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Message-ID: <YEZQY2knlfz2Ku8w@elver.google.com>
Date: Mon, 8 Mar 2021 17:27:15 +0100
From: Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>
To: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@....com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>,
Peter Collingbourne <pcc@...gle.com>,
Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@...gle.com>,
Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@....com>,
Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@....com>,
kasan-dev@...glegroups.com, linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 5/5] kasan, mm: integrate slab init_on_free with
HW_TAGS
On Mon, Mar 08, 2021 at 04:55PM +0100, Andrey Konovalov wrote:
> This change uses the previously added memory initialization feature
> of HW_TAGS KASAN routines for slab memory when init_on_free is enabled.
>
> With this change, memory initialization memset() is no longer called
> when both HW_TAGS KASAN and init_on_free are enabled. Instead, memory
> is initialized in KASAN runtime.
>
> For SLUB, the memory initialization memset() is moved into
> slab_free_hook() that currently directly follows the initialization loop.
> A new argument is added to slab_free_hook() that indicates whether to
> initialize the memory or not.
>
> To avoid discrepancies with which memory gets initialized that can be
> caused by future changes, both KASAN hook and initialization memset()
> are put together and a warning comment is added.
>
> Combining setting allocation tags with memory initialization improves
> HW_TAGS KASAN performance when init_on_free is enabled.
>
> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>
But same as other patch, given the internal API change, let's see if
somebody else responds.
> ---
> include/linux/kasan.h | 10 ++++++----
> mm/kasan/common.c | 13 +++++++------
> mm/slab.c | 15 +++++++++++----
> mm/slub.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
> 4 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/kasan.h b/include/linux/kasan.h
> index 85f2a8786606..ed08c419a687 100644
> --- a/include/linux/kasan.h
> +++ b/include/linux/kasan.h
> @@ -203,11 +203,13 @@ static __always_inline void * __must_check kasan_init_slab_obj(
> return (void *)object;
> }
>
> -bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, unsigned long ip);
> -static __always_inline bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object)
> +bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
> + unsigned long ip, bool init);
> +static __always_inline bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s,
> + void *object, bool init)
> {
> if (kasan_enabled())
> - return __kasan_slab_free(s, object, _RET_IP_);
> + return __kasan_slab_free(s, object, _RET_IP_, init);
> return false;
> }
>
> @@ -313,7 +315,7 @@ static inline void *kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache,
> {
> return (void *)object;
> }
> -static inline bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object)
> +static inline bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, bool init)
> {
> return false;
> }
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
> index 7ea747b18c26..623cf94288a2 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/common.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
> @@ -322,8 +322,8 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache,
> return (void *)object;
> }
>
> -static inline bool ____kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache,
> - void *object, unsigned long ip, bool quarantine)
> +static inline bool ____kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
> + unsigned long ip, bool quarantine, bool init)
> {
> u8 tag;
> void *tagged_object;
> @@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ static inline bool ____kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache,
> }
>
> kasan_poison(object, round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE),
> - KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE, false);
> + KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE, init);
>
> if ((IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && !quarantine))
> return false;
> @@ -362,9 +362,10 @@ static inline bool ____kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache,
> return kasan_quarantine_put(cache, object);
> }
>
> -bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, unsigned long ip)
> +bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
> + unsigned long ip, bool init)
> {
> - return ____kasan_slab_free(cache, object, ip, true);
> + return ____kasan_slab_free(cache, object, ip, true, init);
> }
>
> static inline bool ____kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
> @@ -409,7 +410,7 @@ void __kasan_slab_free_mempool(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
> return;
> kasan_poison(ptr, page_size(page), KASAN_FREE_PAGE, false);
> } else {
> - ____kasan_slab_free(page->slab_cache, ptr, ip, false);
> + ____kasan_slab_free(page->slab_cache, ptr, ip, false, false);
> }
> }
>
> diff --git a/mm/slab.c b/mm/slab.c
> index 936dd686dec9..3adfe5bc3e2e 100644
> --- a/mm/slab.c
> +++ b/mm/slab.c
> @@ -3425,17 +3425,24 @@ static void cache_flusharray(struct kmem_cache *cachep, struct array_cache *ac)
> static __always_inline void __cache_free(struct kmem_cache *cachep, void *objp,
> unsigned long caller)
> {
> + bool init;
> +
> if (is_kfence_address(objp)) {
> kmemleak_free_recursive(objp, cachep->flags);
> __kfence_free(objp);
> return;
> }
>
> - if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_free(cachep)))
> + /*
> + * As memory initialization might be integrated into KASAN,
> + * kasan_slab_free and initialization memset must be
> + * kept together to avoid discrepancies in behavior.
> + */
> + init = slab_want_init_on_free(cachep);
> + if (init && !kasan_has_integrated_init())
> memset(objp, 0, cachep->object_size);
> -
> - /* Put the object into the quarantine, don't touch it for now. */
> - if (kasan_slab_free(cachep, objp))
> + /* KASAN might put objp into memory quarantine, delaying its reuse. */
> + if (kasan_slab_free(cachep, objp, init))
> return;
>
> /* Use KCSAN to help debug racy use-after-free. */
> diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
> index f53df23760e3..37afe6251bcc 100644
> --- a/mm/slub.c
> +++ b/mm/slub.c
> @@ -1532,7 +1532,8 @@ static __always_inline void kfree_hook(void *x)
> kasan_kfree_large(x);
> }
>
> -static __always_inline bool slab_free_hook(struct kmem_cache *s, void *x)
> +static __always_inline bool slab_free_hook(struct kmem_cache *s,
> + void *x, bool init)
> {
> kmemleak_free_recursive(x, s->flags);
>
> @@ -1558,8 +1559,25 @@ static __always_inline bool slab_free_hook(struct kmem_cache *s, void *x)
> __kcsan_check_access(x, s->object_size,
> KCSAN_ACCESS_WRITE | KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT);
>
> - /* KASAN might put x into memory quarantine, delaying its reuse */
> - return kasan_slab_free(s, x);
> + /*
> + * As memory initialization might be integrated into KASAN,
> + * kasan_slab_free and initialization memset's must be
> + * kept together to avoid discrepancies in behavior.
> + *
> + * The initialization memset's clear the object and the metadata,
> + * but don't touch the SLAB redzone.
> + */
> + if (init) {
> + int rsize;
> +
> + if (!kasan_has_integrated_init())
> + memset(kasan_reset_tag(x), 0, s->object_size);
> + rsize = (s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) ? s->red_left_pad : 0;
> + memset((char *)kasan_reset_tag(x) + s->inuse, 0,
> + s->size - s->inuse - rsize);
> + }
> + /* KASAN might put x into memory quarantine, delaying its reuse. */
> + return kasan_slab_free(s, x, init);
> }
>
> static inline bool slab_free_freelist_hook(struct kmem_cache *s,
> @@ -1569,10 +1587,9 @@ static inline bool slab_free_freelist_hook(struct kmem_cache *s,
> void *object;
> void *next = *head;
> void *old_tail = *tail ? *tail : *head;
> - int rsize;
>
> if (is_kfence_address(next)) {
> - slab_free_hook(s, next);
> + slab_free_hook(s, next, false);
> return true;
> }
>
> @@ -1584,20 +1601,8 @@ static inline bool slab_free_freelist_hook(struct kmem_cache *s,
> object = next;
> next = get_freepointer(s, object);
>
> - if (slab_want_init_on_free(s)) {
> - /*
> - * Clear the object and the metadata, but don't touch
> - * the redzone.
> - */
> - memset(kasan_reset_tag(object), 0, s->object_size);
> - rsize = (s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) ? s->red_left_pad
> - : 0;
> - memset((char *)kasan_reset_tag(object) + s->inuse, 0,
> - s->size - s->inuse - rsize);
> -
> - }
> /* If object's reuse doesn't have to be delayed */
> - if (!slab_free_hook(s, object)) {
> + if (!slab_free_hook(s, object, slab_want_init_on_free(s))) {
> /* Move object to the new freelist */
> set_freepointer(s, object, *head);
> *head = object;
> @@ -3235,7 +3240,7 @@ int build_detached_freelist(struct kmem_cache *s, size_t size,
> }
>
> if (is_kfence_address(object)) {
> - slab_free_hook(df->s, object);
> + slab_free_hook(df->s, object, false);
> __kfence_free(object);
> p[size] = NULL; /* mark object processed */
> return size;
> --
> 2.30.1.766.gb4fecdf3b7-goog
>
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