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Message-ID: <1615426365.20483.4.camel@mtksdccf07>
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 2021 09:32:45 +0800
From: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@...iatek.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
CC: Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@...il.com>,
"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@...db.de>,
Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>,
<kasan-dev@...glegroups.com>, <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
<linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
<linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>,
wsd_upstream <wsd_upstream@...iatek.com>,
<linux-mediatek@...ts.infradead.org>,
Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] kasan: remove redundant config option
On Wed, 2021-03-03 at 19:48 +0800, Walter Wu wrote:
> On Fri, 2021-02-26 at 09:25 +0800, Walter Wu wrote:
> > CONFIG_KASAN_STACK and CONFIG_KASAN_STACK_ENABLE both enable KASAN stack
> > instrumentation, but we should only need one config, so that we remove
> > CONFIG_KASAN_STACK_ENABLE and make CONFIG_KASAN_STACK workable. see [1].
> >
> > When enable KASAN stack instrumentation, then for gcc we could do no
> > prompt and default value y, and for clang prompt and default value n.
> >
> > [1]: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=210221
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@...iatek.com>
> > Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>
> > Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@...il.com>
> > Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>
> > Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>
> > Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@...il.com>
> > Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>
> > Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>
> > Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
> > ---
> >
> > v4: After this patch sent, someone had modification about KASAN_STACK,
> > so I need to rebase codebase. Thank Andrey for your pointing.
> >
> Hi Andrew,
>
> Could you pick this v4 patch up into mm?
> Thanks.
>
> Walter
>
> > ---
> > arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S | 2 +-
> > arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S | 2 +-
> > include/linux/kasan.h | 2 +-
> > lib/Kconfig.kasan | 8 ++------
> > mm/kasan/common.c | 2 +-
> > mm/kasan/kasan.h | 2 +-
> > mm/kasan/report_generic.c | 2 +-
> > scripts/Makefile.kasan | 10 ++++++++--
> > security/Kconfig.hardening | 4 ++--
> > 9 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S
> > index 5bfd9b87f85d..4ea9392f86e0 100644
> > --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S
> > +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S
> > @@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(_cpu_resume)
> > */
> > bl cpu_do_resume
> >
> > -#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
> > +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && defined(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK)
> > mov x0, sp
> > bl kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below
> > #endif
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S
> > index 56b6865afb2a..d5d8a352eafa 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S
> > @@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(do_suspend_lowlevel)
> > movq pt_regs_r14(%rax), %r14
> > movq pt_regs_r15(%rax), %r15
> >
> > -#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
> > +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && defined(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK)
> > /*
> > * The suspend path may have poisoned some areas deeper in the stack,
> > * which we now need to unpoison.
> > diff --git a/include/linux/kasan.h b/include/linux/kasan.h
> > index b91732bd05d7..14f72ec96492 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/kasan.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/kasan.h
> > @@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ static inline bool kasan_check_byte(const void *address)
> >
> > #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */
> >
> > -#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
> > +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && defined(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK)
> > void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task);
> > #else
> > static inline void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task) {}
> > diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.kasan b/lib/Kconfig.kasan
> > index 624ae1df7984..cffc2ebbf185 100644
> > --- a/lib/Kconfig.kasan
> > +++ b/lib/Kconfig.kasan
> > @@ -138,9 +138,10 @@ config KASAN_INLINE
> >
> > endchoice
> >
> > -config KASAN_STACK_ENABLE
> > +config KASAN_STACK
> > bool "Enable stack instrumentation (unsafe)" if CC_IS_CLANG && !COMPILE_TEST
> > depends on KASAN_GENERIC || KASAN_SW_TAGS
> > + default y if CC_IS_GCC
> > help
> > The LLVM stack address sanitizer has a know problem that
> > causes excessive stack usage in a lot of functions, see
> > @@ -154,11 +155,6 @@ config KASAN_STACK_ENABLE
> > CONFIG_COMPILE_TEST. On gcc it is assumed to always be safe
> > to use and enabled by default.
> >
> > -config KASAN_STACK
> > - int
> > - default 1 if KASAN_STACK_ENABLE || CC_IS_GCC
> > - default 0
> > -
Hi Andrew,
I see my v4 patch is different in the next tree now. please see below
information.
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git/commit/?id=ebced5fb0ef969620ecdc4011f600f9e7c229a3c
The different is in lib/Kconfig.kasan.
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git/diff/lib/Kconfig.kasan?id=ebced5fb0ef969620ecdc4011f600f9e7c229a3c
Would you please help to check it.
Thanks.
Walter
> > config KASAN_SW_TAGS_IDENTIFY
> > bool "Enable memory corruption identification"
> > depends on KASAN_SW_TAGS
> > diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
> > index b5e08d4cefec..7b53291dafa1 100644
> > --- a/mm/kasan/common.c
> > +++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
> > @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ void __kasan_unpoison_range(const void *address, size_t size)
> > kasan_unpoison(address, size);
> > }
> >
> > -#if CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
> > /* Unpoison the entire stack for a task. */
> > void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task)
> > {
> > diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.h b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
> > index 8c55634d6edd..3436c6bf7c0c 100644
> > --- a/mm/kasan/kasan.h
> > +++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
> > @@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ void *kasan_find_first_bad_addr(void *addr, size_t size);
> > const char *kasan_get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info);
> > void kasan_metadata_fetch_row(char *buffer, void *row);
> >
> > -#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
> > +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && defined(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK)
> > void kasan_print_address_stack_frame(const void *addr);
> > #else
> > static inline void kasan_print_address_stack_frame(const void *addr) { }
> > diff --git a/mm/kasan/report_generic.c b/mm/kasan/report_generic.c
> > index 41f374585144..de732bc341c5 100644
> > --- a/mm/kasan/report_generic.c
> > +++ b/mm/kasan/report_generic.c
> > @@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ void kasan_metadata_fetch_row(char *buffer, void *row)
> > memcpy(buffer, kasan_mem_to_shadow(row), META_BYTES_PER_ROW);
> > }
> >
> > -#if CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
> > static bool __must_check tokenize_frame_descr(const char **frame_descr,
> > char *token, size_t max_tok_len,
> > unsigned long *value)
> > diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.kasan b/scripts/Makefile.kasan
> > index 1e000cc2e7b4..abf231d209b1 100644
> > --- a/scripts/Makefile.kasan
> > +++ b/scripts/Makefile.kasan
> > @@ -2,6 +2,12 @@
> > CFLAGS_KASAN_NOSANITIZE := -fno-builtin
> > KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET ?= $(CONFIG_KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET)
> >
> > +ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
> > + stack_enable := 1
> > +else
> > + stack_enable := 0
> > +endif
> > +
> > ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC
> >
> > ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE
> > @@ -27,7 +33,7 @@ else
> > CFLAGS_KASAN := $(CFLAGS_KASAN_SHADOW) \
> > $(call cc-param,asan-globals=1) \
> > $(call cc-param,asan-instrumentation-with-call-threshold=$(call_threshold)) \
> > - $(call cc-param,asan-stack=$(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK)) \
> > + $(call cc-param,asan-stack=$(stack_enable)) \
> > $(call cc-param,asan-instrument-allocas=1)
> > endif
> >
> > @@ -42,7 +48,7 @@ else
> > endif
> >
> > CFLAGS_KASAN := -fsanitize=kernel-hwaddress \
> > - -mllvm -hwasan-instrument-stack=$(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK) \
> > + -mllvm -hwasan-instrument-stack=$(stack_enable) \
> > -mllvm -hwasan-use-short-granules=0 \
> > $(instrumentation_flags)
> >
> > diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening
> > index 269967c4fc1b..a56c36470cb1 100644
> > --- a/security/Kconfig.hardening
> > +++ b/security/Kconfig.hardening
> > @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ choice
> > config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF
> > bool "zero-init structs passed by reference (strong)"
> > depends on GCC_PLUGINS
> > - depends on !(KASAN && KASAN_STACK=1)
> > + depends on !(KASAN && KASAN_STACK)
> > select GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
> > help
> > Zero-initialize any structures on the stack that may
> > @@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ choice
> > config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL
> > bool "zero-init anything passed by reference (very strong)"
> > depends on GCC_PLUGINS
> > - depends on !(KASAN && KASAN_STACK=1)
> > + depends on !(KASAN && KASAN_STACK)
> > select GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
> > help
> > Zero-initialize any stack variables that may be passed
>
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