
> +
> +int ecdsa_get_signature_s(void *context, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag,
> +			  const void *value, size_t vlen)
> +{
> +	struct ecdsa_signature_ctx *sig = context;
> +
> +	return ecdsa_get_signature_rs(sig->s, hdrlen, tag, value, vlen,
> +				      sig->curve->g.ndigits);
> +}
> +
> +static int _ecdsa_verify(struct ecc_ctx *ctx, const u64 *hash,
> +			 const u64 *r, const u64 *s)
> +{
> +	const struct ecc_curve *curve = ctx->curve;
> +	unsigned int ndigits = curve->g.ndigits;
> +	u64 s1[ECC_MAX_DIGITS];
> +	u64 u1[ECC_MAX_DIGITS];
> +	u64 u2[ECC_MAX_DIGITS];
> +	u64 x1[ECC_MAX_DIGITS];
> +	u64 y1[ECC_MAX_DIGITS];
> +	struct ecc_point res = ECC_POINT_INIT(x1, y1, ndigits);
> +
> +	/* 0 < r < n  and 0 < s < n */
> +	if (vli_is_zero(r, ndigits) || vli_cmp(r, curve->n, ndigits) >= 0 ||
> +	    vli_is_zero(s, ndigits) || vli_cmp(s, curve->n, ndigits) >= 0)
> +		return -EBADMSG;
> +
> +	/* hash is given */
> +	pr_devel("hash : %016llx %016llx ... %016llx\n",
> +		 hash[ndigits - 1], hash[ndigits - 2], hash[0]);
> +
> +	/* s1 = (s^-1) mod n */
> +	vli_mod_inv(s1, s, curve->n, ndigits);
> +	/* u1 = (hash * s1) mod n */
> +	vli_mod_mult_slow(u1, hash, s1, curve->n, ndigits);
> +	/* u2 = (r * s1) mod n */
> +	vli_mod_mult_slow(u2, r, s1, curve->n, ndigits);
> +	/* res = u1*G + u2 * pub_key */
> +	ecc_point_mult_shamir(&res, u1, &curve->g, u2, &ctx->pub_key, curve);
> +
> +	/* res.x = res.x mod n (if res.x > order) */
> +	if (unlikely(vli_cmp(res.x, curve->n, ndigits) == 1))
> +		/* faster alternative for NIST p256 & p192 */
> +		vli_sub(res.x, res.x, curve->n, ndigits);
> +
> +	if (!vli_cmp(res.x, r, ndigits))
> +		return 0;
> +
> +	return -EKEYREJECTED;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Verify an ECDSA signature.
> + */
> +static int ecdsa_verify(struct akcipher_request *req)
> +{
> +	struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
> +	struct ecc_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
> +	size_t keylen = ctx->curve->g.ndigits * sizeof(u64);
> +	struct ecdsa_signature_ctx sig_ctx = {
> +		.curve = ctx->curve,
> +	};
> +	u8 rawhash[ECC_MAX_BYTES];
> +	u64 hash[ECC_MAX_DIGITS];
> +	unsigned char *buffer;
> +	ssize_t diff;
> +	int ret;
> +
> +	if (unlikely(!ctx->pub_key_set))
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	buffer = kmalloc(req->src_len + req->dst_len, GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (!buffer)
> +		return -ENOMEM;
> +
> +	sg_pcopy_to_buffer(req->src,
> +		sg_nents_for_len(req->src, req->src_len + req->dst_len),
> +		buffer, req->src_len + req->dst_len, 0);
> +
> +	ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&ecdsasignature_decoder, &sig_ctx,
> +			       buffer, req->src_len);
> +	if (ret < 0)
> +		goto error;
> +
> +	/* if the hash is shorter then we will add leading zeros to fit to ndigits */
> +	diff = keylen - req->dst_len;
> +	if (diff >= 0) {
> +		if (diff)
> +			memset(rawhash, 0, diff);
> +		memcpy(&rawhash[diff], buffer + req->src_len, req->dst_len);
> +	} else if (diff < 0) {
> +		/* given hash is longer, we take the left-most bytes */
> +		memcpy(&rawhash, buffer + req->src_len, keylen);
> +	}
> +
> +	ecc_swap_digits((u64 *)rawhash, hash, ctx->curve->g.ndigits);
> +
> +	ret = _ecdsa_verify(ctx, hash, sig_ctx.r, sig_ctx.s);
> +
> +error:
> +	kfree(buffer);
> +
> +	return ret;
> +}
> +
> +static int ecdsa_ecc_ctx_init(struct ecc_ctx *ctx, unsigned int curve_id)
> +{
> +	ctx->curve_id = curve_id;
> +	ctx->curve = ecc_get_curve(curve_id);
> +	if (!ctx->curve)
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +
> +static void ecdsa_ecc_ctx_deinit(struct ecc_ctx *ctx)
> +{
> +	ctx->pub_key_set = false;
> +}
> +
> +static int ecdsa_ecc_ctx_reset(struct ecc_ctx *ctx)
> +{
> +	unsigned int curve_id = ctx->curve_id;
> +	int ret;
> +
> +	ecdsa_ecc_ctx_deinit(ctx);
> +	ret = ecdsa_ecc_ctx_init(ctx, curve_id);
> +	if (ret == 0)
> +		ctx->pub_key = ECC_POINT_INIT(ctx->x, ctx->y,
> +					      ctx->curve->g.ndigits);
> +	return ret;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Set the public key given the raw uncompressed key data from an X509
> + * certificate. The key data contain the concatenated X and Y coordinates of
> + * the public key.
> + */
> +static int ecdsa_set_pub_key(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm,
> +			     const void *key, unsigned int keylen)
> +{
> +	struct ecc_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
> +	const unsigned char *d = key;
> +	const u64 *digits = (const u64 *)&d[1];
> +	unsigned int ndigits;
> +	int ret;
> +
> +	ret = ecdsa_ecc_ctx_reset(ctx);
> +	if (ret < 0)
> +		return ret;
> +
> +	if (keylen < 1 || (((keylen - 1) >> 1) % sizeof(u64)) != 0)
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	/* we only accept uncompressed format indicated by '4' */
> +	if (d[0] != 4)
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	keylen--;
> +	ndigits = (keylen >> 1) / sizeof(u64);
> +	if (ndigits != ctx->curve->g.ndigits)
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	ecc_swap_digits(digits, ctx->pub_key.x, ndigits);
> +	ecc_swap_digits(&digits[ndigits], ctx->pub_key.y, ndigits);
> +	ret = ecc_is_pubkey_valid_full(ctx->curve, &ctx->pub_key);
> +
> +	ctx->pub_key_set = ret == 0;
> +
> +	return ret;
> +}
> +
> +static void ecdsa_exit_tfm(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm)
> +{
> +	struct ecc_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
> +
> +	ecdsa_ecc_ctx_deinit(ctx);
> +}
> +
> +static unsigned int ecdsa_max_size(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm)
> +{
> +	struct ecc_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
> +
> +	return ctx->pub_key.ndigits << ECC_DIGITS_TO_BYTES_SHIFT;
> +}
> +
> +static int ecdsa_nist_p256_init_tfm(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm)
> +{
> +	struct ecc_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
> +
> +	return ecdsa_ecc_ctx_init(ctx, ECC_CURVE_NIST_P256);
> +}
> +
> +static struct akcipher_alg ecdsa_nist_p256 = {
> +	.verify = ecdsa_verify,
> +	.set_pub_key = ecdsa_set_pub_key,
> +	.max_size = ecdsa_max_size,
> +	.init = ecdsa_nist_p256_init_tfm,
> +	.exit = ecdsa_exit_tfm,
> +	.base = {
> +		.cra_name = "ecdsa-nist-p256",
> +		.cra_driver_name = "ecdsa-nist-p256-generic",
> +		.cra_priority = 100,
> +		.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
> +		.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct ecc_ctx),
> +	},
> +};
> +
> +static int ecdsa_nist_p192_init_tfm(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm)
> +{
> +	struct ecc_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
> +
> +	return ecdsa_ecc_ctx_init(ctx, ECC_CURVE_NIST_P192);
> +}
> +
> +static struct akcipher_alg ecdsa_nist_p192 = {
> +	.verify = ecdsa_verify,
> +	.set_pub_key = ecdsa_set_pub_key,
> +	.max_size = ecdsa_max_size,
> +	.init = ecdsa_nist_p192_init_tfm,
> +	.exit = ecdsa_exit_tfm,
> +	.base = {
> +		.cra_name = "ecdsa-nist-p192",
> +		.cra_driver_name = "ecdsa-nist-p192-generic",
> +		.cra_priority = 100,
> +		.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
> +		.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct ecc_ctx),
> +	},
> +};
> +static bool ecdsa_nist_p192_registered;
> +
> +static int ecdsa_init(void)
> +{
> +	int ret;
> +
> +	/* NIST p192 may not be available in FIPS mode */
> +	ret = crypto_register_akcipher(&ecdsa_nist_p192);
> +	ecdsa_nist_p192_registered = ret == 0;
> +
> +	ret = crypto_register_akcipher(&ecdsa_nist_p256);
> +	if (ret)
> +		goto nist_p256_error;
> +	return 0;
> +
> +nist_p256_error:
> +	if (ecdsa_nist_p192_registered)
> +		crypto_unregister_akcipher(&ecdsa_nist_p192);
> +	return ret;
> +}
> +
> +static void ecdsa_exit(void)
> +{
> +	if (ecdsa_nist_p192_registered)
> +		crypto_unregister_akcipher(&ecdsa_nist_p192);
> +	crypto_unregister_akcipher(&ecdsa_nist_p256);
> +}
> +
> +subsys_initcall(ecdsa_init);

Why not module_initcall()?

> +module_exit(ecdsa_exit);
> +
> +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
> +MODULE_AUTHOR("Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.ibm.com>");

Remove MODULE_AUTHOR(). It's redundant because of Git.

> +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("ECDSA generic algorithm");
> +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("ecdsa-generic");
> diff --git a/crypto/ecdsasignature.asn1 b/crypto/ecdsasignature.asn1
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..621ab754fb9f
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/crypto/ecdsasignature.asn1
> @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
> +ECDSASignature ::= SEQUENCE {
> +	r	INTEGER ({ ecdsa_get_signature_r }),
> +	s	INTEGER ({ ecdsa_get_signature_s })
> +}
> diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.c b/crypto/testmgr.c
> index 321e38eef51b..2607602f9de5 100644
> --- a/crypto/testmgr.c
> +++ b/crypto/testmgr.c
> @@ -4913,6 +4913,18 @@ static const struct alg_test_desc alg_test_descs[] = {
>  		.suite = {
>  			.kpp = __VECS(ecdh_tv_template)
>  		}
> +	}, {
> +		.alg = "ecdsa-nist-p192",
> +		.test = alg_test_akcipher,
> +		.suite = {
> +			.akcipher = __VECS(ecdsa_nist_p192_tv_template)
> +		}
> +	}, {
> +		.alg = "ecdsa-nist-p256",
> +		.test = alg_test_akcipher,
> +		.suite = {
> +			.akcipher = __VECS(ecdsa_nist_p256_tv_template)
> +		}
>  	}, {
>  		.alg = "ecrdsa",
>  		.test = alg_test_akcipher,
> diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.h b/crypto/testmgr.h
> index 8c83811c0e35..2adcc0dc0bdd 100644
> --- a/crypto/testmgr.h
> +++ b/crypto/testmgr.h
> @@ -566,6 +566,273 @@ static const struct akcipher_testvec rsa_tv_template[] = {
>  	}
>  };
>  
> +/*
> + * ECDSA test vectors.
> + */
> +static const struct akcipher_testvec ecdsa_nist_p192_tv_template[] = {
> +	{
> +	.key =
> +	"\x04\xf7\x46\xf8\x2f\x15\xf6\x22\x8e\xd7\x57\x4f\xcc\xe7\xbb\xc1"
> +	"\xd4\x09\x73\xcf\xea\xd0\x15\x07\x3d\xa5\x8a\x8a\x95\x43\xe4\x68"
> +	"\xea\xc6\x25\xc1\xc1\x01\x25\x4c\x7e\xc3\x3c\xa6\x04\x0a\xe7\x08"
> +	"\x98",
> +	.key_len = 49,
> +	.params =
> +	"\x30\x13\x06\x07\x2a\x86\x48\xce\x3d\x02\x01\x06\x08\x2a\x86\x48"
> +	"\xce\x3d\x03\x01\x01",
> +	.param_len = 21,
> +	.m =
> +	"\xcd\xb9\xd2\x1c\xb7\x6f\xcd\x44\xb3\xfd\x63\xea\xa3\x66\x7f\xae"
> +	"\x63\x85\xe7\x82",
> +	.m_size = 20,
> +	.algo = OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha1,
> +	.c =
> +	"\x30\x35\x02\x19\x00\xba\xe5\x93\x83\x6e\xb6\x3b\x63\xa0\x27\x91"
> +	"\xc6\xf6\x7f\xc3\x09\xad\x59\xad\x88\x27\xd6\x92\x6b\x02\x18\x10"
> +	"\x68\x01\x9d\xba\xce\x83\x08\xef\x95\x52\x7b\xa0\x0f\xe4\x18\x86"
> +	"\x80\x6f\xa5\x79\x77\xda\xd0",
> +	.c_size = 55,
> +	.public_key_vec = true,
> +	.siggen_sigver_test = true,
> +	}, {
> +	.key =
> +	"\x04\xb6\x4b\xb1\xd1\xac\xba\x24\x8f\x65\xb2\x60\x00\x90\xbf\xbd"
> +	"\x78\x05\x73\xe9\x79\x1d\x6f\x7c\x0b\xd2\xc3\x93\xa7\x28\xe1\x75"
> +	"\xf7\xd5\x95\x1d\x28\x10\xc0\x75\x50\x5c\x1a\x4f\x3f\x8f\xa5\xee"
> +	"\xa3",
> +	.key_len = 49,
> +	.params =
> +	"\x30\x13\x06\x07\x2a\x86\x48\xce\x3d\x02\x01\x06\x08\x2a\x86\x48"
> +	"\xce\x3d\x03\x01\x01",
> +	.param_len = 21,
> +	.m =
> +	"\x8d\xd6\xb8\x3e\xe5\xff\x23\xf6\x25\xa2\x43\x42\x74\x45\xa7\x40"
> +	"\x3a\xff\x2f\xe1\xd3\xf6\x9f\xe8\x33\xcb\x12\x11",
> +	.m_size = 28,
> +	.algo = OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha224,
> +	.c =
> +	"\x30\x34\x02\x18\x5a\x8b\x82\x69\x7e\x8a\x0a\x09\x14\xf8\x11\x2b"
> +	"\x55\xdc\xae\x37\x83\x7b\x12\xe6\xb6\x5b\xcb\xd4\x02\x18\x6a\x14"
> +	"\x4f\x53\x75\xc8\x02\x48\xeb\xc3\x92\x0f\x1e\x72\xee\xc4\xa3\xe3"
> +	"\x5c\x99\xdb\x92\x5b\x36",
> +	.c_size = 54,
> +	.public_key_vec = true,
> +	.siggen_sigver_test = true,
> +	}, {
> +	.key =
> +	"\x04\xe2\x51\x24\x9b\xf7\xb6\x32\x82\x39\x66\x3d\x5b\xec\x3b\xae"
> +	"\x0c\xd5\xf2\x67\xd1\xc7\xe1\x02\xe4\xbf\x90\x62\xb8\x55\x75\x56"
> +	"\x69\x20\x5e\xcb\x4e\xca\x33\xd6\xcb\x62\x6b\x94\xa9\xa2\xe9\x58"
> +	"\x91",
> +	.key_len = 49,
> +	.params =
> +	"\x30\x13\x06\x07\x2a\x86\x48\xce\x3d\x02\x01\x06\x08\x2a\x86\x48"
> +	"\xce\x3d\x03\x01\x01",
> +	.param_len = 21,
> +	.m =
> +	"\x35\xec\xa1\xa0\x9e\x14\xde\x33\x03\xb6\xf6\xbd\x0c\x2f\xb2\xfd"
> +	"\x1f\x27\x82\xa5\xd7\x70\x3f\xef\xa0\x82\x69\x8e\x73\x31\x8e\xd7",
> +	.m_size = 32,
> +	.algo = OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha256,
> +	.c =
> +	"\x30\x35\x02\x18\x3f\x72\x3f\x1f\x42\xd2\x3f\x1d\x6b\x1a\x58\x56"
> +	"\xf1\x8f\xf7\xfd\x01\x48\xfb\x5f\x72\x2a\xd4\x8f\x02\x19\x00\xb3"
> +	"\x69\x43\xfd\x48\x19\x86\xcf\x32\xdd\x41\x74\x6a\x51\xc7\xd9\x7d"
> +	"\x3a\x97\xd9\xcd\x1a\x6a\x49",
> +	.c_size = 55,
> +	.public_key_vec = true,
> +	.siggen_sigver_test = true,
> +	}, {
> +	.key =
> +	"\x04\x5a\x13\xfe\x68\x86\x4d\xf4\x17\xc7\xa4\xe5\x8c\x65\x57\xb7"
> +	"\x03\x73\x26\x57\xfb\xe5\x58\x40\xd8\xfd\x49\x05\xab\xf1\x66\x1f"
> +	"\xe2\x9d\x93\x9e\xc2\x22\x5a\x8b\x4f\xf3\x77\x22\x59\x7e\xa6\x4e"
> +	"\x8b",
> +	.key_len = 49,
> +	.params =
> +	"\x30\x13\x06\x07\x2a\x86\x48\xce\x3d\x02\x01\x06\x08\x2a\x86\x48"
> +	"\xce\x3d\x03\x01\x01",
> +	.param_len = 21,
> +	.m =
> +	"\x9d\x2e\x1a\x8f\xed\x6c\x4b\x61\xae\xac\xd5\x19\x79\xce\x67\xf9"
> +	"\xa0\x34\xeb\xb0\x81\xf9\xd9\xdc\x6e\xb3\x5c\xa8\x69\xfc\x8a\x61"
> +	"\x39\x81\xfb\xfd\x5c\x30\x6b\xa8\xee\xed\x89\xaf\xa3\x05\xe4\x78",
> +	.m_size = 48,
> +	.algo = OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha384,
> +	.c =
> +	"\x30\x35\x02\x19\x00\xf0\xa3\x38\xce\x2b\xf8\x9d\x1a\xcf\x7f\x34"
> +	"\xb4\xb4\xe5\xc5\x00\xdd\x15\xbb\xd6\x8c\xa7\x03\x78\x02\x18\x64"
> +	"\xbc\x5a\x1f\x82\x96\x61\xd7\xd1\x01\x77\x44\x5d\x53\xa4\x7c\x93"
> +	"\x12\x3b\x3b\x28\xfb\x6d\xe1",
> +	.c_size = 55,
> +	.public_key_vec = true,
> +	.siggen_sigver_test = true,
> +	}, {
> +	.key =
> +	"\x04\xd5\xf2\x6e\xc3\x94\x5c\x52\xbc\xdf\x86\x6c\x14\xd1\xca\xea"
> +	"\xcc\x72\x3a\x8a\xf6\x7a\x3a\x56\x36\x3b\xca\xc6\x94\x0e\x17\x1d"
> +	"\x9e\xa0\x58\x28\xf9\x4b\xe6\xd1\xa5\x44\x91\x35\x0d\xe7\xf5\x11"
> +	"\x57",
> +	.key_len = 49,
> +	.params =
> +	"\x30\x13\x06\x07\x2a\x86\x48\xce\x3d\x02\x01\x06\x08\x2a\x86\x48"
> +	"\xce\x3d\x03\x01\x01",
> +	.param_len = 21,
> +	.m =
> +	"\xd5\x4b\xe9\x36\xda\xd8\x6e\xc0\x50\x03\xbe\x00\x43\xff\xf0\x23"
> +	"\xac\xa2\x42\xe7\x37\x77\x79\x52\x8f\x3e\xc0\x16\xc1\xfc\x8c\x67"
> +	"\x16\xbc\x8a\x5d\x3b\xd3\x13\xbb\xb6\xc0\x26\x1b\xeb\x33\xcc\x70"
> +	"\x4a\xf2\x11\x37\xe8\x1b\xba\x55\xac\x69\xe1\x74\x62\x7c\x6e\xb5",
> +	.m_size = 64,
> +	.algo = OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha512,
> +	.c =
> +	"\x30\x35\x02\x19\x00\x88\x5b\x8f\x59\x43\xbf\xcf\xc6\xdd\x3f\x07"
> +	"\x87\x12\xa0\xd4\xac\x2b\x11\x2d\x1c\xb6\x06\xc9\x6c\x02\x18\x73"
> +	"\xb4\x22\x9a\x98\x73\x3c\x83\xa9\x14\x2a\x5e\xf5\xe5\xfb\x72\x28"
> +	"\x6a\xdf\x97\xfd\x82\x76\x24",
> +	.c_size = 55,
> +	.public_key_vec = true,
> +	.siggen_sigver_test = true,
> +	},
> +};
> +
> +static const struct akcipher_testvec ecdsa_nist_p256_tv_template[] = {
> +	{
> +	.key =
> +	"\x04\xb9\x7b\xbb\xd7\x17\x64\xd2\x7e\xfc\x81\x5d\x87\x06\x83\x41"
> +	"\x22\xd6\x9a\xaa\x87\x17\xec\x4f\x63\x55\x2f\x94\xba\xdd\x83\xe9"
> +	"\x34\x4b\xf3\xe9\x91\x13\x50\xb6\xcb\xca\x62\x08\xe7\x3b\x09\xdc"
> +	"\xc3\x63\x4b\x2d\xb9\x73\x53\xe4\x45\xe6\x7c\xad\xe7\x6b\xb0\xe8"
> +	"\xaf",
> +	.key_len = 65,
> +	.params =
> +	"\x30\x13\x06\x07\x2a\x86\x48\xce\x3d\x02\x01\x06\x08\x2a\x86\x48"
> +	"\xce\x3d\x03\x01\x07",
> +	.param_len = 21,
> +	.m =
> +	"\xc2\x2b\x5f\x91\x78\x34\x26\x09\x42\x8d\x6f\x51\xb2\xc5\xaf\x4c"
> +	"\x0b\xde\x6a\x42",
> +	.m_size = 20,
> +	.algo = OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha1,
> +	.c =
> +	"\x30\x46\x02\x21\x00\xf9\x25\xce\x9f\x3a\xa6\x35\x81\xcf\xd4\xe7"
> +	"\xb7\xf0\x82\x56\x41\xf7\xd4\xad\x8d\x94\x5a\x69\x89\xee\xca\x6a"
> +	"\x52\x0e\x48\x4d\xcc\x02\x21\x00\xd7\xe4\xef\x52\x66\xd3\x5b\x9d"
> +	"\x8a\xfa\x54\x93\x29\xa7\x70\x86\xf1\x03\x03\xf3\x3b\xe2\x73\xf7"
> +	"\xfb\x9d\x8b\xde\xd4\x8d\x6f\xad",
> +	.c_size = 72,
> +	.public_key_vec = true,
> +	.siggen_sigver_test = true,
> +	}, {
> +	.key =
> +	"\x04\x8b\x6d\xc0\x33\x8e\x2d\x8b\x67\xf5\xeb\xc4\x7f\xa0\xf5\xd9"
> +	"\x7b\x03\xa5\x78\x9a\xb5\xea\x14\xe4\x23\xd0\xaf\xd7\x0e\x2e\xa0"
> +	"\xc9\x8b\xdb\x95\xf8\xb3\xaf\xac\x00\x2c\x2c\x1f\x7a\xfd\x95\x88"
> +	"\x43\x13\xbf\xf3\x1c\x05\x1a\x14\x18\x09\x3f\xd6\x28\x3e\xc5\xa0"
> +	"\xd4",
> +	.key_len = 65,
> +	.params =
> +	"\x30\x13\x06\x07\x2a\x86\x48\xce\x3d\x02\x01\x06\x08\x2a\x86\x48"
> +	"\xce\x3d\x03\x01\x07",
> +	.param_len = 21,
> +	.m =
> +	"\x1a\x15\xbc\xa3\xe4\xed\x3a\xb8\x23\x67\xc6\xc4\x34\xf8\x6c\x41"
> +	"\x04\x0b\xda\xc5\x77\xfa\x1c\x2d\xe6\x2c\x3b\xe0",
> +	.m_size = 28,
> +	.algo = OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha224,
> +	.c =
> +	"\x30\x44\x02\x20\x20\x43\xfa\xc0\x9f\x9d\x7b\xe7\xae\xce\x77\x59"
> +	"\x1a\xdb\x59\xd5\x34\x62\x79\xcb\x6a\x91\x67\x2e\x7d\x25\xd8\x25"
> +	"\xf5\x81\xd2\x1e\x02\x20\x5f\xf8\x74\xf8\x57\xd0\x5e\x54\x76\x20"
> +	"\x4a\x77\x22\xec\xc8\x66\xbf\x50\x05\x58\x39\x0e\x26\x92\xce\xd5"
> +	"\x2e\x8b\xde\x5a\x04\x0e",
> +	.c_size = 70,
> +	.public_key_vec = true,
> +	.siggen_sigver_test = true,
> +	}, {
> +	.key =
> +	"\x04\xf1\xea\xc4\x53\xf3\xb9\x0e\x9f\x7e\xad\xe3\xea\xd7\x0e\x0f"
> +	"\xd6\x98\x9a\xca\x92\x4d\x0a\x80\xdb\x2d\x45\xc7\xec\x4b\x97\x00"
> +	"\x2f\xe9\x42\x6c\x29\xdc\x55\x0e\x0b\x53\x12\x9b\x2b\xad\x2c\xe9"
> +	"\x80\xe6\xc5\x43\xc2\x1d\x5e\xbb\x65\x21\x50\xb6\x37\xb0\x03\x8e"
> +	"\xb8",
> +	.key_len = 65,
> +	.params =
> +	"\x30\x13\x06\x07\x2a\x86\x48\xce\x3d\x02\x01\x06\x08\x2a\x86\x48"
> +	"\xce\x3d\x03\x01\x07",
> +	.param_len = 21,
> +	.m =
> +	"\x8f\x43\x43\x46\x64\x8f\x6b\x96\xdf\x89\xdd\xa9\x01\xc5\x17\x6b"
> +	"\x10\xa6\xd8\x39\x61\xdd\x3c\x1a\xc8\x8b\x59\xb2\xdc\x32\x7a\xa4",
> +	.m_size = 32,
> +	.algo = OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha256,
> +	.c =
> +	"\x30\x45\x02\x20\x08\x31\xfa\x74\x0d\x1d\x21\x5d\x09\xdc\x29\x63"
> +	"\xa8\x1a\xad\xfc\xac\x44\xc3\xe8\x24\x11\x2d\xa4\x91\xdc\x02\x67"
> +	"\xdc\x0c\xd0\x82\x02\x21\x00\xbd\xff\xce\xee\x42\xc3\x97\xff\xf9"
> +	"\xa9\x81\xac\x4a\x50\xd0\x91\x0a\x6e\x1b\xc4\xaf\xe1\x83\xc3\x4f"
> +	"\x2a\x65\x35\x23\xe3\x1d\xfa",
> +	.c_size = 71,
> +	.public_key_vec = true,
> +	.siggen_sigver_test = true,
> +	}, {
> +	.key =
> +	"\x04\xc5\xc6\xea\x60\xc9\xce\xad\x02\x8d\xf5\x3e\x24\xe3\x52\x1d"
> +	"\x28\x47\x3b\xc3\x6b\xa4\x99\x35\x99\x11\x88\x88\xc8\xf4\xee\x7e"
> +	"\x8c\x33\x8f\x41\x03\x24\x46\x2b\x1a\x82\xf9\x9f\xe1\x97\x1b\x00"
> +	"\xda\x3b\x24\x41\xf7\x66\x33\x58\x3d\x3a\x81\xad\xcf\x16\xe9\xe2"
> +	"\x7c",
> +	.key_len = 65,
> +	.params =
> +	"\x30\x13\x06\x07\x2a\x86\x48\xce\x3d\x02\x01\x06\x08\x2a\x86\x48"
> +	"\xce\x3d\x03\x01\x07",
> +	.param_len = 21,
> +	.m =
> +	"\x3e\x78\x70\xfb\xcd\x66\xba\x91\xa1\x79\xff\x1e\x1c\x6b\x78\xe6"
> +	"\xc0\x81\x3a\x65\x97\x14\x84\x36\x14\x1a\x9a\xb7\xc5\xab\x84\x94"
> +	"\x5e\xbb\x1b\x34\x71\xcb\x41\xe1\xf6\xfc\x92\x7b\x34\xbb\x86\xbb",
> +	.m_size = 48,
> +	.algo = OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha384,
> +	.c =
> +	"\x30\x46\x02\x21\x00\x8e\xf3\x6f\xdc\xf8\x69\xa6\x2e\xd0\x2e\x95"
> +	"\x54\xd1\x95\x64\x93\x08\xb2\x6b\x24\x94\x48\x46\x5e\xf2\xe4\x6c"
> +	"\xc7\x94\xb1\xd5\xfe\x02\x21\x00\xeb\xa7\x80\x26\xdc\xf9\x3a\x44"
> +	"\x19\xfb\x5f\x92\xf4\xc9\x23\x37\x69\xf4\x3b\x4f\x47\xcf\x9b\x16"
> +	"\xc0\x60\x11\x92\xdc\x17\x89\x12",
> +	.c_size = 72,
> +	.public_key_vec = true,
> +	.siggen_sigver_test = true,
> +	}, {
> +	.key =
> +	"\x04\xd7\x27\x46\x49\xf6\x26\x85\x12\x40\x76\x8e\xe2\xe6\x2a\x7a"
> +	"\x83\xb1\x4e\x7a\xeb\x3b\x5c\x67\x4a\xb5\xa4\x92\x8c\x69\xff\x38"
> +	"\xee\xd9\x4e\x13\x29\x59\xad\xde\x6b\xbb\x45\x31\xee\xfd\xd1\x1b"
> +	"\x64\xd3\xb5\xfc\xaf\x9b\x4b\x88\x3b\x0e\xb7\xd6\xdf\xf1\xd5\x92"
> +	"\xbf",
> +	.key_len = 65,
> +	.params =
> +	"\x30\x13\x06\x07\x2a\x86\x48\xce\x3d\x02\x01\x06\x08\x2a\x86\x48"
> +	"\xce\x3d\x03\x01\x07",
> +	.param_len = 21,
> +	.m =
> +	"\x57\xb7\x9e\xe9\x05\x0a\x8c\x1b\xc9\x13\xe5\x4a\x24\xc7\xe2\xe9"
> +	"\x43\xc3\xd1\x76\x62\xf4\x98\x1a\x9c\x13\xb0\x20\x1b\xe5\x39\xca"
> +	"\x4f\xd9\x85\x34\x95\xa2\x31\xbc\xbb\xde\xdd\x76\xbb\x61\xe3\xcf"
> +	"\x9d\xc0\x49\x7a\xf3\x7a\xc4\x7d\xa8\x04\x4b\x8d\xb4\x4d\x5b\xd6",
> +	.m_size = 64,
> +	.algo = OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha512,
> +	.c =
> +	"\x30\x45\x02\x21\x00\xb8\x6d\x87\x81\x43\xdf\xfb\x9f\x40\xea\x44"
> +	"\x81\x00\x4e\x29\x08\xed\x8c\x73\x30\x6c\x22\xb3\x97\x76\xf6\x04"
> +	"\x99\x09\x37\x4d\xfa\x02\x20\x1e\xb9\x75\x31\xf6\x04\xa5\x4d\xf8"
> +	"\x00\xdd\xab\xd4\xc0\x2b\xe6\x5c\xad\xc3\x78\x1c\xc2\xc1\x19\x76"
> +	"\x31\x79\x4a\xe9\x81\x6a\xee",
> +	.c_size = 71,
> +	.public_key_vec = true,
> +	.siggen_sigver_test = true,
> +	},
> +};
> +
>  /*
>   * EC-RDSA test vectors are generated by gost-engine.
>   */
> diff --git a/include/linux/oid_registry.h b/include/linux/oid_registry.h
> index 4462ed2c18cd..b504e2f36b25 100644
> --- a/include/linux/oid_registry.h
> +++ b/include/linux/oid_registry.h
> @@ -19,8 +19,12 @@
>  enum OID {
>  	OID_id_dsa_with_sha1,		/* 1.2.840.10030.4.3 */
>  	OID_id_dsa,			/* 1.2.840.10040.4.1 */
> -	OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha1,		/* 1.2.840.10045.4.1 */
>  	OID_id_ecPublicKey,		/* 1.2.840.10045.2.1 */
> +	OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha1,		/* 1.2.840.10045.4.1 */
> +	OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha224,	/* 1.2.840.10045.4.3.1 */
> +	OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha256,	/* 1.2.840.10045.4.3.2 */
> +	OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha384,	/* 1.2.840.10045.4.3.3 */
> +	OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha512,	/* 1.2.840.10045.4.3.4 */
>  
>  	/* PKCS#1 {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1)} */
>  	OID_rsaEncryption,		/* 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1 */
> -- 
> 2.29.2
> 
> 

AFAIK< oid_registry.h updates should be separate commit, acked separately.

Please remove my ack from this, I'll have to re-review this, once the
issues have been fixed.

/Jarkko

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