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Message-Id: <190fd15c1886654afdec0d19ebebd5ade665b601.1615296150.git.andreyknvl@google.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Mar 2021 14:24:39 +0100
From: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@....com>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>,
Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@....com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>,
Peter Collingbourne <pcc@...gle.com>,
Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@...gle.com>,
Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@....com>,
Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@....com>,
kasan-dev@...glegroups.com, linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>
Subject: [PATCH v3 5/5] kasan, mm: integrate slab init_on_free with HW_TAGS
This change uses the previously added memory initialization feature
of HW_TAGS KASAN routines for slab memory when init_on_free is enabled.
With this change, memory initialization memset() is no longer called
when both HW_TAGS KASAN and init_on_free are enabled. Instead, memory
is initialized in KASAN runtime.
For SLUB, the memory initialization memset() is moved into
slab_free_hook() that currently directly follows the initialization loop.
A new argument is added to slab_free_hook() that indicates whether to
initialize the memory or not.
To avoid discrepancies with which memory gets initialized that can be
caused by future changes, both KASAN hook and initialization memset()
are put together and a warning comment is added.
Combining setting allocation tags with memory initialization improves
HW_TAGS KASAN performance when init_on_free is enabled.
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>
---
include/linux/kasan.h | 10 ++++++----
mm/kasan/common.c | 13 +++++++------
mm/slab.c | 15 +++++++++++----
mm/slub.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
4 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/kasan.h b/include/linux/kasan.h
index 85f2a8786606..ed08c419a687 100644
--- a/include/linux/kasan.h
+++ b/include/linux/kasan.h
@@ -203,11 +203,13 @@ static __always_inline void * __must_check kasan_init_slab_obj(
return (void *)object;
}
-bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, unsigned long ip);
-static __always_inline bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object)
+bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
+ unsigned long ip, bool init);
+static __always_inline bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s,
+ void *object, bool init)
{
if (kasan_enabled())
- return __kasan_slab_free(s, object, _RET_IP_);
+ return __kasan_slab_free(s, object, _RET_IP_, init);
return false;
}
@@ -313,7 +315,7 @@ static inline void *kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache,
{
return (void *)object;
}
-static inline bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object)
+static inline bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, bool init)
{
return false;
}
diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
index 7ea747b18c26..623cf94288a2 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/common.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
@@ -322,8 +322,8 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache,
return (void *)object;
}
-static inline bool ____kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache,
- void *object, unsigned long ip, bool quarantine)
+static inline bool ____kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
+ unsigned long ip, bool quarantine, bool init)
{
u8 tag;
void *tagged_object;
@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ static inline bool ____kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache,
}
kasan_poison(object, round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE),
- KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE, false);
+ KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE, init);
if ((IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && !quarantine))
return false;
@@ -362,9 +362,10 @@ static inline bool ____kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache,
return kasan_quarantine_put(cache, object);
}
-bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, unsigned long ip)
+bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
+ unsigned long ip, bool init)
{
- return ____kasan_slab_free(cache, object, ip, true);
+ return ____kasan_slab_free(cache, object, ip, true, init);
}
static inline bool ____kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
@@ -409,7 +410,7 @@ void __kasan_slab_free_mempool(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
return;
kasan_poison(ptr, page_size(page), KASAN_FREE_PAGE, false);
} else {
- ____kasan_slab_free(page->slab_cache, ptr, ip, false);
+ ____kasan_slab_free(page->slab_cache, ptr, ip, false, false);
}
}
diff --git a/mm/slab.c b/mm/slab.c
index 936dd686dec9..3adfe5bc3e2e 100644
--- a/mm/slab.c
+++ b/mm/slab.c
@@ -3425,17 +3425,24 @@ static void cache_flusharray(struct kmem_cache *cachep, struct array_cache *ac)
static __always_inline void __cache_free(struct kmem_cache *cachep, void *objp,
unsigned long caller)
{
+ bool init;
+
if (is_kfence_address(objp)) {
kmemleak_free_recursive(objp, cachep->flags);
__kfence_free(objp);
return;
}
- if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_free(cachep)))
+ /*
+ * As memory initialization might be integrated into KASAN,
+ * kasan_slab_free and initialization memset must be
+ * kept together to avoid discrepancies in behavior.
+ */
+ init = slab_want_init_on_free(cachep);
+ if (init && !kasan_has_integrated_init())
memset(objp, 0, cachep->object_size);
-
- /* Put the object into the quarantine, don't touch it for now. */
- if (kasan_slab_free(cachep, objp))
+ /* KASAN might put objp into memory quarantine, delaying its reuse. */
+ if (kasan_slab_free(cachep, objp, init))
return;
/* Use KCSAN to help debug racy use-after-free. */
diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
index f53df23760e3..37afe6251bcc 100644
--- a/mm/slub.c
+++ b/mm/slub.c
@@ -1532,7 +1532,8 @@ static __always_inline void kfree_hook(void *x)
kasan_kfree_large(x);
}
-static __always_inline bool slab_free_hook(struct kmem_cache *s, void *x)
+static __always_inline bool slab_free_hook(struct kmem_cache *s,
+ void *x, bool init)
{
kmemleak_free_recursive(x, s->flags);
@@ -1558,8 +1559,25 @@ static __always_inline bool slab_free_hook(struct kmem_cache *s, void *x)
__kcsan_check_access(x, s->object_size,
KCSAN_ACCESS_WRITE | KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT);
- /* KASAN might put x into memory quarantine, delaying its reuse */
- return kasan_slab_free(s, x);
+ /*
+ * As memory initialization might be integrated into KASAN,
+ * kasan_slab_free and initialization memset's must be
+ * kept together to avoid discrepancies in behavior.
+ *
+ * The initialization memset's clear the object and the metadata,
+ * but don't touch the SLAB redzone.
+ */
+ if (init) {
+ int rsize;
+
+ if (!kasan_has_integrated_init())
+ memset(kasan_reset_tag(x), 0, s->object_size);
+ rsize = (s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) ? s->red_left_pad : 0;
+ memset((char *)kasan_reset_tag(x) + s->inuse, 0,
+ s->size - s->inuse - rsize);
+ }
+ /* KASAN might put x into memory quarantine, delaying its reuse. */
+ return kasan_slab_free(s, x, init);
}
static inline bool slab_free_freelist_hook(struct kmem_cache *s,
@@ -1569,10 +1587,9 @@ static inline bool slab_free_freelist_hook(struct kmem_cache *s,
void *object;
void *next = *head;
void *old_tail = *tail ? *tail : *head;
- int rsize;
if (is_kfence_address(next)) {
- slab_free_hook(s, next);
+ slab_free_hook(s, next, false);
return true;
}
@@ -1584,20 +1601,8 @@ static inline bool slab_free_freelist_hook(struct kmem_cache *s,
object = next;
next = get_freepointer(s, object);
- if (slab_want_init_on_free(s)) {
- /*
- * Clear the object and the metadata, but don't touch
- * the redzone.
- */
- memset(kasan_reset_tag(object), 0, s->object_size);
- rsize = (s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) ? s->red_left_pad
- : 0;
- memset((char *)kasan_reset_tag(object) + s->inuse, 0,
- s->size - s->inuse - rsize);
-
- }
/* If object's reuse doesn't have to be delayed */
- if (!slab_free_hook(s, object)) {
+ if (!slab_free_hook(s, object, slab_want_init_on_free(s))) {
/* Move object to the new freelist */
set_freepointer(s, object, *head);
*head = object;
@@ -3235,7 +3240,7 @@ int build_detached_freelist(struct kmem_cache *s, size_t size,
}
if (is_kfence_address(object)) {
- slab_free_hook(df->s, object);
+ slab_free_hook(df->s, object, false);
__kfence_free(object);
p[size] = NULL; /* mark object processed */
return size;
--
2.30.1.766.gb4fecdf3b7-goog
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